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Dubious objections from iterated conjunctions

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Abstract

The knowledge account of assertion (KAA)—roughly: one should not assert what one does not know—can explain a variety of Moorean conjunctions, a fact often cited as evidence in its favor. David Sosa has objected that the account does not generalize satisfactorily, since it cannot explain the infelicity of certain iterated conjunctions without appealing to the controversial “KK” principle. This essay responds by showing how the knowledge account can handle such conjunctions without use of the KK principle.

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Notes

  1. I call these “Moorean conjunctions” rather than “Moore’s paradox” because (i) it is important to distinguish them from the original Moorean paradox involving belief, particularly the form “p but I don’t believe that p”; and (ii) some (though not I) take instances of (1) to be not at all paradoxical, or at least less paradoxical than the original. Following Sosa, I shall still refer to (1) as “Moorean.”

  2. On the distinction between clunks and clashes, see DeRose (2009, p. 208, n. 17).

  3. As Sosa notes (2009, p. 270). That its conjuncts can be known provides the KAA-theorist with a good explanation for why (2) would only clunk but not clash: because it can be known, it shouldn’t clash as does (1).

  4. Thanks to an anonymous referee here.

  5. See Moore (1962, p. 277), Unger (1975, p. 253), and DeRose (1991, pp. 597–605 and 2009, p. 93).

  6. As Unger (1975, p. 262) put it.

  7. Note that these sorts of explanation can also account for the oddity of similar iterated conjunctions provided by Sosa (2009, p. 271), e.g.

    • (4) p but I doubt that I know that p

    • (5) p but I believe that I don’t know that p

    • (6) p but I have no justification for believing that I know that p

    • (7) p but I have (sufficient) justification for believing that I don’t know that p

    KAA predicts that flat-out asserting the first conjunct as in (4)–(7) represents the speaker as knowing that p; but it’s irresponsible and misleading for a speaker to assert so as to represent herself as knowing while also calling into question that she in fact knows. Such a speaker, in asserting the second conjunct, shows that she shouldn’t have flat-out (rather than hedgingly) asserted the first conjunct.

  8. And also by Williamson (2000, p. 256), though he labels the dimensions “permissibility” and “reasonability”.

  9. Thanks to an anonymous referee here.

References

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Acknowledgments

Thanks to Christoph Kelp, Blake Roeber, Jonathan Schaffer, Ernest Sosa, John Turri, and an anonymous referee for helpful comments.

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Correspondence to Matthew A. Benton.

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Benton, M.A. Dubious objections from iterated conjunctions. Philos Stud 162, 355–358 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-011-9769-3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-011-9769-3

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