En este artículo, el autor desarrolla el problema de la tolerancia en una sociedad multicultural según el planteamiento de Karl-Otto Apel y el punto de vista de la ética del discurso. En este sentido, parte explicando que el problema actual de la tolerancia consiste en el desafío de abrir un espacio a las diferentes formas de vida socio cultural. Así, expone las contradicciones de la versión de tolerancia negativa en el liberalismo y las insuficiencias de la crítica comunitarista. Luego, se (...) presenta la propuesta de fundamentación ético-discursiva de lo que el filósofo alemán llama como ‘tolerancia afirmativa'. Se concluye con algunas consideraciones valorativas: primero, para cuestionar la necesidad de la tolerancia afirmativa en un régimen constitucional, y segundo, para postular que la fundamentación ético-discursiva de la tolerancia encuentra su derivación más coherente en la categoría del respeto. In this article the author develops the problem of tolerance in a multicultural society according to Karl-Otto Apel's position and the point of view of the ethics of discourse. The author explains that the challenge of opening a space to different forms of socio-cultural life is the current problem of tolerance. This way, he exposes the contradictions of the negative tolerance in liberalism and the communitarian critical insufficiencies. Therefore, he presents the proposal of ethical-discursive basis about what the German philosopher has called ‘affirmative tolerance'. This study concludes with some value considerations which are meant to question the necessity of affirmative tolerance in a constitutional regime, in first place, and to postulate, in second place, that the ethical-discursive basis of tolerance finds a more coherent derivation in the category of respect. (shrink)

This article aims to highlight the theoretical and philosophical debate on hospitality underlining the normative elements of framing migrants and refugees as individual agents in the light of hospitality theory and migration governance. It argued the critiques of the neo-Kantian hospitality approach and the EU welcome culture with regard to refugees in the EU from a philosophical perspective. The “No human being is illegal” motto is proposed to be conceived as a principle of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. The (...) cosmopolitan right to visit and the universal right to reside were discussed in the context of human rights and co-responsibility. Linking the hospitality approach with migration governance enables the reconstruction of reception policies and practices, diversification of non-state actors that engage in migration governance mechanism, and polarization of political initiatives (e.g., politics of allocation and dispersal, readmission negotiations, convergence/divergence of priorities and strategic interests). The research findings highlight that the EU adopted a neo-Kantian hospitality approach that combines both “co-responsibility” and “vertical/heterarchical relations.” The EU’s “New Pact on Migration and Asylum” was considered proof of how the EU follows neo-Kantian hospitality that is manifested in dualism and contradictory approach. The study presents a typology that splits co-responsibility into individual/institutional actions and human rights/migration governance. (shrink)

Recognition and toleration are ways of relating to the diversity characteristic of multicultural societies. The article concerns the possible meanings of toleration and recognition, and the conflict that is often claimed to exist between these two approaches to diversity. Different forms or interpretations of recognition and toleration are considered, confusing and problematic uses of the terms are noted, and the compatibility of toleration and recognition is discussed. The article argues that there is a range of legitimate and importantly different conceptions (...) of both toleration and recognition that are often not clearly distinguished, and that compatibility varies across this range and depending on what one considers the conceptions in relation to. (shrink)

Recognition and toleration are ways of relating to the diversity characteristic of multicultural societies. The article concerns the possible meanings of toleration and recognition, and the conflict that is often claimed to exist between these two approaches to diversity. Different forms or interpretations of recognition and toleration are considered, confusing and problematic uses of the terms are noted, and the compatibility of toleration and recognition is discussed. The article argues that there is a range of legitimate and importantly different conceptions (...) of both toleration and recognition that are often not clearly distinguished, and that compatibility varies across this range and depending on what one considers the conceptions in relation to. (shrink)

The ‘traditional’ conception of toleration, understood as the putting up with beliefs and practices by those who disapprove of them, has come under increasing attack in recent years for being negative, condescending and judgemental. Instead, its critics argue for a more positive, affirmative conception, perhaps best captured by Anna Elisabetta Galeotti’s idea of ‘toleration as recognition’. In this article, without denying that it is not always the most appropriate form of response to differences, I defend the traditional conception of toleration (...) against its critics. Two principal arguments are advanced in defence of it: the first articulates its role as part of a viable and realistic political theory of modus vivendi, while the second argues that it is only the traditional conception of toleration that makes possible the mutual accommodation of some values that are genuinely antithetical and hostlie to each other. Thus, there remains an important place for the traditional conception of toleration in both political theory and practice. (shrink)

The principle of self-determination, as commonly intended, is based on a formal and individualistic view of liberty rights. This perspective, however, is inconsistent with the needs of a community, and particularly with the necessity to promote a relatively stable social order, and an integration between subjects. I propose a different perspective that takes into account the relationships rather than the individual. In particular, I will try to demonstrate 1) that any community implement a specific social order, that is a complex (...) of practices; 2) that any social practices express specific values; 3) that these values are the result of historical and cultural circumstances; 4) that they are subject to an ongoing public debate, and finally 5) that only if the individual praxis is consistent with these values can it lead to recognition of rights. In that perspective does not exist a general liberty to determine itself, outside of a specific relational situation. It could only be affirmed that one has a practical liberty to do and to act as it wants, but its rights depend on relationships in which the person is engaged. (shrink)