- Epistemology.Matthias Steup - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Epistemic norms on evidence-gathering.Carolina Flores & Elise Woodard - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (9):2547-2571.details
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A puzzle about fickleness.Elise Woodard - 2020 - Noûs 56 (2):323-342.details
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Evidence and rationalization.Ian Wells - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (3):845-864.details
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Equal Opportunity and Newcomb’s Problem.Ian Wells - 2019 - Mind 128 (510):429-457.details
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What The Tortoise Has To Say About Diachronic Rationality.Markos Valaris - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):293-307.details
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Reasoning and Deducing.Markos Valaris - 2018 - Mind 128 (511):861-885.details
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The Externalist’s Guide to Fishing for Compliments.Bernhard Salow - 2018 - Mind 127 (507):691-728.details
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Equal treatment for belief.Susanna Rinard - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (7):1923-1950.details
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All Reasons are Fundamentally for Attitudes.Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2022 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 21 (2).details
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The Uniqueness Thesis.Matthew Kopec & Michael G. Titelbaum - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (4):189-200.details
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Options must be external.Justis Koon - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (5):1175-1189.details
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Why Credences Are Not Beliefs.Elizabeth Jackson - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (2):360-370.details
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Belief and Credence: Why the Attitude-Type Matters.Elizabeth Grace Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2477-2496.details
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A Defense of Intrapersonal Belief Permissivism.Elizabeth Jackson - 2021 - Episteme 18 (2):313–327.details
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Chains of Inferences and the New Paradigm in the Psychology of Reasoning.Ulf Hlobil - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (1):1-16.details
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Numbers without aggregation.Tim Henning - 2023 - Noûs.details
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Reasons, Coherence, and Group Rationality.Brian Hedden - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (3):581-604.details
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Rationality and Synchronic Identity.Brian Hedden - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (3):544-558.details
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A defense of objectivism about evidential support.Brian Hedden - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5):716-743.details
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Hedonic and Non-Hedonic Bias toward the Future.Preston Greene, Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller & James Norton - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (1):148-163.details
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Capacity for simulation and mitigation drives hedonic and non-hedonic time biases.Preston Greene, Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller & James Norton - 2022 - Philosophical Psychology 35 (2):226-252.details
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The Concept of Rationality for a City.Kenny Easwaran - 2019 - Topoi 40 (2):409-421.details
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Rationality, time and normativity: On Hedden’s time-slice rationality.Sabine A. Döring & Bahadir Eker - 2017 - Analysis 77 (3):571-585.details
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Are My Temporal Parts Agents?Alexander Dietz - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (2):362-379.details
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The imprecise impermissivist’s dilemma.Clinton Castro & Casey Hart - 2019 - Synthese 196 (4):1623-1640.details
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The Normative Standard for Future Discounting.Craig Callender - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (3):227-253.details
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Time-Slice Rationality and Self-Locating Belief.David Builes - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (10):3033-3049.details
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Revisiting Risk and Rationality: a reply to Pettigrew and Briggs.Lara Buchak - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5):841-862.details
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Self-Locating Belief and Updating on Learning.Darren Bradley - 2020 - Mind 129 (514):579-584.details
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Ought-contextualism and reasoning.Darren Bradley - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2977-2999.details
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Learning by Ignoring the Most Wrong.Seamus Bradley - 2022 - Kriterion – Journal of Philosophy 36 (1):9-31.details
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Bayesianism and self-doubt.Darren Bradley - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2225-2243.details
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Does Success Entail Ability?David Boylan - 2021 - Noûs 56 (3):570-601.details
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Epistemic isomorphism.Sayid R. Bnefsi - 2022 - Metaphilosophy 53 (4):543-554.details
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Supererogation and sequence.Adam Bales & Claire Benn - 2020 - Synthese 198 (8):7763-7780.details
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Reconsidering Resolutions.Alida Liberman - 2016 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (2):1-27.details
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Probability and Inductive Logic.Antony Eagle - manuscriptdetails
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Internalism, Stored Beliefs, and Forgotten Evidence.David James Barnett - forthcoming - In Sanford Goldberg & Stephen Wright (eds.), Memory and Testimony: New Essays in Epistemology.details
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Can All-Accuracy Accounts Justify Evidential Norms?Christopher J. G. Meacham - 2018 - In Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij & Jeff Dunn (eds.), Epistemic Consequentialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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What Is Evaluable for Fit?Oded Na'aman - 2023 - In Chris Howard & R. A. Rowland (eds.), Fittingness. OUP.details
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Beyond Uncertainty: Reasoning with Unknown Possibilities.Katie Steele & H. Orri Stefánsson - 2021 - Cambridge University Press.details
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Bayesian Epistemology.William Talbott - 2006 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Preferences.Sven Ove Hansson & Till Grüne-Yanoff - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Temporal Parts.Katherine Hawley - 2004/2010 - Stanford Encylopedia of Philosophy.details
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The Normative Standard for Future Discounting.Craig Callender - manuscriptdetails
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Pick the Sugar.Seamus Bradley - manuscriptdetails
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Belief and Credence: A Defense of Dualism.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Notre Damedetails
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