Current debates between behavioural and orthodox economists indicate that the role and epistemological status of first principles is a particularly pressing problem in economics. As an alleged paragon of extreme apriorism, the methodology of Austrian economics in Mises’ tradition is often dismissed as untenable in the light of modern philosophy. In particular, the defence of the so-called fundamental axiom of praxeology—“Man acts.”—by means of pure intuition is almost unanimously rejected. However, in recently resurfacing debates, the extremeness of Mises’ epistemological position (...) has been called into question. Rather than directly engaging in these exegetical discussions, this paper aims to substantiate the possibility and plausibility of conventionalist defences of praxeology per se. The proposed shift includes settling for an analytic fundamental axiom and acknowledging the prima facie tenability of other research programs than praxeology. Since conventionalist praxeology is only moderately aprioristic, mainstream economists and philosophers might be more likely to engage in fruitful discussions with those Austrian scholars who elaborate pragmatic arguments for praxeology instead of invoking pure intuition. (shrink)

Studie má za cíl představit strukturu Hayekova evolucionismu. Argumentace postupuje v několika krocích: Východiskem je historicko- systematická expozice způsobu, jakým evoluční teorie ovlivnila Hayekovu filosofii, především s ohledem na periodizaci vývoje jeho myšlení a systematické odlišení explanans a explanandum v rámci jeho teorie vědy. Dále je rozebírán způsob, jakým Hayek rozvíjí svoji metodologii vědy. V této souvislosti je argumentováno ve prospěch teze, že Hayekovo pojetí metodologického dualismu je důsledkem ovlivnění evoluční teorií. Zároveň je evoluční teorie představena jako nástroj vysvětlení, konkrétně (...) pak tzv. vysvětlení vzorce. Následně je představeno Hayekovo pojetí společnosti v kontextu kulturní evoluce. Společnost je interpretována jako řád jednání a je kladen důraz na Hayekovo vnímání společnosti jako řádu vyvíjejícího se společně s lidskou myslí. Na základě těchto předpokladů je v poslední části rozvinuto Hayekovo pojetí mysli. Toto pojetí vychází z konekcionistické pozice. Dále argumentuji proti tradičnímu pohledu na Hayekovu filosofii jako rozvíjení Kantovy filosofie. Závěr rekapituluje základní body Hayekova evolucionismu. (shrink)

One of the still unsolved problems in liberal anarchism is a definition of social constituency in positive terms. Partially, this had been solved by the advancements of liberal discourse ethics. These approaches, built on praxeology as a universal framework for social formation, are detached from the need of any previous or external authority or rule for the discursive partners. However, the relationship between action, personal identity, and liberty within the process of a community becoming solely generated from the praxeological a (...) priori remains largely disputed. In order to develop a testable constitutional model, this study revises how the “ontological turn” was introduced into liberal theories and redefines the concept of liberty. Liberty is usually understood as a moral goal or measurement for just actions, as the generative principle of all social existence - individual and interpersonal. For this purpose, the function of performative contradiction within the mechanism of interpersonal “encounter”, as part of the co-generative process of the individual becoming and social formation was explored through the production of a game-based narrative historiography grounded on 19th century life writings. This narrative historiography was developed in the context of Swiss history, with a “design-based” research approach, and resulted in a prototype for networked storytelling through which the transformative learning process could be visible and the negotiation of competing individual visions of the future could be re-enacted. (shrink)

The study analyzes Mises‘s approach to the question of apriorism in a broader methodological context. It shows that it is not inevitable to advocate the aprioristic character of economics (resp. science of human action), as Mises does, to maintain the subjectivist-individualist methodology and the effort to adequately grasp the general laws of human action from its perspective. The present redefinition of apriorism is developed on the basis of thoughts of Barry Smith and Alfred Schutz. It suggests abandoning the apodictic character (...) of apriori (which is untenable) and move closer to a broadly defined empiricism. The methodological insights developed in the paper are finally used to contribute to the debate between the behavioral economists and the proponents of rational choice theory. (shrink)