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Logical Disagreement.Frederik J. Andersen - 2024 - Dissertation, University of St. Andrewsdetails
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Radical moral encroachment: The moral stakes of racist beliefs.Rima Basu - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):9-23.details
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Higher-order defeat and intellectual responsibility.Ru Ye - 2018 - Synthese 197 (12):5435-5455.details
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Suspiciously Convenient Beliefs and the Pathologies of (Epistemological) Ideal Theory.Alex Worsnip - 2023 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 47:237-268.details
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Moral reasons, epistemic reasons, and rationality.Alex Worsnip - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (263):341-361.details
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Making space for the normativity of coherence.Alex Worsnip - 2022 - Noûs 56 (2):393-415.details
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From Impossibility to Evidentialism?Alex Worsnip - 2021 - Episteme 18 (3):384-406.details
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Against the Doctrine of Infallibility.Christopher Willard-Kyle - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 71 (4):pqaa082.details
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Higher-Order Evidence.Daniel Whiting - 2021 - Analysis 80 (4):789-807.details
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Higher-Order Evidence in Aesthetics.Daniel Whiting - 2023 - British Journal of Aesthetics 63 (2):143-155.details
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The Level-Splitting View and the Non-Akrasia Constraint.Marco Tiozzo - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (3):917-923.details
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Explaining Higher-order Defeat.Marco Tiozzo - 2023 - Acta Analytica 38 (3):453-469.details
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Self-Intimation, Infallibility, and Higher-Order Evidence.Eyal Tal - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (3):665-672.details
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Is higher-order evidence evidence?Eyal Tal - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (10):3157-3175.details
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Disagreement and easy bootstrapping.Eyal Tal - 2021 - Episteme 18 (1):46-65.details
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A Dilemma for Higher-Level Suspension.Eyal Tal - 2022 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 8 (4):685-699.details
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Pro tem rationality.Julia Staffel - 2021 - Philosophical Perspectives 35 (1):383-403.details
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Stealing Harman’s Thought: knowledge saboteurs and dogmatists.Roy Sorensen - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 7):1787-1799.details
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Belief and Self‐Knowledge: Lessons From Moore's Paradox.Declan Smithies - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):393-421.details
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Disbelief is a distinct doxastic attitude.Joshua Smart - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11797-11813.details
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Reconciling Enkrasia and Higher-Order Defeat.Mattias Skipper - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (6):1369-1386.details
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Higher-Order Defeat Without Epistemic Dilemmas.Mattias Skipper - 2018 - Logos and Episteme 9 (4):451-465.details
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Does rationality demand higher-order certainty?Mattias Skipper - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11561-11585.details
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Real and ideal rationality.Robert Weston Siscoe - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (3):879-910.details
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Justification as a Dimension of Rationality.Robert Weston Siscoe - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-24.details
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How Doxastic Justification Helps Us Solve the Puzzle of Misleading Higher-Order Evidence.Paul Silva - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):308-328.details
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Explaining enkratic asymmetries: knowledge-first style.Paul Silva - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (11):2907-2930.details
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Can Worsnip's strategy solve the puzzle of misleading higher-order apparent evidence?Paul Silva - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 65 (3):339-351.details
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The Rationality of Perception : Replies to Lord, Railton, and Pautz.Susanna Siegel - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (3):764-771.details
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Incoherence and the balance of evidential reasons.Sebastian Schmidt - 2023 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):1-10.details
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Facts about incoherence as non-evidential epistemic reasons.Eva Schmidt - 2023 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):1-22.details
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Epistemic characterizations of validity and level-bridging principles.Joshua Schechter - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (1):153-178.details
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Reasoning One’s Way Back into Skepticism.Mark Satta - 2023 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 13 (3):202-224.details
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Elusive Externalism.Bernhard Salow - 2019 - Mind 128 (510):397-427.details
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Rational requirements for suspended judgment.Luis Rosa - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (2):385-406.details
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Coherence and Knowability.Luis Rosa - 2022 - The Philosophical Quarterly 72 (4):960-978.details
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Permissive Situations and Direct Doxastic Control.Blake Roeber - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (2):415-431.details
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Anti-Intellectualism.Blake Roeber - 2018 - Mind 127 (506):437-466.details
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The Value of Rationality, by Ralph Wedgwood.Joseph Raz - 2018 - Mind 127 (508):1253-1261.details
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Higher-Order Evidence and the Duty To Double-Check.Michele Palmira - forthcoming - Noûs.details
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Aesthetic Higher-Order Evidence for Subjectivists.Luis Oliveira & Chris Mag Uidhir - 2023 - British Journal of Aesthetics 63 (2):235-249.details
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The Basing Relation.Ram Neta - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (2):179-217.details
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Evidence, coherence and epistemic akrasia.Ram Neta - 2018 - Episteme 15 (3):313-328.details
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Coherence and Deontology.Ram Neta - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):284-304.details
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Misleading Higher-Order Evidence and Rationality: We Can't Always Rationally Believe What We Have Evidence to Believe.Wade Munroe - forthcoming - Episteme:1-27.details
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Conceptual limitations, puzzlement, and epistemic dilemmas.Deigan Michael - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (9):2771-2796.details
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Rationally irresolvable disagreement.Guido Melchior - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (4):1277-1304.details
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How Many Normative Notions of Rationality? A Critical Study of Wedgwood’s The Value of Rationality.Giacomo Melis - 2020 - Analysis 80 (1):174-185.details
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The Normativity of Rationality, by Benjamin Kiesewetter.Conor McHugh - 2018 - Mind 127 (508):1245-1253.details
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