- Color Comparisons and Interpersonal Variation.Nat Hansen - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (4):809-826.details
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A new argument from interpersonal variation to subjectivism about color: a response to Gómez-Torrente.Nat Hansen - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):421-428.details
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Colour.Laura Gow - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (11):803-813.details
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Descartes’ God is a deceiver, and that’s OK.Joseph Gottlieb & Saja Parvizian - 2023 - Synthese 202 (3):1-29.details
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The Sorites is nonsense disguised by a fallacy.L. Goldstein - 2012 - Analysis 72 (1):61-65.details
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Perceptual Variation, Color Language, and Reference Fixing. An Objectivist Account.Mario Gómez-Torrente - 2016 - Noûs 50 (1):3-40.details
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Josep Corbí, Morality, Self‐Knowledge and Human Suffering: An Essay on the Loss of Confidence in the World, London: Routledge, 2012, xvi + 254 pp. GBP 80.00 (Hardback), ISBN 9780415890694. [REVIEW]Manuel García-Carpintero - 2014 - Dialectica 68 (1):151-161.details
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Foundational Semantics II: Normative Accounts.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (6):410-421.details
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Emotional Perception.Matthew Fulkerson - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (1):16-30.details
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Should moral intuitionism go social?Marvin Backes, Matti Eklund & Eliot Michaelson - 2022 - Noûs 57 (4):973-985.details
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Embodied Conceivability: How to Keep the Phenomenal Concept Strategy Grounded.Guy Dove & Andreas Elpidorou - 2016 - Mind and Language 31 (5):580-611.details
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Fame in the predictive brain: a deflationary approach to explaining consciousness in the prediction error minimization framework.Krzysztof Dołęga & Joe E. Dewhurst - 2020 - Synthese 198 (8):7781-7806.details
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Colour Vision and Seeing Colours.Will Davies - 2018 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (3):657-690.details
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Unknowable Colour Facts.Brian Cutter - 2021 - Mind 130 (519):909-941.details
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The mind-body problem and the color-body problem.Brian Cutter - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 180 (3):725-744.details
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Perceptual illusionism.Brian Cutter - 2021 - Analytic Philosophy 62 (4):396-417.details
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Paradise Regained: A Non-Reductive Realist Account of the Sensible Qualities.Brian Cutter - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (1):38-52.details
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Indeterminate perception and colour relationism.Brian Cutter - 2019 - Analysis 79 (1):25-34.details
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Color and a priori knowledge.Brian Cutter - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (1):293-315.details
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How beliefs are like colors.Devin Sanchez Curry - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7889-7918.details
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Surface Colour is not a Perceptual Content.Damon Crockett - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):303-318.details
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Schellenberg on Perceptual Capacities.Jonathan Cohen - 2019 - Analysis 79 (4):720-730.details
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Ecumenicism, Comparability, and Color, or: How to Have Your Cake and Eat It, Too.Jonathan Cohen - 2015 - Minds and Machines 25 (2):149-175.details
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Chromatic layering and color relationalism.Jonathan Cohen - 2016 - Minds and Machines 26 (3):287-301.details
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The Uses of Colour Vision: Ornamental, Practical, and Theoretical.M. Chirimuuta & F. A. A. Kingdom - 2015 - Minds and Machines 25 (2):213-229.details
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Editorial for Minds and Machines Special Issue on Philosophy of Colour.M. Chirimuuta - 2015 - Minds and Machines 25 (2):123-132.details
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Whither naive realism? - I.Alex Byrne & E. J. Green - 2023 - Philosophical Perspectives (1):1-20.details
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Color relationalism and relativism.Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert - 2017 - Topics in Cognitive Science 9 (1):172-192.details
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The Self-Locating Property Theory of Color.Berit Brogaard - 2015 - Minds and Machines 25 (2):133-147.details
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The Functional Complexity of Scientific Evidence.Matthew J. Brown - 2015 - Metaphilosophy 46 (1):65-83.details
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Perceptual Content and Monadic Truth: On Cappelen and Hawthorne's Relativism and Monadic Truth.Berit Brogaard - 2009 - Philosophical Books 50 (4):213-226.details
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It's Not What it Seems. A Semantic Account of ‘Seems’ and Seemings.Berit Brogaard - 2013 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 56 (2-3):210-239.details
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Colour Layering and Colour Relationalism.Derek H. Brown - 2015 - Minds and Machines 25 (2):177-191.details
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Colour Eliminativism or Colour Relativism?Berit Brogaard - 2012 - Philosophical Papers 41 (2):305 - 321.details
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Colouring for and Colour Relationalism.Derek H. Brown - 2017 - Analysis 77 (2):433-449.details
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Cortical Color and the Cognitive Sciences.Berit Brogaard & Dimitria Electra Gatzia - 2017 - Topics in Cognitive Science 9 (1):135-150.details
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Against Naturalism about Truth.Berit Brogaard - 2016 - In Kelly James Clark (ed.), The Blackwell Companion to Naturalism. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. pp. 262–276.details
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Functionalist response-dependence avoids missing explanations.D. J. Bradley - 2011 - Analysis 71 (2):297-300.details
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Functionalism and The Independence Problems.Darren Bradley - 2013 - Noûs 47 (1):545-557.details
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A defense of holistic representationalism.Jacob Berger - 2018 - Mind and Language 33 (2):161-176.details
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Why Colour Primitivism?Hagit Benbaji - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (2):243-265.details
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Two Theories of Transparency.Edward W. Averill & Joseph Gottlieb - 2021 - Erkenntnis 86 (3):553-573.details
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Revelation and the Nature of Colour.Keith Allen - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (2):153-176.details
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Colour Physicalism, Naïve Realism, and the Argument from Structure.Keith Allen - 2015 - Minds and Machines 25 (2):193-212.details
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Colour Relationalism and the Real Deliverances of Introspection.Pendaran Roberts, James Andow & Kelly Schmidtke - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (5):1173-1189.details
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How Does Colour Experience Represent the World?Adam Pautz - 2021 - In Derek H. Brown & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Colour. New York: Routledge.details
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Relativity in a Fundamentally Absolute World.Jack Spencer - 2022 - Philosophical Perspectives 36 (1):305-328.details
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*Perception* (2021, preview).Adam Pautz - 2021 - In Perception.details
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Daylight savings: what an answer to the perceptual variation problem cannot be.Eliot Michaelson & Jonathan Cohen - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (3):833-843.details
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Representationalism about Consciousness.Adam Pautz - 2020 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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