Abstract

This work is a phenomenological exploration of overgeneral memory in depressed patients. It reviews the current philosophical literature on the first-person experience of depression, which has so far omitted the phenomenon of overgeneral memory. However, this phenomenon is well documented within psychology; and this essay will show that its symptomatic appearance in depression and subsequent disturbance of self- experience justifies attention to the phenomenon within the phenomenology of depression. Both the theory of embodiment and the extended mind thesis work extensively with the nature of memory in other conditions such as Alzheimer's and dementia. Thus, these philosophical approaches will be utilised in an analysis of overgeneral memory; this will enrich the philosophy of depression, memory and self and highlight the value of the concepts of embodiment and the extended mind. Moreover, this philosophical interrogation suggests a route toward therapeutic interventions to help patients suffering from overgeneral memory applying techniques from extended mind and cognition studies.