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  1. Perceptual plasticity and theoretical neutrality: A reply to Jerry Fodor.Paul M. Churchland - 1988 - Philosophy of Science 55 (June):167-87.
    The doctrine that the character of our perceptual knowledge is plastic, and can vary substantially with the theories embraced by the perceiver, has been criticized in a recent paper by Fodor. His arguments are based on certain experimental facts and theoretical approaches in cognitive psychology. My aim in this paper is threefold: to show that Fodor's views on the impenetrability of perceptual processing do not secure a theory-neutral foundation for knowledge; to show that his views on impenetrability are almost certainly (...)
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  • A case of different intentions concerning intentionality.W. Tom Bourbon - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (4):755.
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  • Various senses of “intentional system”.Kenneth M. Sayre - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (4):760.
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  • Intentionality in the visual cortex?Roland Puccetti - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (4):758.
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  • Causal dispositions + sensory experience = intentionality.Karl Pfeifer - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (4):757.
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  • Information and the holism of intentional content.Robert Van Gulick - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (4):759.
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  • Intentionality is a red herring.Chris Fields & Eric Dietrich - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (4):756.
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  • Realism and evidence in the philosophy of mind.Laura Jane Bennett - unknown
    This thesis evaluates a variety of important modern approaches to the study of the mind/brain in the light of recent developments in the debate about how evidence should be used to support a theory and its constituent hypotheses. Although all these approaches are ostensibly based upon the principles of scientific realism, this evaluation will demonstrate that all of them fall well short of these requirements. Consequently, the more modern, co-evolutionary theories of the mind/brain do not constitute the significant advance upon (...)
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