Responding to recent concerns about the reliability of the published literature in psychology and other disciplines, we formed the X-Phi Replicability Project to estimate the reproducibility of experimental philosophy. Drawing on a representative sample of 40 x-phi studies published between 2003 and 2015, we enlisted 20 research teams across 8 countries to conduct a high-quality replication of each study in order to compare the results to the original published findings. We found that x-phi studies – as represented in our sample (...) – successfully replicated about 70% of the time. We discuss possible reasons for this relatively high replication rate in the field of experimental philosophy and offer suggestions for best research practices going forward. (shrink)

Appendix 1 was incomplete in the initial online publication. The original article has been corrected.

To develop more effective ethics education for cross-cultural and international engineering, a study was conducted to determine what Chinese engineering students have learned and think about ethics. Recent research shows traditional approaches to ethics education are potentially ineffective, but also points towards ways of improving ethical behaviors. China is the world’s most populous country, graduating and employing the highest number of STEM majors, although little empirical research exists about the ethical knowledge and perspectives of Chinese engineering students. When compared to (...) engineering students in the US, Chinese engineering students received less ethics education; the form of the education they did receive stressed virtue ethics or the development of moral character; conceive of ethics in contradistinction to the law, where ethics deals with matters of right and wrong not covered by legality. Based on these findings and research in moral psychology and behavioral ethics, recommendations are made for improving engineering ethics education both in China and abroad. (shrink)

This paper argues that one part of the picture of thinking about decolonising the philosophy curriculum should include problematising the notion of Western philosophy. I argue that there are many problems with the idea of Western philosophy, and with the idea that decolonising the curriculum should involve rejecting so-called Western philosophy. Doing this could include granting the West a false narrative about its origins, influences and interactions, perpetuating exclusions within contemporary and recent North American and European philosophy, perpetuating exclusions and (...) failed acknowledgements within the history of so-called Western philosophy, while at the same time rejecting a tradition which has included in itself so many topics and methodologies that what is left after excluding it would leave other traditions with limited resources, at the same time as wrongly granting the West proprietary rights over any ideas it has happened to investigate, rather than seeing these as belonging to all of humanity. I therefore conclude that a central part of curriculum change should be problematising Western philosophy, including our learning more about, and teaching, more complex views of its history and interactions with other traditions. (shrink)

Ethics is a field in which the gap between words and actions looms large. Game theory and the empirical methods it inspires look at behavior instead of the lip service people sometimes pay to norms. We believe that this special issue comprises several illustrations of the fruitful application of this approach to ethics.

This chapter begins by explaining two widespread attitudes towards the methods of moral philosophy. The first common attitude is that the appropriate method for doing ethics was described by John Rawls when he formulated the reflective equilibrium method. Another common attitude is that moral philosophy has no method – anything goes in ethical theorising as long as the results are significant enough. The chapter then motivates the volume by arguing that these attitudes are not helpful. The reflective equilibrium method has (...) its limits and yet not all ways of proceeding in ethics are equally good. For this reason, I argue that we need to be more aware of the argumentative strategies we employ in ethics. This requires being methodologically reflective and transparent and taking part in the debates about the merits and problems of different methodologies exactly in the way done in the chapters of this volume. The second half of the chapter then provides an outline of the other chapters. Here I focus on clarifying exactly how these chapters contribute to the new discussions about the methods of ethics. (shrink)

Purpose of the research is the study of relationship between emotional and rational factors in moral decisions making. Methodology. The work is primarily based on the analysis and synthesis of the main empirical studies of the problem, each of which uses the methods of those sciences in which they were conducted. Originality. In general, the process of moral decision making cannot be described by a single simple model that would see only emotional or rational factor in foundation of this process. (...) Moral decision making is characterized by different types of interaction between emotions and rational considerations. The influence of emotional and rational factors on moral decision is nonlinear: moral decision, which person makes, isn’t proportional to those emotions that preceded it and isn't unambiguously determined by them, because rational reasoning and contextual factors can significantly change it. Similarly, the reasoning that precede the decision is not necessarily reflected in the decision, because it can be significantly corrected by those emotions that accompany it. Conclusions. The process of moral decision making involves complex, heterogeneous interaction between emotional and rational factors. There are three main types of such interaction: first, the reasoning serves to rationalize prior emotional response; second, there are cases when reasoning precedes emotional reactions and determines it; third, interaction between these factors is characterized by cyclic causality. The influence of emotions or rational reasoning on moral decision is nonlinear. (shrink)

In the last few decades, the literature on moral responsibility has been increasingly populated by scientific studies. Studies in neuroscience and psychology, in particular, have been claimed to be relevant for discussions about moral responsibility in a number of ways. And at the same time, there is not yet a systematic understanding of the sort of questions a science of moral responsibility is supposed to answer. This paper is an attempt to move toward such an understanding. I discuss three models (...) for framing scientific questions relevant to an investigation of moral responsibility. The favored model—the Enhancement model—proposes that a science of moral responsibility has two descriptive tasks. First, science can describe the causes and effects of the many sorts of responses that constitute the human practices of moral responsibility, such as praise, blame, and punishment. And, second, science can describe how modifications aiming at the improvement of such practices can be achieved. Relatively to the other models to be considered, the Enhancement model is broader in scope and less tied to the traditional philosophical agenda on moral responsibility. (shrink)

This is a review essay devoted to Pekka Väyrynen’s The Lewd, the Rude and the Nasty. Väyrynen’s book, concerned with thick terms and thick concepts, argues for a pragmatic view on the evaluativeness associated with these terms and concepts. The essay raises a number of critical questions regarding what Väyrynen’s arguments for his view actually show. It deals with, for example, thick properties, the fact-value distinction, what it is for terms and concepts to be (semantically) evaluative, and whether Väyrynen’s arguments (...) generalize to thin evaluative concepts. (shrink)

This paper explores an emerging sub-field of both empirical bioethics and experimental philosophy, which has been called “experimental philosophical bioethics” (bioxphi). As an empirical discipline, bioxphi adopts the methods of experimental moral psychology and cognitive science; it does so to make sense of the eliciting factors and underlying cognitive processes that shape people’s moral judgments, particularly about real-world matters of bioethical concern. Yet, as a normative discipline situated within the broader field of bioethics, it also aims to contribute to substantive (...) ethical questions about what should be done in a given context. What are some of the ways in which this aim has been pursued? In this paper, we employ a case study approach to examine and critically evaluate four strategies from the recent literature by which scholars in bioxphi have leveraged empirical data in the service of normative arguments. (shrink)

Human behavior and thought often exhibit a familiar pattern of within group similarity and between group difference. Many of these patterns are attributed to cultural differences. For much of the history of its investigation into behavior and thought, however, cognitive science has been disproportionately focused on uncovering and explaining the more universal features of human minds—or the universal features of minds in general. -/- This entry charts out the ways in which this has changed over recent decades. It sketches the (...) motivation behind the cultural turn in cognitive science, and situates some of its central findings with respect to the questions that animate it and the debates that it has inspired. Woven throughout the entry are examples of how the cognitive science of culture, and especially its elevated concern with different forms of diversity and variation, continues to influence and be influenced by philosophers. -/- One cluster of philosophical work falls within the traditional subject matter of philosophy of science, in this case of the cognitive and social sciences. Philosophers have analyzed and assessed the methods and evidence central to the scientific study of cognition and culture, and have offered conceptual scrutiny, clarification, and synthesis. Research in a second vein sees philosophers themselves contributing more directly to cognitive scientific projects, (co)constructing theories, helping build computational models, even gathering empirical data. A third kind of work is naturalistic philosophy or philosophy of nature, wherein philosophers seek to use results from the cognitive science of culture to inform or transform debates over long-standing philosophical questions, including questions about the nature of philosophy and philosophical methodology itself. (shrink)

[Note: articles 1-5 are in English; Intro, Discussion, and Conclusion are in Portuguese.] Responsibility practices that are part of our daily lives involve, among other things, standards about how one should praise, blame, or punish people for their actions, as well as particular acts that follow those standards to a greater or lesser extent. A classical question in philosophy asks whether human beings can actually be morally responsible for what they do. This dissertation argues that addressing this classical question is (...) insufficient if one wants the investigation of moral responsibility to serve the goal of improving ordinary responsibility practices. As an alternative, I offer directions for an interdisciplinary investigation that I take to be in a better position to promote that goal. My argument is developed in five articles and a discussion section. The first four articles describe limitations of skeptical views, which deny the existence of moral responsibility. The first article assesses a skeptical argument based on results from neuroscience that intends to show that there is no free will. I argue that a premise in the argument—which says that choices are determined by events in the brain—is not supported by the available results. The second article argues that, despite the fact that existent results do not show that choices are determined by brain events, further studies in neuroscience could in principle do that. The third article begins the discussion of limitations that concern the implementability of some of the changes in responsibility practices recommended in skeptical approaches. Specifically, I describe challenges that attempts to reduce the severity of legal punishment are likely to face due to psychological facts about belief in free will and desire to punish. The forth article presents results from an original experiment that sought to test a hypothesis about the workings of belief in free will and the desire to punish, namely the hypothesis that the desire to punish causally affects beliefs about free will. Results failed to support the hypothesis. Finally, the fifth article presents what I call the enhancement model, i.e., a proposal about how to structure an interdisciplinary investigation that can promote the enhancement of ordinary responsibility practices. The final discussion section shows how the enhancement model overcomes some of the limitations of recent discussions about the existence of moral responsibility, which includes not just the skeptical views considered in earlier articles, but also views that affirm the existence of moral responsibility and free will. The central claim of this dissertation, therefore, is that the investigation of moral responsibility can be rearranged so as to further the goal of improving ordinary responsibility practices. (shrink)

Cognitive scientists have revealed systematic errors in human reasoning. There is disagreement about what these errors indicate about human rationality, but one upshot seems clear: human reasoning does not seem to fit traditional views of human rationality. This concern about rationality has made its way through various fields and has recently caught the attention of philosophers. The concern is that if philosophers are prone to systematic errors in reasoning, then the integrity of philosophy would be threatened. In this paper, I (...) present some of the more famous work in cognitive science that has marshaled this concern. Then I present reasons to think that those with training in philosophy will be less prone to certain systematic errors in reasoning. The suggestion is that if philosophers could be shown to be less prone to such errors, then the worries about the integrity of philosophy could be constrained. Then I present evidence that, according to performance on the CRT (Frederick 2005), those who have benefited from training and selection in philosophy are indeed less prone to one kind of systematic error: irrationally arbitrating between intuitive and reflective responses. Nonetheless, philosophers are not entirely immune to this systematic error, and their proclivity for this error is statistically related to their responses to a variety of philosophical questions. So, while the evidence herein puts constraints on the worries about the integrity of philosophy, it by no means eliminates these worries. The conclusion, then, is that the present evidence offers prima facie reasons to ascribe a mitigated privilege to philosophers' ability to rationally arbitrate between intuitive and reflective responses. (shrink)

The present research reveals the nature of moral philosophy in the human universe based on retrospective analysis and synthesis of the positions of modern sciences related to the problem of scientific searching practices and offers the author’s concept. In the process of achieving the pursued goal, the raised problem is actualized through the prism of a view on the activities of the relevant scientific communities, in particular, AME, APNME, ESMP — associations of moral education and moral philosophy, which study various (...) aspects of moral development and highlight the results in the journals founded by them: Journal of Moral Education, Journal of Moral Philosophy, Philosophical News, Moral Capital. Based on the retrospective study of moral philosophy in the human universe, it is proven that for many centuries, philosophers-moralists have been trying to clarify the specifics of the world of human freedom, their confession of moral norms, and rules accepted in society. Based on the analysis of modern paradigms of moral philosophy and moral psychology, which are related to each other, it is established that the universe contributes to the identification of moral values and their acceptance in the internal plan of human actions. The scientific research results made it possible to outline the author’s concept of the studied phenomenon and determine its main components. It is established that the basis of the universe in its significance for man provides an interaction process that is directly reflected in the formation of moral consciousness, the basis of which is moral philosophy with a system of moral values. In turn, this affects the formation of man’s moral self-consciousness, which contains such constructs as moral intuition, moral judgments, and moral behavior. In conclusion, it is postulated that man as a part of the single whole world acts as a builder of their own moral being, creating their moral “I” and producing their universe. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to review current debate about the moral domain in the moral psychological literature. There is some vagueness in respect to the usage of the very concept of ‘morality’. This conceptual problem recently has been re-addressed by several authors. So far, there is little agreement, nobody seems to agree about how to delineate the moral domain from other ‘non-moral’ normative domains. Currently, there are several positions that disagree about the scope of morality, ranging from complete (...) monists to complete pluralists. The paper will review these positions and will tentatively suggest further directions to test their claims. At this moment, there is no decisive evidence for either position. (shrink)

The normative moral code is considered to be such that it applies universally to all or at least to all who can understand and govern their behavior by it. All or almost all common folk think of and use their own moral codes as them being normative in that for example there simply seem to them to exist “oughts” that apply to all and that there simply, straightforwardly are “things” that are right and wrong, good and bad. Gert Bernard and (...) Gert Joshua have written an article on the topic of defining morality, with the title of “The Definition of Morality”. The authors suggest that the terms ‘normative morality’ refer to a code of conduct that, given some specified conditions, would be put forward by all rational persons. The authors take this formulation as entailing true and important definitional features of what normative morality is, although the authors think of this basic definition, conception as not being complete and that some additional feature hence is lacking but that any such candidate addendum to the definitional basic schema that they surveyed within the article seemed to be controversial, contested. Normative morality seems apt to investigate by creating thought-experiments wherein the participants are for example, envisioned choosing to endorse, put forward or act in accordance with a moral code. Within this large investigative project into normative morality with the help of thought-experiments it seemed to me that there was an under-representation of thought-experiments exhibiting some worthwhile and relevant features and I felt that it was a warranted project to create a thought-experiment which concurrently exhibited these features. Such an experiment could be thought of as an unusual “puzzle-piece” which could be valuable in contributing to furthering the completion of the “puzzle”, i.e. what normative morality is and its moral code. These three features were: i) a high degree of aptness for investigating a major part of or the complete normative moral code and ii) a high degree of freedom pertaining to the participants, e.g. their actions, thoughts etc., as well as iii) a high degree of confidence or warrant concerning what the participants would do, think, feel etc. within the thought-experiment. A thought-experiment, the Normative Moral Codes Workshop was hence created, which was aimed at investigating normative morality and its code and which exhibited these features. It is a thought-experiment mimicking an actual empirical study wherein the participants are given the task to together put forward the moral code for them, that would apply to them and that would cover a major or complete part of what they consider their moral codes to entail. The participants employed within my run of the NMCW thought-experiment were all currently living adult persons who I knew well. The core or main aim of this essay was to investigate whether it would or would not be the case that most or all participants within my run of the thought-experiment the NMCW would decide to put forward the code together with the chosen formulation of the thesis being, that it would not be the case that most or all participants would put forward the code within my run of the NMCW thought-experiment. Part of the core aim was also to elucidate why the thesis was supported or not supported as well as how strong the support was for the outcome of the experiment, i.e. the outcome of a code being put forward or not. The essay also has some minor aims which radiate out from the core aim. As the thought-experimenter, I then reported on the events that I envisioned as happening within my run the NMCW thought-experiment as my selected participants grappled with the task and their decision to put or not put forward the code together that would apply to them. The finding was that the thesis was supported and that the support was robust in that I could identify several reasons the participants had against putting forward the code and I found very little in terms of reasons among the participants for putting forward the code. The essay also had some minor aims to selectively discuss a few further relevant and interesting issues radiating out from the core aim. These minor aims revolved around discussing some selected salient features of the NMCW including how they could relate to the outcome. One such selected salient feature was the feature of the employed participant sample of my run of the NMCW. I for example, discussed the potential extension of it not being the case that most or all participants would decide to put forward the code, if the participant sample would have been modified but still employed currently living5adults and I ended up being of the opinion that pertaining to most potential samples a similar outcome as the one envisioned within my run of the NMCW would be expected. I also wanted to discuss some further selected salient features of the NMCW within the context of addressing whether the NMCW, given its features ought to be considered an unsound, inapt experiment for investigating normative morality, given Gert’s and Gert’s conception of normative morality, since if this was the case the outcome of the experiment ought to be disregarded, given no weight. Although, I did find potential targets for criticism of the NMCW experimental design I did not find any reasons strong enough to disqualify the NMCW experiment as an experiment inapt, unsound for investigating normative morality, given the features of normative morality entailed within the suggested basic definition provided by Gert and Gert. Finally, I also aimed to selectively discuss some aspects of what it could mean pertaining to the conception of normative morality, according to Gert and Gert, that the thesis was supported. For example, given one interpretation the outcome could be taken to provide support for the non-existence of a normative moral code, but given another be taken to mean that addenda has to be identified and added to the basic conception of normative morality and that such addenda would be such that they would disqualify the NMCW as a sound and apt thought-experiment to be employed in investigating normative morality. I also attempted to briefly illustrate how the NMCW thought-experiment could be used as a substratum facilitating the identification and clarification of such potential addenda to the basic conception of normative morality, suggested by Gert and Gert, and I also suggest some potential candidate features of the NMCW that further potential specifications added to the basic conception of morality ought to be able to disqualify, exclude as acceptable features of experiments aimed at investigating normative morality. In this way, an unusual, under-represented kind of thought-experiment, “puzzle-piece” when it comes to the large investigative project of employing experiments in order to acquire further insight into normative morality, i.e. “the puzzle”, can regardless of whether it seems to fit or does not seem to fit the “puzzle”, still be employed in such a way as to potentially provide further insight into “the puzzle”. This since even when a “puzzle-piece” does not seem to fit the “puzzle”, “seeing” and understanding how and why could provide us with information about the “puzzle”. (shrink)