Abstract
Philosophers and psychologists widely hold that artifact categories – just like biological categories – are individuated by their function. But recent empirical findings in psychology question this assumption. My proposal is to suggest a way of squaring these findings with the central role function should play in individuating artifact categories. But in order to do so, we need to give up on the standard account of artifact function, according to which function is fixed by design, and replace it with a more context-sensitive account, according to which function attributions depend on the explanatory context and, as a result, categorization also depends on the explanatory context, just as the empirical findings from psychology suggest. I argue that the recent ‘modal theory of function’ originally proposed to explain biological function, is capable of providing such an account of artifact function.
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Notes
Even those who aim to reconsider the role the notion of design plays in the explanation of biological function (for example, Allen and Bekoff 1995; Buller 2002) accept a weaker claim that if x is designed to do F, then the function of x is to do F. For dissenting views, see Preston 1998, Vermaas-Houkes 2003, 2004.
There are two main strategies available for the advocate of the etiological view. The first is to bite the bullet and agree that the heart and kidney of the swampman do not have any function (Neander 1996; Papineau 1996; Millikan 1996). The second is to deny the possibility (or the biological/philosophical relevance) of the emergence of swampman (Dennett 1996; Millikan 1996; Neander 1991b; Papineau 2001).
It may not be entirely clear why the propensity theory of function faces the trait type individuation problem. According to the propensity definition, a trait “has a (biological) function just when it confers a survival enhancing propensity on a creature that possesses it” (Bigelow and Pargetter 1987, p. 192). As Peter Godfrey-Smith pointed out, this definition hides a type/token ambiguity and, more generally, the propensity theory oscillates between talking about the propensity of a trait token (see, for example, Bigelow and Pargetter 1987, p. 192) and taking about the propensity of a trait type (see, for example, Bigelow and Pargetter 1987, pp. 194–195). Godfrey-Smith argues, convincingly, that while both readings face problems, the latter is the more plausible among the two (Godfrey-Smith 1994, p. 360). But regardless of what may be the most charitable interpretation of the propensity account, it is worth considering whether a ‘token’ version of the propensity account could avoid the trait type individuation objection. My answer, unsurprisingly, is that it couldn’t, for the following reason. One of the best-known objection to the propensity account is that the fitness of an organism always depends on the environment as well as the other organisms in that environment. Hence, if the function of a trait is identified with its capacity to contribute to the fitness of the organism, then it needs to be specified in what environment and against what other organisms it will do so (Godfrey Smith 1994, pp. 352–353). Further, whether the propensity of a token trait contributes to the organism’s fitness also depends on whether the other traits and organs of this organism cooperate. The propensity view wants to fill this gap by referring to the ‘natural habitat’ of the organism: a trait has a function if it has a capacity to contribute to the fitness of the organism in the ‘natural habitat’ of the organism. As Bigelow and Pargetter say, “when we speak of the function of a character, therefore, we mean that the character generates propensities that are survival-enhancing in the creature’s natural habitat” (Bigelow and Pargetter 1987, p. 192). What they mean by ‘natural habitat’ encompasses not only the environment and the other organisms in this environment, but also other organs of the same organism. The objection raised by some of the critics of the propensity view (Neander 1991b, Godfrey Smith 1994; Walsh 1996) is that the only way they can make sense of this notion of ‘natural habitat’ is to identify it with the past habitat of the organism, which would make the propensity view into a version of the etiological view it aims to replace. But for the present purposes we do not even need to accept this conclusion. What matters for us is that when taking about the inter- and intra-organismic ‘natural habitat’ of a token organism in the definition of the function of a token trait, the propensity account needs to bring in trait types – the trait types of the other traits of the organism that the propensity of the trait in question depends on. Even if we don’t hold that the concept of ‘natural habitat’ is intrinsically problematic, it is sufficient for us to see that it presupposes an independent account of trait type individuation. In short, the propensity view is not in a better position than the etiological one when it comes to avoiding the trait type individuation objection.
While Lewis’s theory is useful in many ways – especially in clarifying how function attribution depends on the explanatory context in terms of what counts as a ‘relatively close’ possible world, see esp. Nanay 2012 – it is somewhat misleading in some other ways. If x is doing F in the actual world and this contributes to O’s inclusive fitness, then this, being the actual world, is closer than the closest possible world where x is doing F but this does not contributes to O’s inclusive fitness. Should we then conclude that whatever x is doing in the actual world in such a way that it contributes to O’s inclusive fitness automatically makes it x’s function? No we shouldn’t. This is why the definition put a restriction on the ‘relatively close’ possible, but not actual, worlds. What this means is that x may or may not be doing F in the actual world, but when looking for the closest possible worlds where it’s doing F contributes to O’s inclusive fitness, we should ignore the actual world. This point will play an important role in Section 7(a). Thanks for an anonymous referee for pushing me on this issue.
The reference to the ‘fulfillment of the goals of the agent who is using the artifact’ is by no means new in trying to understanding artifact function. Boorse’s account of function (Boorse 1976), for example, takes the function of an artifact to be fixed by the ‘goal-directed human activity’ of what this artifact is used for: the function of fountain pens is to write because they contribute to the goal-directed human activity of writing. Note, however, that while for Boorse, the function depends on what happens in the actual world only (whether an artifact (in fact, an artifact-type) contributes, in the actual world to a goal-directed human activity), my notion of artifact function is a modal one: what matters is whether an artifact (always a token artifact) would contribute to the fulfillment of the goals of the agent who is using the artifact. It is this modal aspect of my definition that makes my account capable of handling all the three objections I raise in the next section.
The phrase ‘doing F’ here merely means that x has some features or does something – it does not mean having the function to do so (otherwise the account would be circular. So if we find something x does that is such that possible worlds where it’s doing so contributes to the fulfillment of the goals of the user are closer than possible worlds where it doesn’t, we have found a function for x.
Again, as in the case of biological function, here x may or may not do F in the actual world, but when assessing what worlds are closer, we should ignore the actual world.
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Acknowledgements
This work was supported by the EU FP7 CIG grant PCIG09-GA-2011-293818 and the FWO Odysseus grant G.0020.12N.
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Nanay, B. Artifact Categorization and the Modal Theory of Artifact Function. Rev.Phil.Psych. 4, 515–526 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-013-0143-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-013-0143-6