Radical changes of our cultural values in the near future are inevitable, since the current culture is ecologically unsustainable. The present proposal, radical as it may seem to some, is accordingly offered as worthy of consideration. The main section of this article is on a proposed scheme, named Asset and Income Limits, for instituting maxima to the legitimate incomes and assets of individuals. This scheme involves every individual being associated with two bank accounts, an asset account (their own property) and (...) a holding account (held in escrow). Other parts of the advocated change in economic landscape are a radically different understanding of the concept of work and the introduction of a basic income. The roles of technology and culture, in creating both the opportunities and the obstacles to a transformation of society, are discussed. Non-monetary, non-convertible rewards for exceptional contributions to society are described. The scheme enhances freedom, being neutral in relation to many other value systems, such as the secular/sacred spectrum. The qualitative versus quantitative dichotomy is addressed, and it is concluded that the most that can be said of a just and sustainable society that has yet to be created is that the maximum income should be no more than one order of magnitude greater than the basic income, that is ~10 times at the most. Incentives for profitable employment would still be sufficient, and paying the basic income out of taxes on sales and/or non-basic income would be feasible. (shrink)

This article discusses the ethics of knowledge production from a cultural point of view, in contrast with the more usual emphasis on the ethical issues facing individuals involved in KP. Here, the emphasis is on the cultural environment within which individuals, groups and institutions perform KP. A principal purpose is to suggest ways in which reliable scientific knowledge could be produced more efficiently. The distinction between ethical hazard and ethical behaviour is noted. Ethical hazards cannot be eliminated but they can (...) be reduced if the cultural ambience is suitable. The main suggestions for reducing ethical hazards in KP relate to the review process. It is argued that some defects of the current, largely anonymous, review process could be ameliorated by a process of comprehensive, open and ongoing review. This includes partial professionalisation of the work of reviewing. Review at several stages is a vital part of the long filtering that incorporates some claims into the canon of reliable knowledge. The review process would be an acknowledged and explicit part of KP—a respected, public and rewarded activity. COOR would be expensive but cost-effective. The costs should be built explicitly into research culture. Finally, the considerations about a more ‘KP friendly’ culture lead to advocacy of a ‘long-term, short-term’ synthesis; that is, of the synthesis of long-term vision, such as a more cooperative and less competitive culture, with incremental changes which may be implemented in the short term. (shrink)

On the assumption that theistic religious commitment takes place in the face of evidential ambiguity, the question arises under what conditions it is permissible to make a doxastic venture beyond one’s evidence in favour of a religious proposition. In this paper I explore the implications for orthodox theistic commitment of adopting, in answer to that question, a modest, moral coherentist, fideism. This extended Jamesian fideism crucially requires positive ethical evaluation of both the motivation and content of religious doxastic ventures. I (...) suggest that, even though the existence of horrendous evil does not resolve evidential ambiguity in favour of atheism, there are reasonable value commitments that would preclude those who hold them from satisfying extended Jamesian fideist conditions for committing themselves to classical theism. I then begin a discussion of a possible revisionary theistic alternative (in the Christian tradition) which – one might hope – may meet those conditions. An earlier, shorter, version of this paper was delivered as a keynote address at the APA Pacific 2007 Mini-Conference on Models of God. (shrink)

We urgently need to bring about a revolution in academic inquiry, one that transforms knowledge-inquiry into what may be called wisdom-inquiry. This revolution, were it to occur, would help humanity make progress towards as good a world as possible. Wisdom-inquiry gives intellectual priority to articulating problems of living, including global problems, and proposing and critically assessing possible solutions - possible actions, policies, political programmes. It actively seeks to promote public education about what our problems are, and what we need to (...) do about them. It seeks to discover how problematic aims of social, political and economic endeavours may be improved. It includes a virtual government that seeks to discover what the actual government ought to be doing. In these and other ways, wisdom-inquiry would be actively and rationally engaged in helping humanity make progress towards a better world. Academia as it exists at present, dominated by knowledge-inquiry, cannot engage in these vitally necessary activities, or can only do so in a restricted, ineffective fashion. There are strong grounds for holding that wisdom-inquiry would dramatically enhance the capacity of humanity to make progress towards a better, wiser world. (shrink)

For over 30 years I have argued that we need to construe science as accepting a metaphysical proposition concerning the comprehensibility of the universe. In a recent paper, Fred Muller criticizes this argument, and its implication that Bas van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism is untenable. In the present paper I argue that Muller’s criticisms are not valid. The issue is of some importance, for my argument that science accepts a metaphysical proposition is the first step in a broader argument intended to (...) demonstrate that we need to bring about a revolution in science, and ultimately in academic inquiry as a whole so that the basic aim becomes wisdom and not just knowledge. (shrink)

Two great problems of learning confront humanity: (1) learning about the universe, and about ourselves as a part of the universe, and (2) learning how to make progress towards as good a world as possible. We solved the first problem when we created modern science in the 17th century, but we have not yet solved the second problem. This puts us in a situation of unprecedented danger. Modern science and technology enormously increase our power to act, but not our power (...) to act wisely. All our current global crises have arisen as a result. What we need to do is learn from our solution to the first great problem of learning how to go about solving the second one. Properly implemented, this idea leads to a new kind of inquiry rationally devoted to helping humanity make progress towards as good a world as possible. (shrink)