Order:
  1. Locke on Substance in General.Gabor Forrai - 2010 - Locke Studies 10:27-59.
    Locke’s conception of substance in general or substratum has two relatively widespread interpretations. According to one, substance in general is the bearer of properties, a pure subject, something which sustains properties but itself has no properties. I will call this interpretation traditional, because it has already been formulated by Leibniz. According to the other interpretation, substance is general is something like real essence: an underlying structure which is responsible for the fact that certain observable properties form stable, recurrent clusters. I (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  2. Intentionality: Past and Future (Value Inquiry Book Series, Volume 173).Gabor Forrai (ed.) - 2005 - New York: Rodopi NY.
    The present volume has grown out of a conference organized jointly by the History of Philosophy Department of the University of Miskolc and the History and Philosophy of Science Department of Eötvös Loránd University (Budapest), which took place in June 2002. The aim of the conference was to explore the various angles from which intentionality can be studied, how it is related to other philosophical issues, and how it figures in the works of major philosophers in the past. It also (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  3. Argumentation without Arguments Proper.Gábor Forrai - 2014 - In Gizella Horváth, Rozália Klára Bakos & Éva Bíró-Kaszás (eds.), Ten Years of Facebook, The Third Argumentor Conference. Partium Press, Debrecen University Press. pp. 219-238..
    The purpose of the paper is to draw attention to a kind of rational persuasion which has received little attention in argument studies even though its existence is acknowledged in other fields. I start with a brief analysis of the debates conducted in the comments on a philosophical blog. The posts are addressed to a non-academic audience, always end with a problem, and the reader is invited to offer a solution. In the comments we hardly ever find arguments in the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  4. Brandom on Two Problems of Conceptual Role Semantics.Gabor Forrai - 2009 - In Barbara Merker (ed.), Verstehen: Nach Heidegger und Brandom. Meiner.
    The paper examines how Brandom can respond to two objections raised against another sort of inferentialism, conceptual role semantics. After a brief explanation of the difference between the motivations and the nature of the two accounts (I), I argue that externalism can be accommodated within Brandomian inferentialism (II). Then I offer a reconstruction of how Brandom tries to explain mutual understanding (III-IV). Finally I point out a problem in Brandom’s account, which is this. Brandom’s inferential roles are social and normative, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. Lakatos, Reason, and Rationality.Gabor Forrai - 2002 - In G. Kampis L. Kvasz & M. Stöltzner (eds.), Appraising Lakatos: Mathematics, Methodology, and the Man. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 73-83.
    Lakatos's methodology, if analysed as belonging to the demarcationist-rationalist program launched by Popper gives some interesting conclusions concerning the feasibility of the project: (1) Rationalism cannot provide arguments against relativism. (2) A theory of scientific rationality cannot be defended without relying on scientific authorities. (3) A historical justification of scientific rationality does not show that the procedures that are rational according to the theory are truth-conducive.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  6. Conceptual Role Semantics and Naturalizing Meaning.Gábor Forrai - 2008 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 8 (24):337-348.
    In this paper I will do three things. One, to explain why conceptual role semantics seems an attractive theory of meaning (I). Two, to sketch a version of it which has a good chance of withstanding some of the standard objections (II-III). Three, to see what follows from this version with respect to the naturalization of meaning (IV).
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. What Mathematicians' Claims Mean : In Defense of Hermeneutic Fictionalism.Gábor Forrai - 2010 - Hungarian Philosophical Review 54 (4):191-203.
    Hermeneutic fictionalism about mathematics maintains that mathematics is not committed to the existence of abstract objects such as numbers. Mathematical sentences are true, but they should not be construed literally. Numbers are just fictions in terms of which we can conveniently describe things which exist. The paper defends Stephen Yablo’s hermeneutic fictionalism against an objection proposed by John Burgess and Gideon Rosen. The objection, directed against all forms of nominalism, goes as follows. Nominalism can take either a hermeneutic form and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. Are Quine’s Two Indeterminacy Theses Compatible?Gábor Forrai - 1999 - Acta Analytica 14 (23.):89-99..
    The paper seeks to show that Quine’s theses concerning the underdetermination of scientific theories by experience and the indeterminacy of reference cannot be reconciled if some of Quine’s central assumptions are accepted. The argument is this. Quine holds that the thesis about reference is not just a special case of the other thesis. In order to make sense of this comment we must distinguish between factual and epistemic indeterminacy. Something is factual indeterminate if it is not determined by the facts. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark