The Standard View of personal identity says that someone who exists now can exist at another time only if there is continuity of her mental contents or capacities. But no person is psychologically continuous with a fetus, for a fetus, at least early in its career. has no mental features at all. So the Standard View entails that no person was ever a fetus---contrary to the popular assumption that an unthinking fetus is a potential person. It is also mysterious what (...) does ordinarily happen to a human fetus, if it does not come to be a person. Although an extremely complex variant of the Standard View may allow one to persist without psychological continuity before one becomes a person but not afterwards, a far simpler solution is to accept a radically non-psychological account of our identity. (shrink)

According to Peter van Inwagen, visible inanimate objects do not, strictly speaking, exist. In defending this controversial thesis, he offers fresh insights on such topics as personal identity, commonsense belief, existence over time, the phenomenon of vagueness, and the relation between metaphysics and ordinary language.

The whole brain-death criterion of death now enjoys a wide acceptance both within the medical profession and among the general public. That acceptance is in large part the product of the contention that brain death is the proper criterion for even a conservative definition of death – the irreversible loss of the integrated functioning of the organism as a whole. This claim – most recently made in the report of the Presidential Commission and in a comprehensive article by James Bernat (...) and others – is based upon a series of fallacious arguments. Chief among these is the argument that whole brain-death is the proper criterion for the conservative definition because the brain is the organ that integrates the rest of the organism. A central part of the paper shows that this argument rests upon a confusion between a function and the mechanism that performs it, and replies to the defenses that the Presidential Commission makes on this point. The concluding portion of the paper argues that this issue is not merely of academic interest, but has the potential for undermining the present consensus that supports the use of whole brain-death criteria. * Keywords: brain-death, definition of death, determination of death * I would like to thank Howard Brody and Bruce Miller for helpful suggestions and criticisms. CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

When does a human being begin to exist? We argue that it is possible, through a combination of biological fact and philosophical analysis, to provide a definitive answer to this question. We lay down a set of conditions for being a human being, and we determine when, in the course of normal fetal development, these conditions are first satisfied. Issues dealt with along the way include: modes of substance-formation, twinning, the nature of the intra-uterine environment, and the nature of the (...) relation between fetus and mother (connection, parthood, dependence). (shrink)

The question ‘What is death?’ is by no means exclusively or primarily a question of medical science. It is, in the last analysis, a philosophical question. The philosopher’s role in the discussion of death is twofold: On the one hand, he has to explore those highly intelligible and essentially necessary aspects of death which no other human science investigates. This task includes a phenomenology of life and death, an ontology and metaphysics, as well as a philosophical anthropology of death. It (...) likewise includes an analysis of the language of death and life and of the logical structure of the arguments used in the debates about life and death. On the other hand the philosopher has to warn representatives of other disciplines against concluding too much from the little they know and extending their methods to areas where they are not appropriate. Careful reflection on both philosophical knowledge and philosophical ignorance concerning death shows, I shall argue, that the definition of death in terms of ‘brain death’ ought to be rejected. (shrink)

The question ‘What is death?’ is by no means exclusively or primarily a question of medical science. It is, in the last analysis, a philosophical question. The philosopher’s role in the discussion of death is twofold: On the one hand, he has to explore those highly intelligible and essentially necessary aspects of death which no other human science investigates. This task includes a phenomenology of life and death, an ontology and metaphysics, as well as a philosophical anthropology of death. It (...) likewise includes an analysis of the language of death and life and of the logical structure of the arguments used in the debates about life and death. On the other hand the philosopher has to warn representatives of other disciplines against concluding too much from the little they know and extending their methods to areas where they are not appropriate. Careful reflection on both philosophical knowledge and philosophical ignorance concerning death shows, I shall argue, that the definition of death in terms of ‘brain death’ ought to be rejected. (shrink)

This paper reviews moral and cultural assessments which led to the definition of brain death and calls for a similar normative consensus regarding the moral recognition and legal protection of embryonal life related to criteria of brain life. This paper differentiates between cortical brain life I, i.e., the first existence of post-mitotic stationary neurons forming the early cortical plate (54th day post conception), and cortical brain life II, i.e., the beginning of cortical neuro-neuronal synapses (after the 70th day p.c.). The (...) latter are preconditional for establishing the communicative network within the cortex and with subcortical structures. The paper conservatively calls for a tentative moral consensus that could recognize brain life I, i.e., the 54th day p.c., as a stage prior to which embryo research generally would be acceptable in accordance with principles similar to those which led to the acceptance of brain death. Other developmental stages such as fertilization, nidation, viability, as well as the ‘potentiality’ principle are less significant for the moral recognition of early human life. Keywords: brain death, brain life, embryo research, embryonal tissue CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

In an attempt to provide some clarification in the abortion issue it has recently been proposed that since 'brain death' is used to define the end of life, 'brain life' would be a logical demarcation for life's beginning. This paper argues in support of this position, not on empirical grounds, but because of what it reflects of what is valuable about the term 'life'. It is pointed out that 'life' is an ambiguous concept as it is used in English, obscuring (...) the differences between being alive and having a life, a crucial distinction for bioethical questions. The implications of this distinction for the moral debate about abortion are discussed. (shrink)

The concept of brain birth has assumed a position of some significance in discussions on the status of the human embryo and on the point in embryonic development prior to which experimental procedures may be undertaken on human embryos. This paper reviews previous discussions of this concept, which have placed brain birth at various points between 12 days' and 20 weeks' gestation and which have emphasised the symmetry of brain birth and brain death. Major developmental features of brain development are (...) outlined, including the gradualness with which new features generally appear, and also the electroencephalogram (EEG) characteristics of premature infants. From this it is concluded that, if the concept of brain birth is a valid one, it should be placed at 24-28 weeks' gestation. More importantly, it is concluded that the differences between brain development and brain death throw doubt on the concept itself. (shrink)

Michael Lockwood has recently concluded that it can be morally permissible to perform potentially damaging non-therapeutic experiments on live human (pre)embryos. The reasons he provides in support of this conclusion commit him inter alia to the following controversial theses: (i) an organism's potential for twinning bears critically on the identity conditions for that organism; and (ii) functionally intact mentality-mediating neurological structures play a critical role in establishing the identity conditions for human organisms. I argue that Lockwood has given us no (...) good reason to endorse either of these theses and, hence, that he has given us no good reason to believe that it can be morally permissible to perform potentially damaging non-therapeutic experiments on live human (pre)embryos. (shrink)

This paper suggests that medically the term a 'human being' should be defined by the presence of an active human brain. The brain is the only unique and irreplaceable organ in the human body, as the orchestrator of all organ systems and the seat of personality. Thus, the presence or absence of brain life truly defines the presence or absence of human life in the medical sense. When viewed in this way, human life may be seen as a continuous spectrum (...) between the onset of brain life in utero (eight weeks gestation), until the occurrence of brain death. At any point human tissue or organ systems may be present, but without the presence of a functional human brain, these do not constitute a 'human being', at least in a medical sense. The implications of this theory for various ethical concerns such as in vitro fertilisation and abortion are discussed. This theory is the most consistent possible for the definition of a human being with no contradictions inherent. However, having a good theory of definition of a 'human being' does not necessarily solve the ethical problems discussed herein. (shrink)

The concept of whole‐brain death is under attack again. Scholars are arguing that the concept of brain death per se—regardless of the focus on “higher,” “stem” or “whole”—is fundamentally flawed. These scholars have identified what they believe are serious discrepancies between the definition and criterion of brain death, and have pointed out that medical professionals and lay persons remain confused about its meaning. Yet whole‐brain death remains the standard for determining death in much of the Western world and its defenders (...) believe this concept best maps onto our everyday conception of death. (shrink)

The usual way for new cells to come into being is by division of old cells. So the zygote, which is a—new—single cell formed from two, the sperm and ovum, is an exception. Textbooks of human genetics usually say that this new cell is beginning of a new human individual. What this indicates is that they suddenly forget about identical twins.

The usual way for new cells to come into being is by division of old cells. So the zygote, which is a—new—single cell formed from two, the sperm and ovum, is an exception. Textbooks of human genetics usually say that this new cell is beginning of a new human individual. What this indicates is that they suddenly forget about identical twins.

When Did I Begin? investigates the theoretical, moral, and biological issues surrounding the debate over the beginning of human life. With the continuing controversy over the use of in vitro fertilization techniques and experimentation with human embryos, these issues have been forced into the arena of public debate. Following a detailed analysis of the history of the question, Reverend Ford argues that a human individual could not begin before definitive individuation occurs with the appearance of the primitive streak about two (...) weeks after fertilization. This, he argues, is when it becomes finally known whether one or more human individuals are to form from a single egg. Thus, he questions the idea that the fertilized egg itself could be regarded as the beginning of the development of the human individual. The author also differs sharply, however, from those who would delay the beginning of the human person until the brain is formed, or until birth or the onset of conscious states. (shrink)

The process of embryogenesis poses numerous philosophical puzzles. Conceptual difficulties encountered while attempting to clarify the ontological and moral status of the fertilized ovum, for example, are compounded in the minds of some philosophers by the possible occurrence of monozygotic twinning during the earliest stages of embryological development. In light of certain conceptual complexities engendered by this possibility, G.E.M. Anscombe, for example, has come to believe that the pivotal metaphysical query in need of an adequate response is the following: Is (...) the human zygote a single human? The answer to this question is of interest to Anscombe primarily for the role it would play in solving the following puzzle: Suppose that zygote A divides into twins B and B1, such that neither B nor B1 is identical with its twin or with A. It then seems clear that either A, prior to its division, was somehow already B and B1; or A was a single human out of which another human grew ; or A, which was a single human, became two humans, much like an amoeba becomes two amoebae; or A is a "whole human substantial entity". (shrink)

This essay deals with the question of the morality of abortion and infanticide. The fundamental ethical objection traditionally advanced against these practices rests on the contention that human fetuses and infants have a right to life, and it is this claim that is the primary focus of attention here. Consequently, the basic question to be discussed is what properties a thing must possess in order to have a serious right to life. The approach involves defending, then, a basic principle specifying (...) a condition living things must satisfy to have a serious right to life, and the answer given makes it unlikely that this condition is satisfied by human fetuses and infants, though this tentative conclusion could be altered by future scientific studies of the development of the human brain. As things stand at the moment, however, it seems unlikely that developing humans acquire the physical basis of the psychological capacities on which the right to continued existence rests, and therefore unless there are other substantial objections to abortion and infanticide that undercut the above line of thought, the conclusion is that such practices are not intrinsically wrong. (shrink)