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Brutal Composition

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, West Virginia University, Morgantown, WV, 26506-6312, U.S.A.

    Ned Markosian

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  1. Ned Markosian
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Markosian, N. Brutal Composition. Philosophical Studies 92, 211–249 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004267523392

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