- What does it take to "have" a reason?Mark Schroeder - 2011 - In Andrew Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 201--22.details
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Having reasons.Mark Schroeder - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (1):57 - 71.details
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Sellars vs. the Given.Daniel Bonevac - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (1):1-30.details
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Prospects of enactivist approaches to intentionality and cognition.Tobias Schlicht & Tobias Starzak - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 1):89-113.details
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The Problem of Perception.Tim Crane & Craig French - 2021 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Arguments against direct realism and how to counter them.Pierre le Morvan - 2004 - American Philosophical Quarterly 41 (3):221-234.details
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Intentionality: Transparent, translucent, and opaque.Pierre Le Morvan - 2005 - Journal of Philosophical Research 30:283-302.details
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The content and epistemology of phenomenal belief.David Chalmers - 2002 - In Aleksandar Jokic & Quentin Smith (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 220--72.details
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Skepticism, abductivism, and the explanatory gap.Ram Neta - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):296-325.details
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Is conceivability a guide to possibility?Stephen Yablo - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (1):1-42.details
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Unlikely allies: embodied social cognition and the intentional stance.Tadeusz Wieslaw Zawidzki - 2012 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (4):487-506.details
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The structure of acceptance and its evidential basis.P. M. Williams - 1969 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 19 (4):325-344.details
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Introduction: Perception Without Representation.Keith A. Wilson & Roberta Locatelli - 2017 - Topoi 36 (2):197-212.details
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The problem of presentations: how it is that one object is perceptually given in multiple ways.Konrad Werner - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-25.details
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Aspectual Shape: Presentational Approach.Konrad Werner - 2014 - Axiomathes 24 (4):427-440.details
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The perception/cognition distinction.Sebastian Watzl, Kristoffer Sundberg & Anders Nes - 2021 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (2):165-195.details
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Burgeoning skepticism.Willem A. deVries - 1990 - Erkenntnis 33 (2):141-164.details
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The Brentano School and the History of Analytic Philosophy: Reply to Röck.Andreas Vrahimis - 2018 - Axiomathes 28 (3):363-374.details
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Consequences of schematism.Alberto Voltolini - 2009 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (1):135-150.details
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Is Locke’s answer to Molyneux’s question inconsistent? Cross-modal recognition and the sight–recognition error.Anna Vaughn - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (5):670-688.details
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Reading as a source of knowledge.René van Woudenberg - 2021 - Synthese 198 (1):723-742.details
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Shoemaker on qualia, phenomenal properties and spectrum inversions.Timm Triplett - 2006 - Philosophia 34 (2):203-208.details
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Book review: Contemporary theories of knowledge. [REVIEW]Saul Traiger - 2004 - Minds and Machines 14 (3):415-419.details
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Extended Modal Realism — a New Solution to the Problem of Intentional Inexistence.Andrew D. Thomas - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (3):1197-1208.details
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Defeasible Conditionalization.Paul D. Thorn - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (2-3):283-302.details
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Color constancy and Russellian representationalism.Brad Thompson - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (1):75-94.details
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What seemings seem to be.Samuel A. Taylor - 2015 - Episteme 12 (3):363-384.details
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Intentionality and Reference: A Brentanian Distinction.Hamid Taieb - 2017 - The Monist 100 (1):120-132.details
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Linguistic Criteria of Intentionality.Ciecierski Tadeusz - 2016 - Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 46 (1):35-58.details
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Carnap's ontology and challenges.John Sweigart - 1963 - Philosophy of Science 30 (1):71-80.details
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How to understand the foundations of empirical belief in a coherentist way.Wolfgang Spohn - 1998 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 98 (1):22–40.details
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Spectrum inversion without a difference in representation is impossible.Jeff Speaks - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (3):339-361.details
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We see in the dark.Roy Sorensen - 2004 - Noûs 38 (3):456-480.details
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When Does Evidence Suffice for Conviction?Martin Smith - 2018 - Mind 127 (508):1193-1218.details
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Vagueness, Uncertainty and Degrees of Belief: Two Kinds of Indeterminacy—One Kind of Credence.Nicholas J. J. Smith - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (5):1027-44.details
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Solving the problem of creeping minimalism.Matthew Simpson - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (3-4):510-531.details
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Basic knowledge and the normativity of knowledge: The awareness‐first solution.Paul Silva - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (3):564-586.details
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Replies to Dorr, Fine, and Hirsch.Theodore Sider - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (3):733-754.details
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Why do we need perceptual content?Ayoob Shahmoradi - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (5):776-788.details
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The myth of reductive extensionalism.Itay Shani - 2007 - Axiomathes 17 (2):155-183.details
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Perspectival self-consciousness and ego-dissolution.Miguel Angel Sebastian - 2020 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 1 (I):1-27.details
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The unreliability of naive introspection.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2006 - Philosophical Review 117 (2):245-273.details
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Simple Remembering.Arieh Schwartz - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-22.details
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Perceptual Content Defended.Susanna Schellenberg - 2011 - Noûs 45 (4):714 - 750.details
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Ontological Minimalism about Phenomenology.Susanna Schellenberg - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (1):1-40.details
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In Defense of Perceptual Content.Susanna Schellenberg - 2017 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):409-447.details
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A Phenomenal, Dispositional Account of Belief.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2002 - Noûs 36 (2):249-275.details
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Talking about appearances: the roles of evaluation and experience in disagreement.Rachel Etta Rudolph - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (1):197-217.details
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What it takes to believe.Daniel Rothschild - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (5):1345-1362.details
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¿Puede el conocimiento ser un estado mental?Florencia Rimoldi - 2014 - Análisis Filosófico 34 (2):171-201.details
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