Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. In Defense of Eating Meat.Timothy Hsiao - 2015 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 28 (2):277-291.
    Some arguments for moral vegetarianism proceed by appealing to widely held beliefs about the immorality of causing unjustified pain. Combined with the claim that meat is not needed for our nourishment and that killing animals for this reason causes them unjustified pain, they yield the conclusion that eating meat is immoral. However, what counts as a good enough reason for causing pain will depend largely on what we think about the moral status of animals. Implicit in these arguments is the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   31 citations  
  • Clarifying the Concept of Cruelty: What Makes Cruelty to Animals Cruel.Julia Tanner - 2015 - Heythrop Journal 56 (5):818-835.
    The topic of cruelty features regularly in discussions concerning animals’ moral status. Further, condemnation of cruelty to animals is virtually unanimous. As Regan points out, ‘[i]t would be difficult to find anyone who is in favour of cruelty.’ What is to count as cruelty is therefore important. My aim here is to gain a clearer understanding of one aspect of our moral landscape: cruelty to animals. I will start by analyzing the concept of cruelty in section II. In section III (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Non-Human Animals Feel Pain in a Morally Relevant Sense.James Simpson - 2022 - Philosophia 51 (1):329-336.
    In a recent article in this journal, Calum Miller skillfully and creatively argues for the counterintuitive view that there aren’t any good reasons to believe that non-human animals feel pain in a morally relevant sense. By Miller’s lights, such reasons are either weak in their own right or they also favor the view that non-human animals don’t feel morally relevant pain. In this paper, I explain why Miller’s view is mistaken. In particular, I sketch a very reasonable abductive argument for (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Industrial Farming is Not Cruel to Animals.Timothy Hsiao - 2017 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 30 (1):37-54.
    Critics of industrial animal agriculture have argued that its practices are cruel, inhumane, or otherwise degrading to animals. These arguments sometimes form the basis of a larger case for the complete abolition of animal agriculture, while others argue for more modest welfare-based reforms that allow for certain types of industrial farming. This paper defends industrial farming against the charge of cruelty. As upsetting as certain practices may seem, I argue that they need not be construed as cruel or inhumane. Any (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  • Vegetarianism.Mylan Engel - 2016 - Encyclopedia of Global Bioethics.
    Ethical vegetarians maintain that vegetarianism is morally required. The principal reasons offered in support of ethical vegetarianism are: (i) concern for the welfare and well-being of the animals being eaten, (ii) concern for the environment, (iii) concern over global food scarcity and the just distribution of resources, and (iv) concern for future generations. Each of these reasons is explored in turn, starting with a historical look at ethical vegetarianism and the moral status of animals.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The Commonsense Case for Ethical Vegetarianism.Mylan Engel Jr - 2016 - Between the Species: A Journal of Ethics 19 (1):2-31.
    The article defends ethical vegetarianism, which, for present purposes, is stipulatively taken to be the view that it is morally wrong to eat animals when equally nutritious plant-based foods are available. Several examples are introduced to show that we all agree that animals deserve some direct moral consideration and to help identify and clarify several commonsense moral principles—principles we all accept. These principles are then used to argue that eating animals is morally wrong. Since you no doubt accept these principles, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Moral Considerability: Deontological, not Metaphysical.Benjamin Hale - 2011 - Ethics and the Environment 16 (2):37-62.
    Ever since Kenneth Goodpaster published his article "On Being Morally Considerable," environmental ethicists have been engaged in a debate over whether animals, plants, and other natural objects matter morally (Goodpaster 1978). Many, if not most, theorists have treated the problem of moral considerability as a problem of status, arguing that earlier ethical positions have unjustifiably given privileged status to one group of beings over others. They have then proceeded in one of two ways. Either they have appealed to intrinsic value (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Harm to Nonhuman Animals from AI: a Systematic Account and Framework.Simon Coghlan & Christine Parker - 2023 - Philosophy and Technology 36 (2):1-34.
    This paper provides a systematic account of how artificial intelligence (AI) technologies could harm nonhuman animals and explains why animal harms, often neglected in AI ethics, should be better recognised. After giving reasons for caring about animals and outlining the nature of animal harm, interests, and wellbeing, the paper develops a comprehensive ‘harms framework’ which draws on scientist David Fraser’s influential mapping of human activities that impact on sentient animals. The harms framework is fleshed out with examples inspired by both (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Virtues and Animals: A Minimally Decent Ethic for Practical Living in a Non-ideal World.Cheryl Abbate - 2014 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 27 (6):909-929.
    Traditional approaches to animal ethics commonly emerge from one of two influential ethical theories: Regan’s deontology (The case for animal rights. University of California, Berkeley, 1983) and Singer’s preference utilitarianism (Animal liberation. Avon Books, New York, 1975). I argue that both of the theories are unsuccessful at providing adequate protection for animals because they are unable to satisfy the three conditions of a minimally decent theory of animal protection. While Singer’s theory is overly permissive, Regan’s theory is too restrictive. I (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations