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  1. Defending design arguments against Plantinga.Daniel von Wachter - 2014 - Philosophia Reformata 79 (1):54-65.
    This article criticises Alvin Plantinga’s claim that ‘basic’ design beliefs, which arise without a conscious inference, have more positive epistemic status than non-basic ones and that we cannot evaluate the probabilities involved in inferential, inductive design arguments.
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  • Strong Libertarian Free Will and Libet's Intentions.Daniel von Wachter - manuscript
    While other philosophers have pointed out that Libet's experiment is compatible with compatibilist free will and also with weak libertarian free will, this article argues that it is even compatible with strong libertarian free will (SLF), \ie a person's ability to initiate causal processes. Contrary to what Libet suggested, the actions in the experiment were motivated by urges. It is in accordance with SLF that the urges had preceding unconcious causes. Furthermore, Libet's observation that vetoing is possible confirmes SLF.
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  • Wie die Theologie eine Wissenschaft sein kann.Daniel von Wachter - 2022 - In Fabian F. Graßl, Harald Seubert & Daniel Von Wachter (eds.), Ist Theologie eine Wissenschaft? Evangelische Verlagsanstalt. pp. 31-60.
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  • Interacting Minds in the Physical World.Alin C. Cucu - 2022 - Dissertation, University of Lausanne
    Mental causation, idea that it is us – via our minds – who cause bodily actions is as commonsensical as it is indispensable for our understanding of ourselves as rational agents. Somewhat less uncontroversial, but nonetheless widespread (at least among ordinary people) is the idea that the mind is non-physical, following the intuition that what is physical can neither act nor think nor judge morally. Taken together, and cast into a metaphysical thesis, the two intuitions yield interactive dualism: the view (...)
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  • Kein Gehirnereignis kann ein späteres festlegen.Daniel von Wachter - 2012 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 66 (3):393-408.
    The claim of this article is that no event can determine a later event and that in this sense there cannot be sufficient causes. Therefore the causal structure of the world does not exclude free will, even if there are no chance processes.
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  • The Principle of the Causal Openness of the Physical.Daniel Von Wachter - 2019 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 26 (1):40-61.
    The argument from causal closure for physicalism requires the principle that a physical event can only occur through being necessitated by antecedent physical events. This article proposes a view of the causal structure of the world that claims not only that an event need not be necessitated by antecedent events, but that an event cannot be necessitated by antecedent events. All events are open to counteraction. In order to spell out various kinds of counteraction I introduce the idea of ‘directedness.’.
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