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  1. There is nothing to identity.M. Oreste Fiocco - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7321-7337.
    Several have denied that there is, specifically, a criterion of identity for persons and some deny that there are, for any kind, diachronic criteria of identity. I argue, however, that there are no criteria of identity, either synchronic or diachronic, for any kind whatsoever. I begin by elaborating the notion of a criterion of identity in order to clarify what exactly is being denied when I maintain there are none. I examine the motivation of those who qualify in some way (...)
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  • "Thus Saith the Lord": Edwardsean Anti-criterialism and the Physicalist Problem of Resurrection Identity.Christopher Woznicki - 2018 - TheoLogica: An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology 2 (1):115-135.
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  • A Renewed Challenge to Anti-criterialism.Matt Duncan - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (1):165-182.
    In virtue of what do things persist through time? Are there criteria of their identities through time? Anti-criterialists say no. One prominent challenge to anti-criterialism comes in two steps. The first step is to show that anti-criterialists are committed specifically to the claim that there are no informative metaphysically sufficient conditions for identity through time. The second step is to show that this commitment yields absurd results. Each step of this challenge is open to objection. However, in what follows, I (...)
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  • Persistence without essence.Jessica Leech - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
    Questions of persistence and change are central to metaphysics. There is almost always a role for sortal or essential properties to play in theories of persistence. However, one might reasonably be suspicious of many of the claims about sortal properties and essential properties on which so many accounts of persistence conditions rest. The aim of this paper is to think through what persistence looks like if we don't help ourselves to these assumptions. In so doing, we shall uncover a deep (...)
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  • El volcado de la mente en la máquina y el problema de la identidad personal.Antonio Diéguez - 2022 - Revista de Filosofía (La Plata) 52 (2):e054.
    En este trabajo se analiza la cuestión de si el volcado de la mente en una máquina (mind uploading), en caso de ser alguna vez tecnológicamente posible, mantendría o destruiría la identidad personal de quien experimentara el volcado. Se verá cómo podría contestarse a la cuestión en función de los criterios para el mantenimiento de la identidad personal que se asuman. No hay una respuesta única, puesto que la identidad personal se mantendría o no en función de los supuestos aceptados. (...)
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