This chapter is meant to address the extent to which value-based reasoning—as involved in balancing and proportionality—may include quantitative reasoning, according to arithmetic constraints. Relying on some work on cognitive and evolutionary psychology, it is argued that processing non-symbolic approximate magnitudes is a fundamental cognitive capacity, which is deployed also when we are reasoning with goals and values. A model is developed for determining the impact of alternative choice on multiple values, assessing the utilities so produced and merging these utilities (...) into an overall evaluation, which may be used in comparisons. The model is applied to assessing legislative choice on rights and social values, according to proportionality. Finally, it is shown how proportionality assessments may be constrained by the requirement of consistency with precedents. (shrink)

“Vulnerability” is a key concept for research ethics and public health ethics. This term can be discussed from either a conceptual or a practical perspective. I previously proposed the metaphor of layers to understand how this concept functions from the conceptual perspective in human research. In this paper I will clarify how my analysis includes other definitions of vulnerability. Then, I will take the practical‐ethical perspective, rejecting the usefulness of taxonomies to analyze vulnerabilities. My proposal specifies two steps and provides (...) a procedural guide to help rank layers. I introduce the notion of cascade vulnerability and outline the dispositional nature of layers of vulnerability to underscore the importance of identifying their stimulus condition. In addition, I identify three kinds of obligations and some strategies to implement them. This strategy outlines the normative force of harmful layers of vulnerability. It offers concrete guidance. It contributes substantial content to the practical sphere but it does not simplify or idealize research subjects, research context or public health challenges. (shrink)

This book analyses the general structure of constitutional rights reasoning under the German Basic Law. It deals with a wide range of problems common to all systems of constitutional rights review. In an extended introduction the translator argues for its applicability to the British Constitution, with particular reference to the Human Rights Act 1998.