Basing herself on Indian and Chinese traditions, the author provides arguments in favour of revising the customary understanding of philosophy per se. The nonexistence of uniformity in the methods of cognition cannot be taken as evidence for the phenomenon of ‘philosophy’ missing outside the Western world. In the East, one can witness fidelity to the broad interpretation of ‘philosophy’, etymologically much nearer to this concept, presuming, along with rationality, the authority of other sources of knowledge. Philosophy came into the world (...) not once but a number of times and in various places. From the outset it bore out, along with common generic traits, its specific ‘patrimonial’ characteristics; in other words, those revealing its own culture. In its turn, each culture is built up around a certain ‘frame’ made up of universal conceptual constituents. The history of philosophy would remain incomplete and one-sided (with a ‘Western bias’) until it ignores the fundamental universals of other cultures. Even the universals and values recognized as common to all mankind are frequently imbued with basically different substance depending on a context of relevant culture. The reappraisal of the history of philosophy should make the teaching system of philosophy multicultural. (shrink)

In this paper, I shall argue that philosophy proper is a Western cultural practice and cannot refer to traditional Chinese thinking unless in an analogical or metaphorical sense. Likewise, the Chinese idiom ‘Zhongguo zhexue’ has evolved its independent cultural meaning and has no need to be considered as philosophy in the Western academic sense. For the purpose of elucidating the culturally autonomous status of Zhongguo zhexue, as well as the possible counterparts of Western philosophy in other cultures, I contend that (...) Davidsonian anomalous monism may provide a proper explanatory framework for the intercultural relationships between different ‘sophias’ from various traditions. As for the equivocal English term ‘Chinese philosophy’, I suggest replacing it with a more precise new word: ‘sinosophy’. (shrink)

Reevaluates Western and Chinese philosophical traditions to question the boundaries of entrenched conceptual frameworks.

Postcolonial studies and decolonial theory make visible the nature and extent of Eurocentrism through a critique of constructed categories as basic as “history” and “culture.” Walter Mignolo asserts a strong claim that the concept of “culture” is itself a colonial construction, and hence all cultural difference bears the mark of coloniality. This thesis presents a challenge to the field of comparative philosophy: What does “cross-cultural” philosophy even mean if all so-called cultural difference is indeed colonial difference? Could comparativists, in the (...) wake of this critique, preserve the possibility of cross-cultural philosophical inquiry even when basic terms of discourse are suspended? This essay is a thought experiment in accepting Mignolo's general premise that all cultural difference is colonial difference, through which I offer three strategies for philosophizing comparatively under this constraint: historical contextualization, subversive categorization, and decen.. (shrink)

This essay looks into a particular aspect of Sinological challenge to the modern project of Chinese philosophy within the Western academy through the lens of authorship, using the Zhuangzi 莊子 as a case study. It explores philosophical implications for texts whose authorship is in doubt and develops a new heuristic model of authorship and textuality, so that a more robust intellectual space for the philosophical discourse on Chinese classics can be carved out from the dominant historicist Sinological discourse. It argues (...) that philosophical and Sinological approaches to Chinese classics have divergent scholarly objectives and follow different disciplinary norms. To clarify such divergence, it proposes a heuristic model to distinguish two sets of scholarly objects operative in Sinology and philosophy respectively, namely original text versus inherited text, historical author versus textual author, and authorial intent versus textual intent. These two sets of scholarly objects are related, at times overlapping but often irreducibly distinct, with the former in the pairs belonging to Sinologists and the latter to philosophers. (shrink)

The contributions to Concepts of Philosophy in Asia and the Islamic World reflect upon the problems implied in the received notions of philosophy in the respective scholarly literatures. They ask whether, and for what reasons, a text should be categorized as a philosophical text (or excluded from the canon of philosophy), and what this means for the concept of philosophy. The focus on texts and textual corpora is central because it makes authors expose their claims and arguments in direct relation (...) to specific sources, and discourages generalized reflections on the characteristics of, for example, Japanese culture or the Indian mind. The volume demonstrates that close and historically informed readings are the sine qua non in discussing what philosophy is in Asia and the Islamic world, just as much as with regard to Western literature Contributors are Yoko Arisaka, Wolfgang Behr, Thomas Fröhlich, Lisa Indraccolo, Paulus Kaufmann, Iso Kern, Ralf Müller, Gregor Paul, Lisa Raphals, Fabian Schäfer, Ori Sela, Rafael Suter, Christian Uhl, Viatcheslav Vetrov, Yvonne Schulz Zinda, and Nicholas Zufferey. (shrink)

Aristotel v Politiki razlikuje med govorico in glasom. Glas pomeni racionalno, pravično, koristno in razumljivo,medtem ko je glas živali nesmiselno zavijanje, ki pomeni nepravičnost, nekoristnost in nerazumnost. To razlikovanje je močno vplivalo na zahodno filozofijo. Ta esej trdi, da je razlikovanje »govor/glas« nerazumen in samouničevalen diskurz; resnično mednarodna filozofija ali nova knjižna republika bi morala zavreči to razlikovanje in namesto tega zagovarjati eksplozijo nacionalne filozofije, plodna kitajska nacionalna filozofija bi morala poskusiti reševati svoje lastne probleme s pomočjo kritičnega mišljenja ne (...) pa s ponavljanjem teorije in izkustva drugih. V dobi bie-modernosti morajo kitajski učenjaki v celoti upoštevati specifičnost sodobne kitajske družbe ter odvreči psevdo-modernost, predlagati različne zhuyi ob tem ko sledi avtentičnost modernosti. Koristen kitajski zhuyi ne bi smel biti omejen na kitajsko perspektivo in bi moral imeti globoko medsebojno delovanje z mednarodnim akademskim svetom, da bi lahko promoviral bolj odprto in bolj svetovljansko filozofijo. (shrink)

In her anchor-piece on historicizing the canon, Li-Hsiang Lisa Rosenlee appeals to professional philosophers to develop several tools that can be implemented in historicizing the canon. Amy Donahue, David H. Kim, Nelson Maldonado-Torres, and Kris Sealey tessellate different aspects of this call. Donahue augments Rosenlee’s argument by braiding together Dharmakīrti’s “anyāpoha” theory and Charles Mills’ ruminations about “white ignorance”; Kim explores some of the nuances of Rosenlee’s account for a post-Eurocentric philosophy; Maldonado-Torres ruminates about the larger social context in which (...) thinking can be decolonized; and Sealey uses the work of Kristie Dotson to acknowledge the possibility of multiple canons. In putting on the table a number of questions, concepts, and approaches to canon-building, the symposium aims to contribute to what is by now a large array of similar reflections and engagements in different parts of the world. (shrink)

I would like to begin my thesis with a general overview of a book on African sage philosophy (1990) written by the prominent African philosopher Henry Odera Oruka (1944-1995), My reading of this book on philosophic sagacity needs to be equipped by two underlying backgrounds of philosophic sagacity. The first background is a perspective of the intercultural philosophy. The second one explains of philosophic sagacity in the African setting.