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How to Say Things with Formalisms

In Michael Detlefsen (ed.), Proof, Logic and Formalization. London, England: Routledge. pp. 77--93 (1992)

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  1. Hilbert's program then and now.Richard Zach - 2002 - In Dale Jacquette (ed.), Philosophy of Logic. Malden, Mass.: North Holland. pp. 411–447.
    Hilbert’s program was an ambitious and wide-ranging project in the philosophy and foundations of mathematics. In order to “dispose of the foundational questions in mathematics once and for all,” Hilbert proposed a two-pronged approach in 1921: first, classical mathematics should be formalized in axiomatic systems; second, using only restricted, “finitary” means, one should give proofs of the consistency of these axiomatic systems. Although Gödel’s incompleteness theorems show that the program as originally conceived cannot be carried out, it had many partial (...)
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  • On the Invariance of Gödel’s Second Theorem with Regard to Numberings.Balthasar Grabmayr - 2021 - Review of Symbolic Logic 14 (1):51-84.
    The prevalent interpretation of Gödel’s Second Theorem states that a sufficiently adequate and consistent theory does not prove its consistency. It is however not entirely clear how to justify this informal reading, as the formulation of the underlying mathematical theorem depends on several arbitrary formalisation choices. In this paper I examine the theorem’s dependency regarding Gödel numberings. I introducedeviantnumberings, yielding provability predicates satisfying Löb’s conditions, which result in provable consistency sentences. According to the main result of this paper however, these (...)
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