One of the main issues that dominates Neoplatonism in late antique philosophy of the 3rd–6th centuries A.D. is the nature of the first principle, called the ‘One’. From Plotinus onward, the principle is characterized as the cause of all things, since it produces the plurality of intelligible Forms, which in turn constitute the world’s rational and material structure. Given this, the tension that faces Neoplatonists is that the One, as the first cause, must transcend all things that are characterized by (...) plurality—yet because it causes plurality, the One must anticipate plurality within itself. This becomes the main mo- tivation for this study’s focus on two late Neoplatonists, Proclus (5th cent. A.D.) and Damascius (late 5th–early 6th cent. A.D.): both attempt to address this tension in two rather different ways. Proclus’ attempted solution is to posit intermediate principles (the ‘henads’) that mirror the One’s nature, as ‘one’, but directly cause plurality. This makes the One only a cause of unity, while its production of plurality is mediated by the henads that it produces. Damascius, while appropriating Proclus’ framework, thinks that this is not enough: if the One is posed as a cause of all things, it must be directly related to plurality, even if its causality is mediated through the henads. Damascius then splits Proclus’ One into two entities: (1) the Ineffable as the first ‘principle’, which is absolutely transcendent and has no causal relation; and (2) the One as the first ‘cause’ of all things, which is only relatively transcendent under the Ineffable. -/- Previous studies that compare Proclus and Damascius tend to focus either on the Ineffable or a skeptical shift in epistemology, but little work has been done on the causal framework which underlies both figures’ positions. Thus, this study proposes to focus on the causal frameworks behind each figure: why and how does Proclus propose to assert that the One is a cause, at the same time that it transcends its final effect? And what leads Damascius to propose a notion of the One’s causality that no longer makes it transcendent in the way that a higher principle, like the Ineffable, is? The present work will answer these questions in two parts. In the first, Proclus’ and Damascius’ notions of causality will be examined, insofar as they apply to all levels of being. In the second part, the One’s causality will be examined for both figures: for Proclus, the One’s causality in itself and the causality of its intermediate principles; for Damascius, the One’s causality, and how the Ineffable is needed to explain the One. The outcome of this study will show that Proclus’ framework results in an inner tension that Damascius is responding to with his notion of the One. While Damascius’ own solution implies its own tension, he at least solves a difficulty in Proclus—and in so doing, partially returns to a notion of the One much like Iamblichus’ and Plotinus’ One. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to provide some acquaintance with the exegetical history of ἐξαίφνης inside the Platonic Tradition, from Plato to Marsilio Ficino, by way of Middle Platonism and Greek Neoplatonism. (Since this is only a draft, several modifications should be made later, notably in order to improve the English.) Some part has been presented in Los Angeles: “Damascius’ Theodicy: Psychic Input of Disorder and Evil into the World”, 16th Annual ISNS (International Society for Neoplatonic Studies) Conference, (...) Loyola Marymount University, 14th June 2018. (shrink)

Federico Pendasio was a highly esteemed professor at the universities of Padua and Bologna. His contemporaries as well as modern scholars have recognized his commitment both to Aristotle and Plato. The aim of this paper is to provide a contribution to the study of the dissemination of Platonism in sixteenth-century university teaching by examining Pendasio’s Platonic sources, in particular Olympiodorus’s and Damascius’s commentaries on Plato’s Phaedo, Damascius’s commentary on the Philebus and Hermias Alexandrinus’s Scholia on the Phaedrus. These (...) works are used in two of Pendasio’s most representative works: his De animae immortalitate and Lectiones dictatae in librum De anima. In order to assess Pendasio’s interests in Platonism, a general survey of most of his university lectures and quaestiones will also be provided. (shrink)

_Theurgy and the Soul_ is a study of Iamblichus of Syria, whose teachings set the final form of pagan spirituality prior to the Christianization of the Roman Empire. Gregory Shaw focuses on the theory and practice of theurgy, the most controversial and significant aspect of Iamblichus's Platonism. Theurgy literally means "divine action." Unlike previous Platonists who stressed the elevated status of the human soul, Iamblichus taught that the soul descended completely into the body and thereby required the performance of theurgic (...) rites—revealed by the gods—to unite the soul with the One. Iamblichus was once considered one of the great philosophers whose views on the soul and the importance of ritual profoundly influenced subsequent Platonists such as Proclus and Damascius. The Emperor Julian followed Iamblichus's teachings to guide the restoration of traditional pagan cults in his campaign against Christianity. Although Julian was unsuccessful, Iamblichus's ideas persisted well into the Middle Ages and beyond. His vision of a hierarchical cosmos united by divine ritual became the dominant world view for the entire medieval world and played an important role in the Renaissance Platonism of Marsilio Ficino. Even Ralph Waldo Emerson wrote that he expected a reading of Iamblichus to cause a "revival in the churches." But modern scholars have dismissed him, seeing theurgy as ritual magic or "manipulation of the gods." Shaw, however, shows that theurgy was a subtle and intellectually sophisticated attempt to apply Platonic and Pythagorean teachings to the full expression of human existence in the material world. (shrink)

O artigo oferece uma breve exposição da biografia e do contexto histórico do filósofo neoplatônico Damáscio (c. 458 - c. 538) para, na sequência, apresentar a tradução de um dos seus poemas líricos do período final de sua vida. O procedimento adotado justifica-se pelo caráter lutuoso e decididamente pessoal dos versos, nos quais Damáscio lamenta consigo próprio as perdas sofridas no decorrer de sua longa e fascinante vida. Como veremos, tais perdas estão, em verdade, diretamente ligadas ao colapso do mundo (...) antigo e ao derradeiro golpe proferido por Justiniano contra a filosofia helênica pagã. (shrink)

One of the most famous and most important commentaries of the Neoplatonist Simplicius treats the Physics of Aristotle. Several times, having commented the text within the Aristotelian frame, Simplicius treats the same subject again but now under a Neoplatonist perspective. These texts are called corollaries and one of them is about time. Discussing other Neoplatonist views about time (esp. Pseudo-Archytas, Plotinus, Damascius, Jamblichus), he tries to clarify the nature of our physical time arising from and differentiating (diakrisis) a ”first“ (...) unmoving time. What Simplicius calls ”first time“ is the very first difference in being, identical with the fact that the soul (psyche) contains the structure of the totality of things in itself before they exist materially (vorweg-bei-anderem-Sein der Seele), which makes possible the original synthesis of becoming. Following this line, our physical time brings unity to the ever changing nature. (shrink)

Această carte discută problema fundamentală a neoplatonismului – cea a unui principiu de dincolo de ființă și de gândire – în operele celor mai importanți reprezentanți ai acestui curent filozofic: Plotin, Porfir, Iamblichos, Proclus și Damascius. Este vorba despre una dintre cele mai pasionante înfruntări din istoria filozofiei, care pornește de la câteva indicații enigmatice din dialogurile lui Platon, referitoare la sursa cunoașterii și a ființei lucrurilor. Depășind distincția platonică dintre lumea sensibilă și cea inteligibilă, filozofii neoplatonici au căutat (...) să înțeleagă principiul absolut, numit unu sau bine, care face posibilă lumea inteligibilă însăși și realitatea în ansamblul ei, dar care trece astfel dincolo de ființă și de gândire. Volumul de față urmăreşte modul în care evoluează căutarea principiului – cu intriga, desfăşurarea şi deznodământul ei –, dezvăluind disputele interpretative, directe sau indirecte, ce se ţes între filozofii neoplatonici. Miza analizei este aceea de a arăta că, departe de a reprezentaun „dat“ dogmatic inflexibil, problema principiului de dincolo de fiinţă nu încetează să se adâncească şi să se reformuleze, cu mereu alte dificultăţi, de-a lungul tradiţiei neoplatonice. (shrink)