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  1. Respekt for personer, epistemiske plikter og klanderverdig politisk uvitenhet.Kristian Skagen Ekeli - 2020 - Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift 55 (2-3):199-213.
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  • Politisk uvitenhet, stemmeretten og velgeres moralske ansvar.Kristian Skagen Ekeli - 2019 - Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift 54 (3):151-166.
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  • Demokrati og uvitenhet.Herman Cappelen - 2020 - Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift 55 (2-3):185-198.
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  • Democratic legitimacy, political speech and viewpoint neutrality.Kristian Skagen Ekeli - 2021 - Philosophy and Social Criticism 47 (6):723-752.
    The purpose of this article is to consider the question of whether democratic legitimacy requires viewpoint neutrality with regard to political speech – including extremist political speech, such as hate speech. The starting point of my discussion is Jeremy Waldron’s negative answer to this question. He argues that it is permissible for liberal democracies to ban certain extremist viewpoints – such as vituperative hate speech – because such viewpoint-based restrictions protect the dignity of persons and a social and moral environment (...)
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  • Toleration, Respect for Persons, and the Free Speech Right to do Moral Wrong.Kristian Skagen Ekeli - 2020 - In Mitja Sardoč (ed.), The Palgrave Handbook of Toleration. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 149-172.
    The purpose of this chapter is to consider the question of whether respect for persons requires toleration of the expression of any extremist political or religious viewpoint within public discourse. The starting point of my discussion is Steven Heyman and Jonathan Quong’s interesting defences of a negative answer to this question. They argue that respect for persons requires that liberal democracies should not tolerate the public expression of extremist speech that can be regarded as recognition-denying or respect-denying speech – that (...)
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