- Inference to the best explanation.Peter Lipton - 1991 - New York: Routledge.details
|
|
Précis of Inference to the Best Explanation, 2 nd Edition.Peter Lipton - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2):421-423.details
|
|
Epistemic Modals.Seth Yalcin - 2007 - Mind 116 (464):983-1026.details
|
|
Belief as Question‐Sensitive.Seth Yalcin - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (1):23-47.details
|
|
Mental causation.Stephen Yablo - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (2):245-280.details
|
|
Scientific explanation.James Woodward - 1979 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 30 (1):41-67.details
|
|
Making things happen: a theory of causal explanation.James F. Woodward - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Bayesianism and language change.Jon Williamson - 2003 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 12 (1):53-97.details
|
|
Explanatory Depth.Brad Weslake - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (2):273-294.details
|
|
The scientific image.C. Van Fraassen Bas - 1980 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
The causal and unification approaches to explanation unified—causally.Michael Strevens - 2004 - Noûs 38 (1):154–176.details
|
|
Epistemic consequentialism.Robert Stalnaker - 2002 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 76 (1):153–168.details
|
|
Black box inference: When should intervening variables be postulated?Elliott Sober - 1998 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (3):469-498.details
|
|
Resiliency, propensities, and causal necessity.Brian Skyrms - 1977 - Journal of Philosophy 74 (11):704-713.details
|
|
Causal necessity: a pragmatic investigation of the necessity of laws.Brian Skyrms - 1980 - New Haven: Yale University Press.details
|
|
Subjunctive Conditional Probability.Wolfgang Schwarz - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 47 (1):47-66.details
|
|
Counterfactual Triviality: A Lewis‐Impossibility Argument for Counterfactuals.J. Robert & G. Williams - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):648-670.details
|
|
The Population Ethics of Belief: In Search of an Epistemic Theory X.Richard Pettigrew - 2018 - Noûs 52 (2):336-372.details
|
|
A New Epistemic Utility Argument for the Principal Principle.Richard G. Pettigrew - 2013 - Episteme 10 (1):19-35.details
|
|
Accuracy, Chance, and the Principal Principle.Richard Pettigrew - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (2):241-275.details
|
|
Quantitative parsimony.Daniel Nolan - 1997 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (3):329-343.details
|
|
Scoring Rules and Epistemic Compromise.Sarah Moss - 2011 - Mind 120 (480):1053-1069.details
|
|
Contrastive Explanation.Peter Lipton - 1990 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 27:247-266.details
|
|
Erratum: Probabilities of Conditionals and Conditional Probabilities.David Lewis - 1976 - Philosophical Review 85 (4):561.details
|
|
Counterfactual Dependence and Time’s Arrow.David Lewis - 1979 - Noûs 13 (4):455-476.details
|
|
Causal decision theory.David Lewis - 1981 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 59 (1):5 – 30.details
|
|
Counterfactuals.David K. Lewis - 1973 - Malden, Mass.: Blackwell.details
|
|
An Objective Justification of Bayesianism I: Measuring Inaccuracy.Hannes Leitgeb & Richard Pettigrew - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (2):201-235.details
|
|
Laws and their stability.Marc Lange - 2005 - Synthese 144 (3):415Ð432.details
|
|
The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory.James M. Joyce - 1999 - Cambridge University Press.details
|
|
A nonpragmatic vindication of probabilism.James M. Joyce - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (4):575-603.details
|
|
The Logic of Decision.Richard C. Jeffrey - 1965 - New York, NY, USA: University of Chicago Press.details
|
|
Theory Change and Bayesian Statistical Inference.Jan-Willem Romeijn - 2005 - Philosophy of Science 72 (5):1174-1186.details
|
|
Program explanation: A general perspective.Frank Jackson & Philip Pettit - 1990 - Analysis 50 (2):107-17.details
|
|
Functionalism and broad content.Frank Jackson & Philip Pettit - 1988 - Mind 97 (July):318-400.details
|
|
What conditional probability could not be.Alan Hájek - 2003 - Synthese 137 (3):273--323.details
|
|
Justifying conditionalization: Conditionalization maximizes expected epistemic utility.Hilary Greaves & David Wallace - 2006 - Mind 115 (459):607-632.details
|
|
Epistemic Decision Theory.Hilary Greaves - 2013 - Mind 122 (488):915-952.details
|
|
Imaging and conditionalization.Peter Gärdenfors - 1982 - Journal of Philosophy 79 (12):747-760.details
|
|
How do simple rules `fit to reality' in a complex world?Malcolm R. Forster - 1999 - Minds and Machines 9 (4):543-564.details
|
|
The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by John Henry McDowell.details
|
|
Epistemic Expansions.Jennifer Carr - 2015 - Res Philosophica 92 (2):217-236.details
|
|
Rational Probabilistic Incoherence.Michael Caie - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (4):527-575.details
|
|
Guillermo Owen's Proof Of The Minimax Theorem.Ken Binmore - 2004 - Theory and Decision 56 (1-2):19-23.details
|
|
Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions.Selim Berker - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (3):337-393.details
|
|
Quantitative Parsimony and Explanatory Power.Alan Baker - 2003 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (2):245-259.details
|
|
A heuristic for conceptual change.Frank Arntzenius - 1995 - Philosophy of Science 62 (3):357-369.details
|
|
Quantitative Parsimony and Explanatory Power.Baker Alan - 2003 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (2):245-259.details
|
|
Rationality and Self-Confidence.Frank Arntzenius - 2007 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology:Volume 2: Volume 2. Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Rational Credence and the Value of Truth.Allan Gibbard - 2007 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology:Volume 2: Volume 2. Oxford University Press.details
|
|