- Three inferential temptations.Alexander Levine & Georg Schwarz - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):57-58.details
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Phenomenal access: A moving target.Joseph Levine - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):261-261.details
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Even a theory-theory needs information processing: ToMM, an alternative theory-theory of the child's theory of mind.Alan M. Leslie, Tim P. German & Francesca G. Happé - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):56-57.details
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Cognitive Phenomenology: In Defense of Recombination.Preston Lennon - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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Experiences, thoughts, and qualia.Harold Langsam - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 99 (3):269-295.details
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In Defence of the Phenomenological Objection to Mental Fictionalism.Márton Miklós & Tőzsér János - 2020 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 27 (2):169-186.details
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Phenomenal content.Uriah Kriegel - 2002 - Erkenntnis 57 (2):175-198.details
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Theories of consciousness.Uriah Kriegel - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (1):58-64.details
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Intentionality, mind and folk psychology.Winand H. Dittrich & Stephen E. G. Lea - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):39-41.details
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Self-attributions help constitute mental types.Bernard W. Kobes - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):54-56.details
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Access and what it is like.Bernard W. Kobes - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):260-260.details
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Triangulating phenomenal consciousness.Patricia Kitcher - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):259-260.details
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Common sense and adult theory of communication.Boaz Keysar - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):54-54.details
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On distinguishing phenomenal consciousness from the representational functions of mind.Leonard D. Katz - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):258-259.details
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“Good developmental sequence” and the paradoxes of children's skills.Brian D. Josephson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):53-54.details
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Gopnik's invention of intentionality.Carl N. Johnson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):52-53.details
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Analyzing mental demonstratives.Greg Jarrett - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 84 (1):49-62.details
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Qualia for propositional attitudes?Frank Jackson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):52-52.details
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Empirical functionalism and conceivability arguments.H. Jacoby - 1989 - Philosophical Psychology 2 (3):271-82.details
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Blocking out the distinction between sensation and perception: Superblindsight and the case of Helen.Nicholas Humphrey - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):257-258.details
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The Importance of a Consideration of Qualia to Imagery and Cognition.Timothy L. Hubbard - 1995 - Consciousness and Cognition 5 (3):327-358.details
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Dispositions, logical states, and mental occurrents.Ronald C. Hoy - 1980 - Synthese 44 (2):207-40.details
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Analytic functionalism without representational functionalism.Terence Horgan - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):51-51.details
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Qualitative characteristics, type materialism and the circularity of analytic functionalism.Christopher S. Hill - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):50-51.details
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On Knowing How I Feel About That—A Process-Reliabilist Approach.Larry A. Herzberg - 2016 - Acta Analytica 31 (4):419-438.details
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The Metaphysics of Sensory ExperiencePapineau, David, The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021, pp. 176, £33.49 (hardback). [REVIEW]Benj Hellie - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.details
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Unraveling introspection.John Heil - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):49-50.details
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The nature and plausibility of cognitivism.John Haugeland - 1978 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1 (2):215-26.details
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Phenomenal fallacies and conflations.Gilbert Harman - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):256-257.details
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First-person current.Paul L. Harris - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):48-49.details
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Know my own mind? I should be so lucky!Jennifer M. Gurd & John C. Marshall - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):47-48.details
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On behalf of phenomenological parity for the attitudes.Keith Gunderson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):46-47.details
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Guilty consciousness.George Graham - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):255-256.details
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Self-ascription of belief and desire.Robert M. Gordon - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):45-46.details
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Theories and illusions.Alison Gopnik - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):90-100.details
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Theories and qualities.Alison Gopnik - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):44-45.details
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How we know our minds: The illusion of first-person knowledge of intentionality.Alison Gopnik - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):1-14.details
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The psychology of folk psychology.Alvin I. Goldman - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):15-28.details
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Simulationist Models of Face-based Emotion Recognition.Alvin I. Goldman & Chandra Sekhar Sripada - 2005 - Cognition 94 (3):193-213.details
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Functionalism, the theory-theory and phenomenology.Alvin I. Goldman - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):101-108.details
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Competing accounts of belief-task performance.Alvin I. Goldman - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):43-44.details
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A priori physicalism, lonely ghosts and cartesian doubt.Philip Goff - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):742-746.details
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Does mentality entail consciousness?Rocco J. Gennaro - 1995 - Philosophia 24 (3-4):331-58.details
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Qualia that it is right to Quine.Manuel Garcia-Carpintero - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):357-377.details
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Qualia that It Is Right to Quine.Manuel Garcia-Carpintero - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):357-377.details
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Tye-dyed teleology and the inverted spectrum.Jason Ford - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (2):267-281.details
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Perception, hallucination, and illusion: reply to my critics. [REVIEW]William Fish - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (1):57-66.details
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Goldman has not defeated folk functionalism.James H. Fetzer - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):42-43.details
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Is consciousness of perception really separable from perception?Martha J. Farah - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):254-255.details
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Qualia and vagueness.Anthony Everett - 1996 - Synthese 106 (2):205-226.details
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