The relationships between various modal logics based on Belnap and Dunn’s paraconsistent four-valued logic FDE are investigated. It is shown that the paraconsistent modal logic \, which lacks a primitive possibility operator \, is definitionally equivalent with the logic \, which has both \ and \ as primitive modalities. Next, a tableau calculus for the paraconsistent modal logic KN4 introduced by L. Goble is defined and used to show that KN4 is definitionally equivalent with \ without the absurdity constant. Moreover, (...) a tableau calculus is defined for the modal bilattice logic MBL introduced and investigated by A. Jung, U. Rivieccio, and R. Jansana. MBL is a generalization of BK that in its Kripke semantics makes use of a four-valued accessibility relation. It is shown that MBL can be faithfully embedded into the bimodal logic \ over the non-modal vocabulary of MBL. On the way from \ to MBL, the Fischer Servi-style modal logic \ is defined as the set of all modal formulas valid under a modified standard translation into first-order FDE, and \ is shown to be characterized by the class of all models for \. Moreover, \ is axiomatized and this axiom system is proved to be strongly sound and complete with respect to the class of models for \. Moreover, the notion of definitional equivalence is suitably weakened, so as to show that \ and \ are weakly definitionally equivalent. (shrink)

Besides the better-known Nelson logic and paraconsistent Nelson logic, in 1959 David Nelson introduced, with motivations of realizability and constructibility, a logic called $\mathcal{S}$. The logic $\mathcal{S}$ was originally presented by means of a calculus with infinitely many rule schemata and no semantics. We look here at the propositional fragment of $\mathcal{S}$, showing that it is algebraizable, in the sense of Blok and Pigozzi, with respect to a variety of three-potent involutive residuated lattices. We thus introduce the first known algebraic (...) semantics for $\mathcal{S}$ as well as a finite Hilbert-style calculus equivalent to Nelson’s presentation; this also allows us to clarify the relation between $\mathcal{S}$ and the other two Nelson logics $\mathcal{N}3$ and $\mathcal{N}4$. (shrink)