Abstract
Logical empiricism
is commonly seen as
a
counter-position to scientific realism.
In the present
paper
it is shown
that there indeed existed a realist faction within the logical empiricist
movement.
In particular, I shall point out
that
at least
four
types of realistic arguments
can be
distinguished within this faction: Reichenbach’s ‘probabilistic argument,’ Feigl’s
‘pragmatic
argument,’ Hempel’s ‘indispensability argument,’ and Kaila’s ‘invariantist argument.’
All
these
variations
of arguments are intended to prevent the logical empiricist agenda from
the
shortcomings of
radical
positivism, instrumentalism, and other forms of scientific antirealism.
On the whole,
it will be seen that logical empiricism and scientific realism are
essentially
compatible with each other.
Especially Kaila’s invariantist approach
to science (and nature)
comes quite close to what nowadays is discussed under the label ‘structural
realism.’
This, in
turn, necessitates a
fundamental reevaluation of Kaila’s role in the logical empiricist movement in particular
and in
twentieth-century philosophy of science in
general.