Abstract
In this paper we advocate the thesis that qualia are tropes (or qualitons), and not (universal) properties. The main advantage of the thesis is that we can accept both the Wittgensteinian and Sellarsian assault on the given and the claim that only subjective and private states can do justice to the qualitative character of experience. We hint that if we take qualia to be tropes, we dissolve the problem of inverted qualia. We develop an account of sensory concept acquisition that takes the presence of qualia as an enabling condition for learning. We argue that qualia taken to be qualitons are part of our mechanism of sensory concept acquisition.
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Notes
Take two parallel lines of the same size. On the top one, place inward arrows at both ends of the line. On the bottom line, place outward arrows at both ends of the line. The bottom one will seem longer.
Several other features are commonly attributed to qualia. Typically, for instance, they are taken to be categorical, i.e., non-dispositional states. Different from functional properties, such as a belief understood as what would someone answer if the question arises, qualia have none of this what-would-be-if element. Interestingly, one could argue that qualia are dispositional if they are taken to be a disposition to recognize something as something under the right stimuli conditions. Robb and Heil (2003) diagnose that some of the difficulties around the notion of qualia can be dispelled if we abandon the idea that properties are either dispositional or categorical.
Mary, in Jackson thought experiment, is to be understood as having the qualitative counterpart of red missing while she is in the black and white room. As she was not exposed to anything red, she did not display the ready-made expected subjective state corresponding to the image of something red (Jackson 1986). Jackson's Knowledge Argument – there are facts about qualia unknown to Mary in the black and white room – is often used to support the existence of phenomenal concepts, concepts that refer to intrinsic, qualitative properties of experience (Fürst 2004). So the phenomenal concept of 'red' refers to red qualia.
We think Lowe’s argument has to assume too much concerning the phenomenology of perception. Further, it is unclear that in his general terms the universalist (such as Levinson) doesn’t have a cogent reply available. Our argument in what follows concentrates rather on how to go about the qualia dilemma we presented in Sect. 1.
If we can think of a as a Fa, there should be at least one G such that we are able to think of Ga and at least on b such that we are able to think of Fb, in order to satisfy the generality constraint (Evans 1982, p. 100-1).
Some physicalists deal with Jackson's Knowledge Argument by appealing to Fregean senses. What Mary obtains straight away when she leaves the room is not knowledge of new, irreducible phenomenal facts, but a new mode of presentation of (known) physical facts. This strategy avoids commitment to a Given, but brings the somewhat mysterious Fregean senses into the picture. Moreover, if senses are part of the world, Mary would then fail to know all the facts before leaving the room. Like Derek Ball (2009), we think it is more promising to dispense with phenomenal concepts altogether. Ball refers to the phenomenon of deference to explain how Mary, still in the room, can possess all color's concepts without having to appeal to phenomenal concepts. So when Mary leaves the room, there is no physical fact new to her. However, Ball does not explain what happens with Mary, what changes take place in her subjective and private life. If qualia are seen as qualitons, Mary simply has new qualitons when she leaves the room. In our approach, as qualitons have no intentional content, nothing would in principle preclude naturalizing qualia.
Qualia as tropes could be part of a naturalized picture of the mind, where those other relations of similarity play a role in our neurophysiology. Michael Beaton (2009) has coined the term moderate phenomenal realism to describe his position in contrast with Chalmers (who would hold a strong version of phenomenal realism). Beaton proposes to define qualia as the introspectible properties (if any) that can still vary (within or between agents); however, many properties that can be understood in terms of propositional attitude have been fixed. His proposal, still committed to qualia as universals (properties), would constitute a moderate phenomenal realism because it has no commitment to a non-reductive nature of qualia. We believe our proposal would also be in the moderate phenomenal realist camp as qualitons (and relations of similarity between them) could be part of a naturalized picture of the mind.
Hacker's comments (1993) on this section suggest an interpretation of Wittgenstein that favors, in our view, the view of sensations as tropes. He tell us that what Wittgenstein "is doing is rejecting the grammar of name and object." Having a pain is not like having a penny. So, pain is not concrete. Also, it does not make sense to say that we have now the same pain we had yesterday. So, pain is not a universal. These together suggest that pain is an abstract particular. At the same time, a sensation is not a nothing, as it's not the absence of anything. It is nothing only in the sense that it cannot be used unaided in predications.
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Acknowledgments
We would like to thank David Chalmers, Alexandre Costa-Leite, Tomás Ribeiro Cardoso, Erick de Lima, Juliana de Orione and Cesar Schirmer for useful comments on earlier versions of the text.
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Bensusan, H., de Carvalho, E. Qualia Qua Qualitons: Mental Qualities as Abstract Particulars. Acta Anal 26, 155–163 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-010-0099-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-010-0099-4