Hume: Philosophy of Mathematics

Nosso objetivo, no presente trabalho, está circunscrito à Seção IV da Parte II do Livro I do Tratado da natureza humana, em que Hume examina a teoria do contínuo e da infinita divisibilidade das partes do extenso. Mais particularmente, desejamos nos ater à afirmação de Hume, à primeira vista um tanto enigmática em relação à geometria, em que assim descreve o que considera que lhe incumbe: “Minha tarefa neste momento deve ser, por isso, defender as definições e refutar as demonstrações” (...) (T I, II, IV, 8). Essa afirmação de Hume é forte, programática, feita em um parágrafo de pouco mais de cinco linhas. Nada o prepara, e Hume não explica em pormenor suas intenções na sequência imediata desse texto. Por isso, tomamos essa questão como foco da análise. Inicialmente examinaremos esse problema em Bayle, destacando passagens que possam lançar luz às críticas feitas por Hume e tornar compreensíveis as discussões que empreendeu. A seguir, a partir de duas respostas dadas por Hume a esse problema, colhido dentro do Tratado, procuraremos explicitar o que Hume entende por definições, o que designa por demonstrações, e por qual modo julga que isso lhe permitiria tratar os fundamentos da geometria de modo mais consequente do que aquele pelo qual estes tinham sido compreendidos no interior de uma longa tradição. (shrink)

The paper addresses two difficulties that arise in Treatise 1.2.5. First, Hume appears to be inconsistent when he denies that we have an idea of a vacuum or empty space yet allows for the idea of an “invisible and intangible distance.” My solution to this difficulty is to develop the overlooked possibility that Hume does not take the invisible and intangible distance to be a distance at all. Second, although Hume denies that we have an idea of a vacuum, some (...) texts in Treatise 1.2.5 are taken by interpreters to suggest that Hume nonetheless believes that there are vacuums in nature. I discuss the relevant texts and defend the view that Hume does not in fact countenance belief in vacuums. I conclude by outlining an interpretation of Hume’s intention in the Treatise that allows us to understand his discussion of ideas as having implications for the sciences. (shrink)

If Tahiti suggested to theorists comfortably at home in Europe thoughts of noble savages without clothes, those who paid for and went on voyages there were in pursuit of a quite opposite human ideal. Cook's voyage to observe the transit of Venus in 1769 symbolises the eighteenth century's commitment to numbers and accuracy, and its willingness to spend a lot of public money on acquiring them. The state supported the organisation of quantitative researches, employing surveyors and collecting statistics to..

El análisis de los conceptos de espacio y tiempo es generalmente considerado uno de los aspectos menos satisfactorios de la obra de Hume. Kemp Smith ha demostrado que en esta sección del Tratado Hume estaba respondiendo a los argumentos que Pierre Bayle había utilizado para probar que el razonamiento humano siempre termina refutándose a sí mismo. En este ensayo expongo las falacias en los argumentos de Bayle, las cuales están basadas en una comprensión inadecuada del concepto de extensión. Hume no (...) logró detectar dichas falacias y repitió los mismos errores de Bayle, lo cual explica la absurda doctrina del espacio que defiende en el Tratado. (shrink)

Throughout history, almost all mathematicians, physicists and philosophers have been of the opinion that space and time are infinitely divisible. That is, it is usually believed that space and time do not consist of atoms, but that any piece of space and time of non-zero size, however small, can itself be divided into still smaller parts. This assumption is included in geometry, as in Euclid, and also in the Euclidean and non- Euclidean geometries used in modern physics. Of the few (...) who have denied that space and time are infinitely divisible, the most notable are the ancient atomists, and Berkeley and Hume. All of these assert not only that space and time might be atomic, but that they must be. Infinite divisibility is, they say, impossible on purely conceptual grounds. (shrink)

Neo-logicism uses definitions and Hume's Principle to derive arithmetic in second-order logic. This paper investigates how much arithmetic can be derived using definitions alone, without any additional principle such as Hume's.

In the Treatise of Human Nature, David Hume mounts a spirited assault on the doctrine of the infinite divisibility of extension, and he defends in its place the contrary claim that extension is everywhere only finitely divisible. Despite this major departure from the more conventional conceptions of space embodied in traditional geometry, Hume does not endorse any radical reform of geometry. Instead Hume espouses a more conservative approach, claiming that geometry fails only “in this single point” – in its purported (...) proofs of infinite divisibility – while “all of its other arguments” remain intact. -/- In this paper, after laying out the prima facie case for Hume’s radical challenge to traditional geometry, I consider five strategies for blocking the arguments for infinite divisibility while conserving most of geometry. I show that each of these interpretive strategies suffers from serious substantive problems, and so none of them delivers an interpretation of Hume’s account that provides him with a way of blocking the geometric arguments for infinite divisibility while sustaining his geometric conservatism. (shrink)