Sleep and dreaming are important daily phenomena that are receiving growing attention from both the scientific and the philosophical communities. The increasingly popular predictive brain framework within cognitive science aims to give a full account of all aspects of cognition. The aim of this paper is to critically assess the theoretical advantages of Predictive Processing (PP, as proposed by Clark 2013, Clark 2016; and Hohwy 2013) in defining sleep and dreaming. After a brief introduction, we overview the state of the (...) art at the intersection between dream research and PP (with particular reference to Hobson and Friston 2012; Hobson et al. 2014). In the following sections we focus on two theoretically promising aspects of the research program. First, we consider the explanations of phenomenal consciousness during sleep (i.e. dreaming) and how it arises from the neural work of the brain. PP provides a good picture of the peculiarity of dreaming but it can’t fully address the problem of how consciousness comes to be in the first place. We propose that Integrated Information Theory (IIT) (Oizumi et al. 2014; Tononi et al. 2016) is a good candidate for this role and we will show its advantages and points of contact with PP. After introducing IIT, we deal with the evolutionary function of sleeping and dreaming. We illustrate that PP fits with contemporary researches on the important adaptive function of sleep and we discuss why IIT can account for sleep mentation (i.e. dreaming) in evolutionary terms (Albantakis et al. 2014). In the final section, we discuss two future avenues for dream research that can fruitfully adopt the perspective offered by PP: (a) the role of bodily predictions in the constitution of the sleeping brain activity and the dreaming experience, and (b) the precise role of the difference stages of sleep (REM (Rapid eye movement), NREM (Non-rapid eye movement) in the constitution and refinement of the predictive machinery. (shrink)

In an effort to produce new and more sustainable technologies, designers have turned to nature in search of inspiration and innovation. Biomimetic design (from the Greek bios, life, mimesis, imitation) is the conscious imitation of biological models to solve today's technical and ecological challenges. Nowadays numerous different approaches exist that take inspiration from nature as a model for design, such as biomimicry, biomimetics, bionics, permaculture, ecological engineering, etc. This variety of practices comes in turn with a wide range of different (...) promises, including sustainability, increased resilience, multi-functionality, and a lower degree of risk. How are we to make sense of this heterogeneous amalgam of existing practices and technologies, and of the numerous promises attached to them? We suggest that a typology of biomimetic approaches would provide a useful hermeneutic framework to understand the different tensions that pull this variegated landscape in different directions. This is achieved through a critical analysis of the literature in different fields of biomimetic design and the philosophy of biomimicry, in order to derive conceptual and normative assumptions concerning the meaning and value of the imitation of nature. These two dimensions are then intersected to derive an analytical grid composed of six different biomimetic types, which enable the classification of existing and possible biomimetic approaches, practices, and technologies according to their specific conceptual assumptions and guiding norms. (shrink)

This book discusses fundamental topics on contemporary Ockhamism. The collected essays show how contemporary Ockhamism can impact areas of research such as semantics, metaphysics and also the philosophy of science. In addition, the volume hosts one historian of Medieval philosophy who investigates the way in which William of Ockham “in flesh and bone” construed time and, more generally, future contingency. The essays explore the different meanings of this theory. They cover three main topics, in particular. The first examines the thesis (...) that sentences and propositions about the future have a definite truth value, without any ensuing commitment to determinism or fatalism. The second topic looks at the problem whether the branching-time model needs to countenance a privileged branch (the so-called Thin Red Line). Finally, the third topic considers the idea that there are so-called soft facts. These would be the subject matter of sentences and propositions verbally about the present or the past, but metaphysically about a later time, and which might change in the future. Overall, the book provides an updated and rigorous idea of the debate about Ockhamism. It gives readers a deeper understanding into this philosophical approach influenced by William of Ockham, characterized by the rejection of the Aristotelian idea that, in order to preserve the contingency of the future, future contingents must be deemed neither true nor false. (shrink)

Vera Zasulich’s shooting of Trepov, a governor of St Petersburg who had ordered the flogging of a political prisoner, in January 1878, catapulted her to international fame as a revolutionary heroine, a reputation that she put to good use by becoming one of the five ‘founding parents’ of Russian Marxism that created the ‘Group for the Emancipation of Labour’ in 1883. But her act of self-sacrifice also triggered, to her dismay, the institutionalisation of individual terrorist tactics in the Russian Populist (...) movement with the creation of the ‘People’s Will’ (Narodnaya Volya) Party in 1879. The organisation went into decline after the killing of Tsar Alexander II in 1881, and Populism itself was increasingly superseded by Marxism as the hegemonic force on the left with the rise of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (RSDLP). But individual terrorist tactics reappeared with the creation of the Socialist Revolutionary Party in 1902, prompting Zasulich to write an article for Die neue Zeit, the theoretical organ of German Social Democracy, in which she both condemned the Neo-Populist tendency as deleterious to the rising labour movement and supported the organisational plans for the RSDLP sponsored by the Iskra group, developed at length by Lenin in his book What Is to Be Done?, published in March 1902. This article provides the background to Vera Zasulich’s article ‘The Terrorist Tendency in Russia’ (December 1902), setting it against the history of the Russian revolutionary movement from 1878 to 1902. (shrink)

This paper addresses a fundamental line of research in neuroscience: the identification of a putative neural processing core of the cerebral cortex, often claimed to be “canonical”. This “canonical” core would be shared by the entire cortex, and would explain why it is so powerful and diversified in tasks and functions, yet so uniform in architecture. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the search for canonical explanations over the past 40 years, discussing the theoretical frameworks informing this research. (...) It will highlight a bias that, in my opinion, has limited the success of this research project, that of overlooking the dimension of cortical development. The earliest explanation of the cerebral cortex as canonical was attempted by David Marr, deriving putative cortical circuits from general mathematical laws, loosely following a deductive-nomological account. Although Marr’s theory turned out to be incorrect, one of its merits was to have put the issue of cortical circuit development at the top of his agenda. This aspect has been largely neglected in much of the research on canonical models that has followed. Models proposed in the 1980s were conceived as mechanistic. They identified a small number of components that interacted as a basic circuit, with each component defined as a function. More recent models have been presented as idealized canonical computations, distinct from mechanistic explanations, due to the lack of identifiable cortical components. Currently, the entire enterprise of coming up with a single canonical explanation has been criticized as being misguided, and the premise of the uniformity of the cortex has been strongly challenged. This debate is analyzed here. The legacy of the canonical circuit concept is reflected in both positive and negative ways in recent large-scale brain projects, such as the Human Brain Project. One positive aspect is that these projects might achieve the aim of producing detailed simulations of cortical electrical activity, a negative one regards whether they will be able to find ways of simulating how circuits actually develop. (shrink)

In 2007, two experiments that have now become very famous have appeared in the neuroscientific literature. With over of one thousand of citation, that moved neuroscientist to speculate about the self- representation and other conscious phenomena and to create new experiments, Henrik Ehrsson and Bigna Lengenhagger produce in two studies out of the body experiences in healthy subjects. The literature reports this kind of experience as consequence of neurological disease or drug use. In this article, I will prove that the (...) where, and the what, of the out of the body experience and the normal experience are something different from the bodily one and I will argue in favor of some kind of dualism and, in particular, a dualism called property dualism. ER -. (shrink)

Review of: "Zeno and Einstein".

Review of: "Biology as a postmodern science: Universals, historicity, and context".

Review of: "Objectivity and Honesty in Science: The case of Light Interference Phenomena".

Review of: "Straightening the ‘Value-Laden Turn’: Minimising the Influence of Values in Science".

Review of: "Further Chaos and Dysfunction in the Brickyard and the Systems That Support It".

In this paper I will try to outline a Metaphysics of Perception that takes for granted one of the central thesis of the metaphysical doctrine called Indirect Realism. Firstly, I will introduce the central thesis of Indirect Realism and then a special version of the Causal Theory of Perception that modifies in some fundamental respect one of the most influential version of Causal Theory of Perception designed by William Child.

The article is an experiment that deals with "Embodied Simulation" and " Embodied Cognition". This work follows the procedures of studies of the Parma Group and against them try to demonstrate their failure. The cognition is not embodied at all, maybe a little and at least.

In order to defend his controversial claim that observation is unaided perception, Bas van Fraassen, the originator of constructive empiricism, suggested that, for all we know, the images produced by a microscope could be in a situation analogous to that of the rainbows, which are ‘images of nothing’. He added that reflections in the water, rainbows, and the like are ‘public hallucinations’, but it is not clear whether this constitutes an ontological category apart or an empty set. In this paper (...) an argument will be put forward to the effect that rainbows can be thought of as events, that is, as part of a subcategory of entities that van Fraassen has always considered legitimate phenomena. I argue that rainbows are actually not images in the relevant (representational) sense and that there is no need to ontologically inflate the category of entities in order to account for them, which would run counter to the empiricist principle of parsimony. (shrink)

Discutindo acerca das centenas de detecções de planetas extrassolares, que supostamente aconteceram desde 1989 e que ele considera (incorretamente) como instâncias de observações, Peter Kosso disse, justamente, que segundo os parâmetros de Bas van Fraassen esses objetos celestes seriam observáveis. Ora, tais astros poderiam sem dúvida ser observados diretamente (sem a necessidade de instrumentos), nas condições apropriadas. Mas, acrescenta Kosso, “esse tipo de epistemologia externalista, que permite que a justificação se baseie em informação que não temos a disposição (nós não (...) estamos em condição de ver planetas extrassolares a olho nu [atualmente]), não ajuda a decidir quais particulares afirmações científicas garantem a crença” (Kosso 2006, 225, nota 1). Van Fraassen provavelmente incorre em uma petição de princípio não muito diferente daquelas que ele muitas vezes desmascarou em textos de autores realistas, quando apela para o fato de o objeto detectado ser observável, para atribuir o estatuto de ‘observação’ a uma certa detecção. O ponto é, mais uma vez, entender o que vale como observação, particularmente quando isso envolve o uso de algum instrumento. Endossar aquilo que Otávio Bueno chama de ‘padrão internalista’ parece garantir solidez à qualificação de determinadas ações como observações. Uma das principais consequências dessa adoção é que tal critério, não operando nenhuma distinção relevante entre detecções ‘diretas’ e detecções mediadas por instrumentos, permite que a linha que separa observáveis e inobserváveis seja traçada de maneira diferente de como van Fraassen acredita que deveria ser, abarcando, entre os observáveis, mais (tipos de) entidades do que esse parece estar disposto a admitir. (shrink)

Aspetti filosofico-matematici dei celebri paradossi di Zenone di Elea.

NOTA PRELIMINAR: o texto a seguir representa a versão ampliada (e corrigida conforme as indicações dos pareceristas) do artigo homônimo, publicado na revista Archai em 2014. Por algum problema técnico, acabou sendo publicada, na época, a primeira versão, sem as melhorias sugeridas pelos avaliadores. Eis, então, a versão ‘definitiva’ do artigo “Zenão e a impossibilidade da analogia”: -/- A reductio ad absurdum foi elevada por Zenão de Eléia a único método que permitiria vislumbrar a verdadeira realidade, invisível tanto aos sentidos (...) quanto à maneira de pensar comum. Mostrando uma certa continuidade com os filósofos anteriores, não só na busca de um procedimento para que a especulação pudesse avançar, como também na mesma rota de afastamento daquilo que é mais próximo, conhecido e particular (visível) em direção àquilo que é menos conhecido, distante e universal (invisível), para dizê-lo em termos aristotélicos, Zenão utilizou-se de argumentos aporéticos como único caminho possível para poder entrever o ‘reino do Ser’. Esse, com efeito, é invisível não somente aos nossos sentidos, como também ao nosso raciocínio ordinário. Eis que somente a ‘via do não-ser’, a única que poderia ser trilhada após Parménides, como diz Wolff, nos permite ter uma ideia, por quanto vaga, daquilo que é ‘verdadeiramente invisível’. Tão invisível ao ponto de ser inalcançável até mesmo pelo pensamento. (shrink)

Naive realism is a widely debated topic in the philosophy of the mind. In this article I will review the theses of naive realism through the works of one of the most influential philosophers who supported and developed them, Michael Martin. Once the reasons why naive realism should be supported are discussed, I will propose an empirical argument to show that naive realism and the most basic scientific knowledge of perceptive processes are contradictory.

In this paper, I have outlined an original Metaphysics of Perception which takes into consideration some of the most common views about perception in the contemporary debate. Then I will look at the consequences of this metaphysics about our perception of others and what we know about them. In the third section, I suggest how to make sense of certain neuroscientific discoveries about social perception and social cognition. In the conclusion, I recap what has been done to say that others (...) are what we can know after all. (shrink)

The concept of observability is of key importance for a consistent defense of Constructive Empiricism. This anti-realist position, originally presented in 1980 by Bas van Fraassen in his book The Scientific Image, crucially depends on the observable/unobservable dichotomy. Nevertheless, the question of what it means to observe has been faced in an unsatisfactory and inadequate manner by van Fraassen and this represents an important lacuna in his philosophical position. The aim of this work is to propose a characterization of the (...) act of observation able to give the necessary support to the ‘rough guide’ of ‘observable’ that can be found in the aforementioned book. Countering van Fraassen’s own statements, that observability is not a matter for philosophy, but for scientific inquiry only, we maintain that any attempt to deal with this subject by the philosophers is legitimate. We will show that van Fraassen ended up doing a philosophical analysis of observation himself, albeit in a fragmentary way. We believe that this question should be dealt with methodically, though, ‘following the rules’ of a ‘proper’ philosophical analysis, as we attempted to do in this work. We will propose a way of conceiving the act of observation, different from van Fraassen’s one, that can help not only to ground the distinction between observable and unobservable, upon which Constructive Empiricism rests, but to get this anti-realist position closer to scientific practice as well, which is one of its desiderata. Without neglecting the philosophical dimension of the issue, though. However, this proposal does not represent an ad hoc ‘solution’ for Constructive Empiricism, but a characterization aspiring to have a universal reach. (shrink)

Con questo articolo vorrei dare qualche argomento e qualche esempio per mostrare la natura non fisica dell’esperienza umana. Per prima cosa argomenterò l’esistenza di qualcosa di non fisico e successivamente come e perché fenomeni come colori, emozioni, stati mentali e tutti gli altri fenomeni legati alla soggettività sono ciò che compone l’esperienza umana nel suo versante non fisico. Nel secondo capitolo mostrerò qual è la relazione tra l’esperienza umana nel suo carattere non fisico e metafisico e il funzionamento dei meccanismi (...) cerebrali e la priorità del carattere metafisico dell’esperienza umana rispetto ai meccanismi cerebrali. (shrink)

This article aims to examine the way in which an old expression, jouissance-value, created by Jacques Lacan, has become a key concept in the media industry and in the field of Media studies. The hypothesis presented here is the following: in the fabrication of jouissance-value, the gaze (regard) works as labor, establishing an economy of scopic desire.

The hypothesis we present in this paper is about the representation of colours in the nervous system as metaphysical and immaterial properties of the neural activations, first in the lateral geniculate body and following in the primary visual cortex, where the colours are not directly coded but whose representation is modulated by a signal born by fewer neurons. The metaphysical background of this hypothesis is the dualism of properties that will be discussed in the last paragraph of this article.

Un primo tentativo di dare un'interpretazione morale dell'aritmetica.

Raccolta di brevi saggi in filosofia della mente.

Questo saggio cerca di mostrare che la filosofia non deve essere obbligatoriamente intesa come una disciplina che discute problemi, cercando sempre nuove soluzioni, ma che resta alla mercé delle correnti di pensiero che in un caso o nell'altro si avvicendano nel corso della storia senza poter mai trovare una conclusione ultima a quei problemi. Nel primo capitolo l'autore ripercorre brevemente alcune delle metodologie della ricerca filosofica che hanno segnato la storia della filosofia mostrandone le virtù e i limiti. Descrive poi (...) come la filosofia può onorevolmente svolgere il compito di disciplina scientifica come le altre ottenendo veri e propri risultati e non posizioni dibattimentali, seppur largamente condivise, di uno o l'altro dei pensatori preminenti in un dato secolo o periodo storico. Nel secondo capitolo l'autore mostra a mo' di gioco alcuni risultati ottenuti nel corso della storia della filosofia da grandi pensatori. Risultati da tenere a mente come possibili esempi del gran numero di risultati ottenuti dalla filosofia ma per un motivo o per un altro dimenticati, sottovalutati o passati di moda. Risultati così solidi da poterne fare teoria. (shrink)

Il libro prende in esame la percezione come il modo in cui gli oggetti del mondo esterno entrano a far parte della nostra esperienza cosciente. Il corpo, da un lato, gli oggetti del mondo che ci circonda, dall'altro, verranno messi nel loro posto di argomento rispetto alla metafisica della nostra esperienza percettiva.

Published in Darren Tofts, Annemarie Jonson, and Alessio Cavallaro (eds), _Prefiguring Cyberculture: an intellectual history_ (MIT Press and Power Publications, December 2002). Please do send comments: email me. Back to my main publications page . Back to my home page.

Tradução para o português do livro "Ensaios sobre Strawson", de Carlos Caorsi. Editora da unijuí, 2014. Sumário: Apresentação; A teoria da verdade em Strawson, Mauricio Beuchot; Réplica a Mauricio Beuchot, Peter F. Strawson; Strawson: entre a lógica tradicional e a lógica clássica, Robert Calabria; Réplica a Robert Clabria, Peter F. Strawson; Referência e termos singulares, Carlos E. Caorsi; Réplica a Carlos E. Caorsi, Peter F. Strawson; Strawson e a metafísica, Juan C. D’Alessio; Réplica a Juan C. D’Alessio, Peter (...) F. Strawson; A meta-metafísica de Strawson: identificação versus individuação, Jorge J. E. Gracia; Réplica a Jorge J. E. Gracia, Peter F. Strawson; Algumas distinções sobre a noção de indivíduo, Jesús Mosterín; Réplica a Jesús Mosterín, Peter F. Strawson; Sobre a percepção e seus objetos em Strawson, Ernest Sosa; Réplica a Ernest Sosa, Peter F. Strawson; Limitações ao exercício da perplexidade, Teresa de Jesús Zavalía; Réplica a Tereza de Jesús Zavalía, Peter F. Strawson; Publicações de P. F. Strawson . (shrink)