Abstract
Searle’s Chinese Room Argument (CRA) has been the object of great interest in the philosophy of mind, artificial intelligence and cognitive science since its initial presentation in ‘Minds, Brains and Programs’ in 1980. It is by no means an overstatement to assert that it has been a main focus of attention for philosophers and computer scientists of many stripes. It is then especially interesting to note that relatively little has been said about the detailed logic of the argument, whatever significance Searle intended CRA to have. The problem with the CRA is that it involves a very strong modal claim, the truth of which is both unproved and highly questionable. So it will be argued here that the CRA does not prove what it was intended to prove.
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Notes
This interpretation of the systems response assumes that 1 and 2–6 are inconsistent in some sense.
I thank an anonymous referee for pointing out the second way of interpreting the systems response, and I suspect that the referee is correct in asserting that it is the more typical interpretation of the systems response. Nevertheless, the first approach is interesting in and of itself as a response to the CRA and so it is worthy of attention here. The real point is then that the CRA can be rebutted without either having to assert that the room understands Chinese even if the occupant does not or that the occupant understand Chinese.
Searle’s only real reason for accepting this contention appears to be that there really is no syntax at all. Syntax is rather something that we impose on systems when we interpret their behaviors. This is however not an adequate response. What is important about syntax is just structure and structures—or structural properties—are as real as anything else. So the discussion could be formulated in terms of the causal power of structural properties to produce semantic properties and Searle offers no arguments against this possibility.
The same point holds for the matter of whether the room understands Chinese.
To be sure, this world may be the actual world.
Again, the same point can be made with respect to the matter of the room’s understanding Chinese.
Again, I wish to thank an anonymous referee for pointing out that one might regard this as the proper way to understand the systems reply. I am somewhat unsure about this matter, as the exact nature of the systems reply is not entirely clear for reasons noted earlier. If my solution in fact agrees with the second interpretation of the systems reply, then the solution offered here can simply be regarded as a more well-defined way to see the modal error involved in the CRA. Again, I can remain neutral on this matter here.
References
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Shaffer, M.J. A Logical Hole in the Chinese Room. Minds & Machines 19, 229–235 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-009-9151-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-009-9151-9