My paper focuses on what and how Kant had accomplished with his intended “re- form of metaphysics” through “reason’s entering the secure path of science”. In this respect, I will argue that the influence of (pure) sciences on Kant’s programme was a major one, and this may be best highlighted if one assumes that he developed his mature theory only in the B edi- tion of his Critique (1787), where the influence of the model of pure a priori (...) sciences turn to be decisive. This influence, as we already know, is closely related to the “reform of metaphysics” by “reason’s entering the secure path of science”. My claim is upheld also by the historical ar- gument that only in the Prolegomena (1783) and in the B edition of the Critique Kant explicitly conceived the idea of “metaphysics as science”. Therefore, the necessary steps in dealing with “metaphysics as science” must consider the A Critique, the Prolegomena, and the B Critique in this precise order. Assuming this order, my approach will involve three parts: in the first I will investigate the idea of the reform of metaphysics from the A Critique, in the second I will take into account “reason’s entering the secure path of science” (in the Prolegomena and the B Cri- tique), i.e., philosophy as science (the discipline within the B Critique); finally, I will argue that understanding Kant’s “idea of philosophy as science” can best be achieved by focusing on the role and place that pure sciences have in the transcendental philosophy of the B Critique, where its structure and content are themed and projected within the methodological frame of the “ex- periment of pure reason”. (shrink)

This dissertation concerns the methodology Kant employs in the first two sections of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (Groundwork I-II) with particular attention to how the execution of the method of analysis in these sections contributes to the establishment of moral metaphysics as a science. My thesis is that Kant had a detailed strategy for the Groundwork, that this strategy and Kant’s reasons for adopting it can be ascertained from the Critique of Pure Reason (first (...) Critique) and his lectures on logic, and that understanding this strategy gains us interpretive insight into Kant’s moral metaphysics. At the most general level of methodology, Kant says there are four steps for the establishment of any science: 1) make distinct the idea of the natural unity of its material 2) determine the special content of the science 3) articulate the systematic unity of the science 4) critique the science to determine its boundaries The first two of these steps are accomplished by the genetically scholastic method of analysis, paradigmatically the method whereby confused and obscure ideas are made clear and distinct, thereby logically perfecting them and transforming them into possible grounds of cognitive insight that are potentially complete and adequate to philosophical purposes. The analysis of Groundwork I is a paradigmatic analysis that makes distinct what is contained in common understanding, i.e. its Inhalt or intension, making distinct the higher partial concepts that together define the concept of morality. The analysis of Groundwork II is an employment more specifically of the method of logical division, which makes distinct what is contained under the concept, i.e. its Umfang, by which the extension or object of morality is determined. Part I introduces Kant’s conception of moral metaphysical science and why he took it to be in need of establishment, explains the general method for establishing science and the scholastic method of analysis by which its first two steps are to be accomplished, then provides an interpretation of Groundwork I as an execution of this method. Part II details Kant’s determination of the special content of moral science in Groundwork II in relation to the central problem for moral metaphysics – how synthetic a priori practical cognition is possible. (shrink)

Contrast between Aristotle and Kant on whether Metaphysics can be considered a science. Draws from Books 4 and 6 of Aristotle's Metaphysics and Kant's Prolegomena on any Future Metaphysic.

In this chapter, I investigate a problem for Kant’s claim that metaphysics can reach the status of science. The problem arises when one considers Kant’s account of the “architectonic unity” of metaphysics in the Architectonic of Pure Reason. Attaining architectonic unity is a condition for becoming a science for any body of cognitions that purports to be such. This is achieved when the cognitions belonging to a science are systematically organized according to the “idea of (...) reason” which lies at the basis of that science. However, Kant suggests that nobody can ever legitimately claim to have matched the idea of the philosopher, where this appears to imply that nobody can justifiably claim that she has fully grasped the idea of metaphysics. This generates a problem. I suggest that when Kant claims that the idea of the philosopher must remain an ideal or an archetype, he has a particular conception of philosophy in mind, that is, philosophy as a doctrine of wisdom. According to this understanding, philosophy must provide an example of how one can become virtuous. However, this is only a partial solution to our problem, for reasons that will be illustrated. (shrink)

Against the separation of metaphysics and science advocated for by Plato and his followers and against the rejection of metaphysics in favour of science the Logical Positivists, this work argues that 'a new link' between metaphysics and science is all the more necessary for man to better understand nature. This is precisely what Whitehead's process metaphysics purports to do. But why is 'a new link' necessary It is necessary because Aristotle and his followers (...) already established a link 'an old link' by making metaphysics the foundation of all the sciences. Yet, Aristotelian metaphysics is a substance based metaphysics while Whitehead's metaphysics takes process and especially the category of relation seriously. Whitehead's Process metaphysics prioritizes process over permanence, becoming over being, relation over substance. Why does Whitehead have such preference for process metaphysics over classical metaphysics The answer, as shall be shown in this paper, lies in science with the demise of Newtonian science and the rise of Einsteinian science based on the theory of relativity. In an era when the concept of depassement de la metaphysique has become such a dominant feature of modern and postmodern thought, it is therefore our point of interest to find out why Whitehead who situates himself within this period takes up metaphysics as the foundation of his philosophizing Why does Whitehead embark on reconciling science and metaphysics when all his contemporaries are dissociating themselves from the former These questions will be the main concern of my research in this paper. (shrink)

The emphasis on the limitations of objectivity, in specific guises and networks, has been a continuing theme of contemporary analytic philosophy for the past few decades. The popular sport of baiting feminist philosophers — into pointing to what's left out of objective knowledge, or into describing what methods, exactly, they would offer to replace the powerful objective methods grounding scientific knowledge — embodies a blatant double standard which has the effect of constantly putting feminist epistemologists on the defensive, on the (...) fringes, on the run.This strategy can only work if objectivity is transparent, simple, stable, and clear in its meaning. It most certainly is not. In fact, taking objectivity as a sort of beautiful primitive, self-evident in its value, and all-powerful in its revelatory power, requires careless philosophy, and the best workers in metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of science have made reworked definitions of objectivity absolutely central to their own projects. In fact, classic feminist concerns with exploring the impact of sex and gender on knowledge, understanding, and other relations between human beings and the rest of the world fall squarely within the sort of human and social settings thatare already considered central in most current analytic metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of science. I argue that the burden of proof is clearly on those who wish toreject the centrality and relevance of sex and gender to our most fundamental philosophical work on knowledge and reality. (shrink)

In this paper, we intend to promote an analysis of the use of the artificial language Heptapod B in Story of Your Life written by Ted Chiang and in its filmic adaptation, Arrival, written by Eric Heisserer and directed by Denis Villeneuve in relation to the authors’ views on the metaphysics of time. In both literary and filmic texts, the glossopoeia is used as a plot device upon which the alien race’s time perception is constructed and explicated in connexion (...) with the strong metaphor provided by Fermat’s principle of least time. Throughout the article, we discuss these hybrid interfaces of literature, cinema and science, researching the stories’ specific diegeses, the writers’ own elicitations as well as various texts on the Philosophy of time. The result consists of a comprehensive exegesis of the problematics generated by the narratives and an extensive philosophical debate on the subject. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to determine whether Kant’s account of freedom fits with his theory of the human sciences. Several Kant scholars have recently acknowledged a tension between Kant’s metaphysics and his works on anthropology in particular. I believe that in order to clarify the issue at stake, the tension between Kant’s metaphysics and his anthropology should be broken down into three distinct problems. Firstly, Kant’s Anthropology studies the human being “as a freely acting being”. This (...) approach thus presupposes that such an inquiry can acknowledge freedom and appeal to it in its accounts of human behaviour. Yet, the Critique of Pure Reason clearly asserts that “as regard [man’s] empirical character there is no freedom; and yet it is only in the light of this character that man can be studied”. This, in contrast, seems to indicate that the human sciences should be carried out independently of freedom. Secondly, the Anthropology seems to suggest that empirical factors encompassed by culture, civilisation and mores can have an impact on the human being’s moral status by generating some form of moral progress. Yet if freedom and moral agency are restricted to the domain of the intelligible, they cannot be influenced by anything empirical. Thirdly, the Anthropology provides numerous moral and prudential recommendations as to how one should behave in particular circumstances. Thus, it seems to presuppose that anthropological knowledge, as well as the practical guidance based on this knowledge, can have an impact on the free choices we make. Yet how can the human sciences be legitimately, and efficaciously, prescriptive vis-à-vis our free choices? Regarding the first problem, which I tackle in section 1, I will hold that the human sciences can legitimately refer to ‘practical freedom’ understood as the power to determine one’s aims and to act independently of sensuous impulses, through intentions and the representation of purposes. I will address the second and third problems in two steps. Section 2 will tackle them negatively through a distinction between the conditions of moral agency and the conditions of moral improvement. It will allow me to argue that the possibility of any direct influence of the empirical on the intelligible is metaphysically invalid in principle, and hence, that empirical factors cannot effect any direct change in one’s moral character. In the third section, I will turn to the positive side of my account by focusing on the issue of the moral relevance of culture and civilisation as well as that of the human sciences (which study their influence), and suggest that they are morally relevant insofar as they make us more morally efficacious. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to examine the nature, scope and importance of philosophy in the light of its relation to other disciplines. This work pays its focus on the various fundamental problems of philosophy, relating to Ethics, Metaphysics, Epistemology Logic, and its association with scientific realism. It will also highlight the various facets of these problems and the role of philosophers to point out the various issues relating to human issues. It is widely agreed that philosophy as (...) a multi-dimensional subject that shows affinity to others branches of philosophy like, Philosophy of Science, Humanities, Physics and Mathematics, but this paper also seeks, a philosophical nature towards the universal problems of nature. It evaluates the contribution and sacrifices of the great sages of philosophers to promote the clarity and progress in the field of philosophy. (shrink)

This paper distinguishes and critiques several forms of pluralism about the levels of selection, and introduces a novel way of thinking about the biological properties and processes typically conceptualized in terms of distinct levels. In particular, "levels" should be thought of as being entwined or fused. Since the pluralism discussed is held by divergent theorists, the argument has implications for many positions in the debate over the units of selection. And since the key points on which the paper turns apply (...) beyond this specific issue, the paper may prove of general interest in thinking about the metaphysics of science. (shrink)

Metaphysicians frequently appeal to the idea that theoretical simplicity is truth conducive in metaphysics, in the sense that, all other things being equal, simpler metaphysical theories are more likely to be true. In this paper I defend the notion that theoretical simplicity is truth conducive in metaphysics, against several recent objections. I do not give any direct arguments for the thesis that simplicity is truth conducive in metaphysics, since I am aware of no such arguments. I do (...) argue, however, that there is no special problem with the notion that simplicity is truth conducive in metaphysics. More specifically, I argue that if you accept the idea that simplicity is truth conducive in science, then it would be objectionably arbitrary to reject the idea that simplicity is truth conducive in metaphysics. (shrink)

Ernst Mayr argued that the emergence of biology as a special science in the early nineteenth century was possible due to the demise of the mathematical model of science and its insistence on demonstrative knowledge. More recently, John Zammito has claimed that the rise of biology as a special science was due to a distinctive experimental, anti-metaphysical, anti-mathematical, and anti-rationalist strand of thought coming from outside of Germany. In this paper we argue that this narrative neglects the (...) important role played by the mathematical and axiomatic model of science in the emergence of biology as a special science. We show that several major actors involved in the emergence of biology as a science in Germany were working with an axiomatic conception of science that goes back at least to Aristotle and was popular in mid-eighteenth-century German academic circles due to its endorsement by Christian Wolff. More specifically, we show that at least two major contributors to the emergence of biology in Germany—Caspar Friedrich Wolff and Gottfried Reinhold Treviranus—sought to provide a conception of the new science of life that satisfies the criteria of a traditional axiomatic ideal of science. Both C.F. Wolff and Treviranus took over strong commitments to the axiomatic model of science from major philosophers of their time, Christian Wolff and Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, respectively. The ideal of biology as an axiomatic science with specific biological fundamental concepts and principles thus played a role in the emergence of biology as a special science. (shrink)

Psychology considered as a natural science began as Aristotelian "physics" or "natural philosophy" of the soul. C. Wolff placed psychology under metaphysics, coordinate with cosmology. Scottish thinkers placed it within moral philosophy, but distinguished its "physical" laws from properly moral laws (for guiding conduct). Several Germans sought to establish an autonomous empirical psychology as a branch of natural science. British and French visual theorists developed mathematically precise theories of size and distance perception; they created instruments to test (...) these theories and to measure visual phenomena such as the duration of visual impressions. These investigators typically were dualists who included mental phenomena within nature. (shrink)

The article evaluates the Domain Postulate of the Classical Model of Science and the related Aristotelian prohibition rule on kind-crossing as interpretative tools in the history of the development of mathematics into a general science of quantities. Special reference is made to Proclus’ commentary to Euclid’s first book of Elements , to the sixteenth century translations of Euclid’s work into Latin and to the works of Stevin, Wallis, Viète and Descartes. The prohibition rule on kind-crossing formulated by Aristotle (...) in Posterior analytics is used to distinguish between conceptions that share the same name but are substantively different: for example the search for a broader genus including all mathematical objects; the search for a common character of different species of mathematical objects; and the effort to treat magnitudes as numbers. (shrink)

We analyse Peirce's original idea concerning abduction from the perspective of a critical philosophy, the same philosophy in Peirce's background. Peirce's realism is directly related to reason and experience and has ties with the idea of abstraction. We show how the philosophical environment of science abruptly changed, specially for physics, in the last period of the XIX century and the initial period of the XX century, when science was divided in disciplines and set free from the control of (...) philosophy. The phenotype of the physicist changed from abstract into imaginative thinker. Further, abstraction was linked to metaphysics and attacked as such. Elements of phantasy and dogmatism entered the scene in place of abstraction alongside ideas taken from the observable world. We provide evidence that the scientists of the newer kind had problems understanding those of the older school. As a consequence of the problems arisen in conciliating the idea of science grounded in experience and reason with the science actually practised, the former conceptualisation was abandoned. Abduction was then expelled from science. In the late part of the XX century and the early part of our century abduction re-emerged but without its scientific attributes. -/- Influenced by a constructivist, Piagetian, perspective of science, we propose and discuss a small number of conditions that we identify as characteristics of rational abduction: rules for the rational construction of theories. We show how a classical example of belief that satisfies today's most common definition of abduction does not match the standards of scientific retroduction. We further show how the same rules indicate the detachment of Special Relativity from the observable world, a fact actually known to Einstein. Finally, the same rules indicate the initial point in the path to re-conciliate Electromagnetism with the classical view of spatial relations, a matter not possible for the imaginative scientist but not extremely difficult for the abstract scientist. We close arguing that there is an urgent need to develop a critical epistemology, and to give room in science for the abstract scientist. (shrink)

What role does the wild duck play in Ibsen's famous drama? I argue that, besides mirroring the fate of the human cast members, the duck is acting as animal subject in a quasi-experiment, conducted in a private setting. Analysed from this perspective, the play allows us to discern the epistemological and ethical dimensions of the new scientific animal practice (systematic observation of animal behaviour under artificial conditions) emerging precesely at that time. Ibsen's play stages the clash between a scientific and (...) a romantic understanding of animals that still constitutes the backdrop of most contemporary debates over animals in research. Whereas the scientific understanding reduces the animal's behaviour, as well as its environment, to discrete and modifiable elements, the romantic view regards animals as being at one with (or violently disconnected from) their natural surroundings. (shrink)

Psychology considered as a natural science began as Aristotelian "physics" or "natural philosophy" of the soul, conceived as an animating power that included vital, sensory, and rational functions. C. Wolff restricted the term " psychology " to sensory, cognitive, and volitional functions and placed the science under metaphysics, coordinate with cosmology. Near the middle of the eighteenth century, Krueger, Godart, and Bonnet proposed approaching the mind with the techniques of the new natural science. At nearly the (...) same time, Scottish thinkers placed psychology within moral philosophy, but distinguished its "physical" laws from properly moral laws. British and French visual theorists developed mathematically precise theories of size and distance perception; they created instruments to test these theories and to measure visual phenomena such as the duration of visual impressions. By the end of the century there was a flourishing discipline of empirical psychology in Germany, with a professorship, textbooks, and journals. The practitioners of empirical psychology at this time typically were dualists who included mental phenomena within nature. Accordingly, psychology as a natural scientific disciplines was not invented in the 18th and 19th centuries, but *remade* from the extant empirical psychology. (shrink)

In this article, I explore the consequences of two commonsensical premises in semantics and epistemology: (1) natural language is a complex system rooted in the communal life of human beings within a given environment; and (2) linguistic knowledge is essentially dependent on natural language. These premises lead me to emphasize the process-socio-environmental character of linguistic meaning and knowledge, from which I proceed to analyse a number of long-standing philosophical problems, attempting to throw new light upon them on these grounds. In (...) particular, I criticize the use of expressions such as ‘absolute truth’, ‘absolute existence’ and ‘the thing in itself’, arguing that they lead to what I call ‘the ultralinguistic paradox’ (a fatal antinomy). In the same way, I review a number of mainstream topics in philosophical semantics, epistemology and metaphysics, reformulating them in terms much more naturalistic – and less mysterious – than usual. (shrink)

The main aim of the text is to show how a game of Go (Weiqi, baduk, Igo) can serve as a model representation of the ontological-metaphysical aspect of the actor–network theory (ANT). An additional objective is to demonstrate in return that this ontological-metaphys⁠ical aspect of ANT represented on Go/Weiqi game model is able to highlight the key aspect of this theory—onto-methodological praxis.

A science of metaphysics adhering to Immanuel Kant's critical demands as set forth in his "Critique of Pure Reason", and "Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic...." The work includes an Appendix that quotes Kant's most relevant remarks in this regard, along with his criterion for objective validity that, given the technical jargon, can be next to impossible to interpret even for those most familiar with Kant. The Appendix allows Kant to interpret himself, the point being that many secondary works (...) enter into conflict with Kant. This can be seen most notably with respect to the somewhat understandable notion that Kant was opposed to speculative metaphysics; but Kant's criterion for objective validity undermines this closed-to-speculative-metaphysics interpretation. As a science in the Kantian sense this work (in this latest edition there is a 2/3 page abstract diagram of the science that makes it more conceptually clear) offers an opportunity for those inclined to shy away from speculative metaphysics to reexamine their interpretations. The objectives are as Kant mentions in the introduction to his CPR: God, Freedom, and Immortality; and that these problems can be dealt with rationally can be seen in this work; and without fear of violating Kant's justifiable strictures, the main one being that where anything offered in the name of pure reason is concerned, it must be such that it helps us to make sense of our phenomenal world. And as to Kant's prerequisite: "How are synthetic cognitions, a priori possible?" I refer to my essay "Beyond Kant and Hegel ..." in "The Review of Metaphysics", March 2013. The premise advanced in the essay is the same as in this booklet. This first part forms the groundwork for the second part, "Rational Theism, Part Two: The Problem of Evil, and God's Omnibenevolence (A Biblical Exegesis)," which notwithstanding its title, is philosophically grounded as a dissertation that can stand on its own. This secondary work is not secondary in importance, but primary in that it provides a rational answer to the problem of evil; and that answer can be found in the pages of the Bible. It is an answer that has escaped the notice of theologians and apologists and philosophers who have sought for an answer to the problem outside the sacred texts wherein the sole answer to the problem can be found, at least for anyone who cares to examine the relevant texts with care and attention. In this short work there are over five dozen scriptures taken into account that support the answer given; and the answer is both very clear, and rational. (shrink)

Metaphysics as theoretical framework for more empirically oriented research in science and in the humanities seems to be either ignored or regarded with great suspicion at the present time. Natural scientists, for example, by and large employ an instrumentalist approach to the study of the laws of nature. Their aim is to deal, not with things in themselves (the Kantian noumena) but with their empirical manifestation (Kantian phenomena) via tentative hypotheses subject to empirical verification. In the humanities, there (...) is deep suspicion of so-called “meta-narratives” that offer a comprehensive vision of reality on the grounds that their authors are consciously or unconsciously trying to control the thinking and behavior of others. Yet, as Colin Gunton points out, human beings, thus faced with an enormous diversity of options in virtually every area of human life, end up making important decisions simply on the basis of momentary personal preference. In this article, I first review the classical philosophical understanding of the relation between the One and Many in which the One is conceived as ontologically prior to the Many as their necessary principle of unity and intelligibility. I then propose a new paradigm for the relation between the One and the Many in which the Many by their dynamic interrelation from moment to moment initially co-create and then sustain the One not as a higher-order individual entity but as their conjoint energy-source and ongoing field of activity. The One can then be readily integrated into a hierarchical ordered system of fields within fields at all levels of existence and activity within nature. In the final part of the article, I indicate how this new field-oriented understanding of the relation between the One and the Many may help to solve controversial issues in natural science and Christian systematic theology. (shrink)

This work in metaphysics adheres to the critical demands of Immanuel Kant for what Kant would call a science of metaphysics, in that it consits strictly of a priori principles that, while from pure reason, can help make sense of our phenomenal world (Kant's criterion for objective validity). The work has an Appendix quoting Kant's most relevant remarks with regard to a science, and offers parallel quotes from David Hume's "Treatise of Human Nature". The work advances (...) the explanation of a causal process that accounts for the origination of the universals: space, time, mass (or substance), and mind (or consciousness), and it necessitates the existence of God as Absolute Being and Absolute Mind. Hegel's 'Science of Logic' is quoted wherein Hegel makes an analogous claim. The causal process is defined with both a definite beginning and a definite end and agreement can be found with the statement found in the book of Revelation, final chapter: "I am the Alpha and the Omega, the first and the last, the beginning and the end." The statement suggests a movement that is not in conflict with the science, and seems to reflect Hegel's own thoughts. The science does not conflict with, but it further finds agreement with the science of big bang cosmology, but it goes further in necessitating a 'singularity' at the beginning of time. The causal process defined has a Formative Phase and a Creative Phase, with the former preceding the big bang and the latter following after the big bang. (shrink)

This is a system of pure speculative reason in answer to the challenge issued by Immanuel Kant, in his "Critique of Pure Reason," with regard to metaphysics; the challenge being clearly mentioned in the Appendix to his "Prolegomena..." wherein he asks his Reviewer to take any one of his four sets of contradictory propositions, and offer an a priori judgment/proposition of his own that would overturn the antinomy, and thus, allow room for the possibility of raising metaphysics to (...) the level of a science, meaning a synthesis of judgments, from pure reason, self-evidently a priori, therefore, necessary; and that as a synthesis of pure understanding, would relate to and help us make sense of reality, that is, the world of our experience. (shrink)

In this paper, I will reread the history of molecular genetics from a psychoanalytical angle, analysing it as a case history. Building on the developmental theories of Freud and his followers, I will distinguish four stages, namely: (1) oedipal childhood, notably the epoch of model building (1943–1953); (2) the latency period, with a focus on the development of basic skills (1953–1989); (3) adolescence, exemplified by the Human Genome Project, with its fierce conflicts, great expectations and grandiose claims (1989–2003) and (4) (...) adulthood (2003–present) during which revolutionary research areas such as molecular biology and genomics have achieved a certain level of normalcy—have evolved into a normal science. I will indicate how a psychoanalytical assessment conducted in this manner may help us to interpret and address some of the key normative issues that have been raised with regard to molecular genetics over the years, such as ‘relevance’, ‘responsible innovation’ and ‘promise management’. (shrink)

A specific soul of the times appears to require a survey of brain research as a study of the psyche and conduct as most settled definition. Two significant developments have emerged freely, one in the core of the American Mental Affiliation itself with Division 5 as of late renamed Quantitative and Subjective Techniques, remembering the General public for Subjective Request for Brain research and the Diary of Subjective Brain research and the other in the European custom with The Yokohama Proclamation (...) for a Brain research as the Study of Person. Both expect an open pluralistic move in the direction of the Mind as "perplexing, abstract, significant, and strange" "no act of request is precluded deduced; numerous objectives of request are delivered conceivable and different pathways might guarantee an arranged authenticity Following this contention, certain implied transcendentalism comprising of a dualistic cosmology with criticism from the regular logical strategy would be at the premise of the persevering dualism in brain research. It is perceived that the distinguishing proof of brain research as an inherent science was likely due more to its esteem than to its own intricacy as suggested by its review. The time has come to reconceive brain research as a human science (social, conduct), without a "complex". To do as such, an ontological inquiry ought to be raised concerning the spot of brain research in a pluralistic metaphysics, not dualistic or monistic. (shrink)

In the good old days, when general philosophy of science ruled the Earth, a simple division was often invoked to talk about philosophical issues specific to particular kinds of science: that between the natural sciences and the social sciences. Over the last 20 years, philosophical studies shaped around this dichotomy have given way to those organized by more fine-grained categories, corresponding to specific disciplines, as the literatures on the philosophy of physics, biology, economics and psychology--to take the most (...) prominent four examples--have blossomed. In general terms, work in each of these areas has become increasingly enmeshed with that in the corresponding science itself, increasingly naturalistic (in at least one sense of that term), and in my view, increasingly interesting. (shrink)

Friedrich Engels’ dialectical assessment of modern science resulted from his fascination with the natural sciences in combination with his resurging interest in the work of “old Hegel.” Engels became especially interested in what he saw as the molecular essence of life, namely proteins or, more specifically, albumin, seeing life as the mode of existence of these enigmatic substances. Hegelian dialectics is crucial for a dialectical materialist understanding of contemporary technoscience. The dialectical materialist understanding of technoscience as a research practice (...) builds on Engels, but also on later authors who were inspired by his writings, e.g., life scientists such as Haldane and Bernal. Considering the criticism raised against Engels’ dialectics by 20th-century Marxists, a dialectical diagnostic of contemporary technoscience can be achieved, which shifts the focus from artificial albumin as “living matter” to contemporary research on synthetic cells. (shrink)

This paper subjects Dan Brown’s most recent novel Origin to a philosophical reading. Origin is regarded as a literary window into contemporary technoscience, inviting us to explore its transformative momentum and disruptive impact, focusing on the cultural significance of artificial intelligence and computer science: on the way in which established world-views are challenged by the incessant wave of scientific discoveries made possible by super-computation. While initially focusing on the tension between science and religion, the novel’s attention gradually shifts (...) to the increased dependence of human beings on smart technologies and artificial intelligence. Origin’s message, I will argue, reverberates with Oswald Spengler’s The Decline of the West, which aims to outline a morphology of world civilizations. Although the novel starts with a series of oppositions, most notably between religion and science, the eventual tendency is towards convergence, synthesis and sublation, exemplified by Sagrada Família as a monumental symptom of this transition. Three instances of convergence will be highlighted, namely the convergence between science and religion, between humanity and technology and between the natural sciences and the humanities. (shrink)

This book gives an account of work that I have done over a period of decades that sets out to solve two fundamental problems of philosophy: the mind-body problem and the problem of induction. Remarkably, these revolutionary contributions to philosophy turn out to have dramatic implications for a wide range of issues outside philosophy itself, most notably for the capacity of humanity to resolve current grave global problems and make progress towards a better, wiser world. A key element of the (...) proposed solution to the first problem is that physics is about only a highly specialized aspect of all that there is – the causally efficacious aspect. Once this is understood, it ceases to be a mystery that natural science says nothing about the experiential aspect of reality, the colours we perceive, the inner experiences we are aware of. That natural science is silent about the experiential aspect of reality is no reason whatsoever to hold that the experiential does not objectively exist. A key element of the proposed solution to the second problem is that physics, in persistently accepting unified theories only, thereby makes a substantial metaphysical assumption about the universe: it is such that a unified pattern of physical law runs through all phenomena. We need a new conception, and kind, of physics that acknowledges, and actively seeks to improve, metaphysical presuppositions inherent in the methods of physics. The problematic aims and methods of physics need to be improved as physics proceeds. These are the ideas that have fruitful implications, I set out to show, for a wide range of issues: for philosophy itself, for physics, for natural science more generally, for the social sciences, for education, for the academic enterprise as a whole and, most important of all, for the capacity of humanity to learn how to solve the grave global problems that menace our future, and thus make progress to a better, wiser world. It is not just science that has problematic aims; in life too our aims, whether personal, social or institutional, are all too often profoundly problematic, and in urgent need of improvement. We need a new kind of academic enterprise which helps humanity put aims-and-methods improving meta-methods into practice in personal and social life, so that we may come to do better at achieving what is of value in life, and make progress towards a saner, wiser world. This body of work of mine has met with critical acclaim. Despite that, astonishingly, it has been ignored by mainstream philosophy. In the book I discuss the recent work of over 100 philosophers on the mind-body problem and the metaphysics of science, and show that my earlier, highly relevant work on these issues is universally ignored, the quality of subsequent work suffering as a result. My hope, in publishing this book, is that my fellow philosophers will come to appreciate the intellectual value of my proposed solutions to the mind-body problem and the problem of induction, and will, as a result, join with me in attempting to convince our fellow academics that we need to bring about an intellectual/institutional revolution in academic inquiry so that it takes up its proper task of helping humanity learn how to solve problems of living, including global problems, and make progress towards as good, as wise and enlightened a world as possible. (shrink)

I propose a distinct type of robustness, which I suggest can support a confirmatory role in scientific reasoning, contrary to the usual philosophical claims. In model robustness, repeated production of the empirically successful model prediction or retrodiction against a background of independentlysupported and varying model constructions, within a group of models containing a shared causal factor, may suggest how confident we can be in the causal factor and predictions/retrodictions, especially once supported by a variety of evidence framework. I present climate (...) models of greenhouse gas global warming of the 20th Century as an example, and emphasize climate scientists’ discussions of robust models and causal aspects. The account is intended as applicable to a broad array of sciences that use complex modeling techniques. (shrink)

Traditionally, vision science and information/data visualization have interacted by using knowledge of human vision to help design effective displays. It is argued here, however, that this interaction can also go in the opposite direction: the investigation of successful visualizations can lead to the discovery of interesting new issues and phenomena in visual perception. Various studies are reviewed showing how this has been done for two areas of visualization, namely, graphical representations and interaction, which lend themselves to work on visual (...) processing and the control of visual operations, respectively. The results of these studies have provided new insights into aspects of vision such as grouping, attentional selection and the sequencing of visual operations. More generally yet, such results support the view that the perception of visualizations can be a useful domain for exploring the nature of visual cognition, inspiring new kinds of questions as well as casting new light on the limits to which information can be conveyed visually. (shrink)

Ground is all the rage in contemporary metaphysics. But what is its nature? Some metaphysicians defend what we could call, following Skiles and Trogdon (2021), the inheritance view: it is because constitutive forms of metaphysical explanation are such-and-such that we should believe that ground is so-and-so. However, many putative instances of inheritance are not primarily motivated by scientific considerations. This limitation is harmless if one thinks that ground and science are best kept apart. Contrary to this view, we (...) believe that ground is a highly serviceable tool for investigating metaphysical areas of science. In this paper, we defend a naturalistic version of the inheritance view which takes constitutive scientific explanation as a better guide to ground. After illustrating the approach and its merits, we discuss some implications of the emerging scientific conception for the theory of ground at large. (shrink)

There are different narratives on mathematics as part of our world, some of which are more appropriate than others. Such narratives might be of the form ‘Mathematics is useful’, ‘Mathematics is beautiful’, or ‘Mathematicians aim at theorem-credit’. These narratives play a crucial role in mathematics education and in society as they are influencing people’s willingness to engage with the subject or the way they interpret mathematical results in relation to real-world questions; the latter yielding important normative considerations. Our strategy is (...) to frame current narratives of mathematics from a virtue-theoretic perspective. We identify the practice of mathematizing, put forward by Freudenthal’s ‘Realistic mathematics education’, as virtuous and use it to evaluate different narratives. We show that this can help to render the narratives more adequately, and to provide implications for societal organization. (shrink)

Theories of natural kinds can be seen to face a twofold task: First, they should provide an ontological account of what kinds of (fundamental) things there are, what exists. The second task is an epistemological one, accounting for the inductive reliability of acceptable scientific concepts. In this chapter I examine whether concepts and categories used in the cognitive sciences should be understood as natural kinds. By using examples from human memory research to illustrate my argument, I critically examine some of (...) the main contenders for a theory of natural kinds. I show that when applied to complex target domains – such as human cognition – both essentialist theories and more liberal accounts of natural kindhood (such as HPC theory) fail to simultaneously satisfy the ontological and epistemological desiderata for a theory of natural kinds. I argue, however, that natural kindhood of a category in a metaphysical sense is not necessary for its inductive reliability, and that HPC theory provides an analytically useful account of the grounds of category-based inductive inference. (shrink)

William Whewell’s 19th century philosophy of science is sometimes glossed over as a footnote to Kant. There is however a key feature of Whewell’s account worth noting. This is his appeal to Aristotle’s form/matter hylomorphism as a metaphor to explain how mind and world merge in successful scientific inquiry. Whewell’s hylomorphism suggests a middle way between rationalism and empiricism reminiscent of experience pragmatists like Steven Levine’s view that mind and world are entwined in experience. I argue however that Levine (...) does not adequately explain exactly how mind and world entwine. He could nonetheless do so if he appealed to Whewell’s hylomorphic metaphor. We may prefer a reductive metaphysical explanation, but I suggest that pragmatists only have recourse to metaphor in this case. Both reductive and metaphorical explanations can enjoy great explanatory power if they exhibit a suitable measure of what I will call sematic distance. Semantic distance measures how close or how far apart explanandum and explanans are from each other in meaning. Metaphorical explanation - as evident in Whewell’s hylomorphism and as detailed via the notion of semantic distance - presents a valuable new explanatory tool to those who hold that mind and world are entwined sans recourse to metaphysics. (shrink)

Artificial gametes, derived from stem cells, have the potential to enable in vitro fertilization of embryos. Currently, artificial gametes are only being generated in laboratory animals; however, considerable efforts are underway to develop artificial gametes using human cell sources. These artificial gametes are being proposed as a means to address infertility through assisted reproductive technologies. Nonetheless, the availability of artificial gametes obtained from adult organisms can potentially expand the possibilities of reproduction. Various groups, such as same-sex couples, post-menopausal women, and (...) deceased donors, could potentially utilize artificial gametes to conceive genetically related offspring. The advent of artificial gametes raises significant bioethical questions. Should all these reproductive scenarios be accepted? How can we delineate the range of future reproductive choices? A normative bioethical framework may be necessary to establish a consensus regarding the use of human artificial gametes. This review aims to present the current state of research on the biological roadmap for generating artificial gametes, while also summarizing proposed approaches to establish a normative framework that delineates ethically acceptable paths for reproduction. (shrink)

Should a principle of charity be applied to the interpretation of the colour concepts exercised in visual experience? We think not. We shall argue, for one thing, that the grounds for applying a principle of charity are lacking in the case of colour concepts. More importantly, we shall argue that attempts at giving the experience of colour a charitable interpretation either fail to respect obvious features of that experience or fail to interpret it charitably, after all. Charity to visual experience (...) is therefore no motive for resisting the natural, Galilean response to a scientific understanding of light and vision. The best interpretation of colour experience ends up convicting it of widespread and systematic error. (shrink)

Although Whitehead’s particular style of philosophizing--looking at traditional philosophical problems in light of recent scientific advances--was part of a trend that began with the scientific revolutions in the early 20th century and continues today, he was marginalized in 20th century philosophy because of his outspoken defense of what he was doing as “metaphysics.” Metaphysics, for Whitehead, is a cross-disciplinary hermeneutic responsible for coherently integrating the perspectives of the special sciences with one another and with everyday experience. The program (...) of such a meta-discipline is challenging to philosophical orthodoxy because it enlarges, rather than narrows, the range of empirical evidence that philosophy must acknowledge. This places Whitehead’s philosophy in a perennial tradition that seeks to resolve fundamental antinomies through synthesis and reconciliation rather than reduction or elimination. (shrink)

Fallibilism, as a fundamental aspect of pragmatic epistemology, can be illuminated by a study of law. Before he became a famous American judge, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., along with his friends William James and Charles Sanders Peirce, associated as presumptive members of the Metaphysical Club of Cambridge in the 1870s, recalled as the birthplace of pragmatism. As a young scholar, Holmes advanced a concept of legal fallibilism as incremental community inquiry. In this early work, I suggest that Holmes treats common (...) law cases more like scientific experiments than as deductive applications of already clear rules. Common law rules may be seen as a product of 1) the conflicts that occur in society, 2) the channeling of conflicts into legal disputes, 3) the gradual accumulation of judicial decisions classified into groups, and 4) the development of consensual understanding, expressed in rules and principles, as to how future cases should be classified and decided. This does not involve only lawyers and judges. Especially in controversial cases, it may indirectly involve an entire community. The legal process is seen as an extended intergenerational process of inquiry. It illuminates the relation of thought, expression, and conduct among a community of inquirers, applied to the problems of social ordering. (shrink)

The central aim of this thesis is to confront the world-view of positivistic materialism with its nihilistic implications and to develop an alternative world-view based on process philosophy, showing how in terms of this, science and ethics can be reconciled. The thesis begins with an account of the rise of positivism and materialism, or ‘scientism’, to its dominant position in the culture of Western civilization and shows what effect this has had on the image of man and consequently on (...) ethical views. After having shown the basic weaknesses of this world-view, the positivist account of science is criticised and an alternative epistemology is developed in which the aim of disciplined inquiry is seen to be understanding. It is argued on the basis of this epistemology that science and metaphysics are indissociable, and that the materialist conception of being is open to challenge from a different ontology. Having reviewed the various conceptions of being which have been developed in the past, a version of process philosophy is outlined and it is argued that this promises to be far more effective than materialism as a foundation for the natural sciences. In particular it is shown how in terms of process philosophy it is possible to conceive of living, sentient organisms as having emerged from inanimate being. This provides the basis for the development of a conception of humanity as an emergent form of life. The human order is then seen as a process of becoming within nature with its own unique dynamics, irreducible to any other processes, involving both intentional and unintentional processes. It is shown how on the basis of this conception of humanity it is possible to develop an ethical theory and a critical social science, and in this way, to transcend the disjunction between science and ethics. -/- . (shrink)

It is argued here that cognitive science currently neglects an important source of insight into the human mind: the effects created by magicians. Over the centuries, magicians have learned how to perform acts that are perceived as defying the laws of nature, and that induce a strong sense of wonder. This article argues that the time has come to examine the scientific bases behind such phenomena, and to create a science of magic linked to relevant areas of cognitive (...) science. Concrete examples are taken from three areas of magic: the ability to control attention, to distort perception, and to influence choice. It is shown how such knowledge can help develop new tools and indicate new avenues of research into human perception and cognition. (shrink)

In this article, I offer a critical interpretation of Hegel’s claims regarding the presuppositionless status of the Logic. Commentators have been divided as to whether the Logic actually achieves the status of presuppositionless science, disagreeing as to whether the Logic succeeds in making an unmediated beginning. I argue, however, that this understanding of presuppositionless science is misguided, as it reflects a spurious conception of immediacy that Hegel criticizes as false. Contextualizing Hegel’s remarks in light of his broader approach (...) to the problem of beginning, I contend that Hegel’s Logic is presuppositionless not in the sense that it satisfies a formal epistemological demand to begin free from all mediation, but in that its self-mediating structure facilitates an immanent deduction of the categories. (shrink)

I have had the fortune to find a way to unite theology and science. It is and has been a bit overwhelming. My aim was to integrate science and hermeneutics but I ended up with a theory that integrates pretty much everything. In this paper I focus the fundamental principle that seems so simple that it could taken for a tautology but it is not. The principle, or, rather, the basic assumption, is that an ontologically homogeneous domain does (...) not cause an ontologically homogeneous domain. By this device all ontologically homogeneous domains are causally closed in relation to other ontologically homogeneous domains. Ontologically heterogeneous domains, on the other hand, are permitted to cause and to be caused by ontologically homogeneous domains. The very first ontologically homogeneous domain, also, is permitted to be caused by an ontologically heterogeneous domain. Science, therefore, would concern inquiries into all ontologically homogeneous and heterogeneous domains except for the first ontologically heterogeneous domain. The first ontologically heterogeneous domain would be the field of interest for theology. Consecutive ontologically homogeneous domains could be the platonic mathematical universe, the physical universe and ourselves as subjects. (shrink)

This article explores Ibn Sīnā’s cosmological views and analyzes the underlying assumptions and arguments in support of the theories to which he subscribes. These include the notions of the central and stationary position of the earth in a finite, spherical cosmos, the impossibility of the existence of many universes, and the metaphysical forces that drive, guide, and maintain the perpetual movement of cosmic bodies.

O Brasil possui um efeito significativo de caprinos, sendo o Nordeste a região com maior expressão deste rebanho. Por mais que a caprinocultura nordestina enfrente inúmeros desafios como a alta mortalidade dos cabritos, escassez de recursos alimentares, abates clandestinos etc., a atividade vem ganhando notoriedade, oferecendo aos consumidores produtos de qualidade para consumo. Diante deste cenário, separou-se 20 caprinos das raças Boer e SPRD, distribuídos em dois grupos, 10 animais recebendo dieta à base de feno padrão de capim Tifton-85 e (...) suplementação concentrada de 25 g/cabeça/dia e o suplemento de palma forrageira cv. Miúda juntamente com farelo da vagem da algaroba e grãos de feijão guandu, misturados e fornecidos em duas refeições diárias (8h e 16h) e um grupo de 10 animais, o grupo controle, recebendo apenas feno padrão e o concentrado na mesma proporção que o grupo experimental. Os animais foram separados preconizando-se a homogeneização do peso corporal e a idade. Foram avaliados os padrões de ganho de peso diário, o consumo de matéria seca e de nutrientes e a idade de abate destes animais conforme o desempenho. Os animais iniciaram o experimento com 25,6±1,6 kg e foram abatidos com 35±2,5 kg. O grupo experimental apresentou maior ganho de peso diário em comparação com o grupo controle (128±6 g vs. 106±9 g), consequentemente o grupo experimental apresentou uma idade de abate menor do que o grupo controle (73±4 vs. 89±8 dias). O rendimento de carcaça do grupo experimental foi maior que o do grupo controle (54,2±0,8 vs. 52,7±0,7%). Diante desses resultados, pôde-se afirmar que uma dieta com palma miúda, farelo da vagem de algaroba e grãos de feijão guandu favorece um maior ganho de peso e um encurtamento na idade de abate de caprinos de corte e SPRD. REFERÊNCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS ABEBE, H.; TAMIR, B.. Effects of supplementation with pigeon pea (Cajanus cajun), cowpea (Vigna unguiculata) and lablab (Lablab purpureus) on feed intake, body weight gain and carcass characteristics in Wollo sheep fed grass hay. International Journal of Advanced Research in Biological Sciences, v. 3, n. 2, p. 280-295, 2016. ALMEIDA, M. A. D. et al. (Orgs.). Criando caprinos e ovinos no Semiárido: manejo e doenças 1ª ed. Salvador: EDUFBA, 2023. ARAÚJO, G. G. L. Alternativas alimentares para caprinos e ovinos no Semiárido. In: VII Seminário Nordestino Pecuário - PECNORDESTE 2003. Anais. Fortaleza - CE, 2003. p. 61-80. BARROS, J. R. L; CRUZ, G. R. B.; MELO, D. A. Caracterização do manejo alimentar de caprinos e ovinos na microrregião do cariri ocidental do estado da Paraíba. Revista Brasileira de Agroecologia, v. 13, n. 4, 2018. BELMONT, A. R. B. et al. Algaroba na alimentação animal. 1ª ed. Natal: SEBRAE/RN, 2016. CONTRERAS-VILLARREAL, V. et al. Complementación alimenticia con mezquite y naranja en cabras: efecto sobre el calostro, leche y cabritos. Abanico veterinario, v. 12, 2022. DA SILVA EIC. A água na nutrição animal. 1ª ed. Recife, PE: Instituto Agronômico de Pernambuco, 2023. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro. Cálculos de consumo e digestibilidade de alimentos e nutrientes para ruminantes. Revista Universitária Brasileira, v. 1, n. 3, p. 71-88, 2023. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro. Concentrados e Rações Para Cabras em Lactação. 2022. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro. Efeitos da raça e do manejo nutricional sobre as características de qualidade da carcaça e da carne em ovinos. Revista Universitária Brasileira, v. 2, n. 1, p. 61-81, 2024. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro. Fisiologia da Reprodução de Bovinos Leiteiros: Aspectos Básicos e Clínicos. Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva, 2022. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro. Formulação de ração para caprinos. Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva, 2021. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro. Formulação e Avaliação de Suplemento Mineral Para Caprinos. Instrução Técnica Para o Produtor Rural de Pernambuco, v. 3, n. 1, p. 1-4, 2023. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro. Formulação e fabricação de rações para ruminantes. 1ª ed. Belo Jardim: Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva, 2021. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro. Formulação e Fabricação de Rações Para Ruminantes: Bovinos, Caprinos e Ovinos. 2021. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro. Manejo Reprodutivo e Índices Zootécnicos em Gado de Leite. 2023. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro. Métodos de Formulação e Balanceamento de Rações para Bovinos. Belo Jardim: Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva, 2021. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro. Nutrição Sobre a Reprodução e Fertilidade dos Bovinos. Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva, 2021. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro. Opções de concentrados para vacas em lactação no Semiárido. 2022. DA SILVA, E. I. C. Suplementação e formulação de sal mineral e mistura múltipla para bovinos. Revista Universitária Brasileira, v. 2, n. 1, 2024. 27-52. DA SILVA, K. B. Utilização de palma forrageira (Nopalea cochenillifera) como fonte exclusiva de forragem na dieta de ovinos. Tese (Doutorado Integrado em Zootecnia) - Centro de Ciências Agrárias, Campus II - UFPB. Areia, 2021. 83 p. GARCÍA-LÓPEZ, J. C. et al. Producción y contenido nutrimental de vainas de tres variantes de mezquite (Prosopis laevigata) en el altiplano potosino, México. Agrociencia, v. 53, n. 6, p. 821-831, 2019. LUCENA, R. B. Utilização da palma forrageira (nopalea cochenillifera) nas formas in natura e desidratada sobre: consumo, digestibilidade, balanço hídrico e absorção de minerais em ovinos. Dissertação (Mestrado em Nutrição de Ruminantes) - Departamento de Zootecnia, UFRPE. Recife, 2011. 77 p. MEDEIROS, L. P.; SAMPAIO, C. F. Desempenho de caprinos SRD em regime de confinamento. In: V Seminário de Pesquisa Agropecuária do Piauí. Anais. Teresina: Embrapa, 1988. p. 183-185. OLIVEIRA, A. P. D. Mandioca e farelo da vagem de algaroba na alimentação de caprinos mestiços. Dissertação (Mestrado em Ciência Animal) - Centro de Ciências Agrárias, Ambientais e Biológicas, UFRB. Cruz das Almas, 2012. 57 p. OLIVEIRA, L. L. et al. Native legumes and spineless cactus in supplementation of goats grazing in Caatinga rangeland: intake, performance, carcass characteristics, and meat quality. Acta Scientiarum. Animal Sciences, v. 44, p. e56445, 2022. OLIVEIRA, L. L. Suplementação com leguminosas sobre o desempenho e característica da carcaça de caprinos em crescimento no Semiárido. Dissertação (Mestrado em Ciência Animal e Pastagens) - UFRPE. Garanhuns, 2014. 90 p. OLIVEIRA, R. L. et al. Alimentos alternativos na dieta de ruminantes. Revista Científica de Produção Animal, v. 15, n. 2, p. 141-160, 2013. ROGÉRIO, M. C. P. et al. Manejo alimentar de caprinos e ovinos nos trópicos. Veterinária e Zootecnia, v. 23, n. 3, p. 326-346, 2016. SILVA, J. G. M. et al. Cactáceas nativas na alimentação de ruminantes. Revista Científica de Produção Animal. v. 15, n. 1. p. 53-62. 2013. SOUSA, F. A. Desempenho de cabritos alimentados com variedades de palma forrageira resistente a cochonilha do carmim. Dissertação (Mestrado em Zootecnia) - Centro de Ciências Agrárias, UFPB. Areia, 2015. 71 p. VALADARES FILHO, S. C. et al. (Eds.). Tabelas brasileiras de composição de alimentos para ruminantes. 1ª ed. Viçosa: UFV, 2015. (shrink)

Naturalist views of persons, such as those of the philosophers Annette Baier and Marjorie Grene, emphasize that human persons are cultural animals: We are living, embodied, organic beings, embedded in nature, the product of Darwinian evolution, but dependent on culture. Such naturalist views of persons typically eschew science fiction and look askance at the philosophical fantasies and thought experiments that often populate philosophical treatments of personal identity. Marge Piercy’s dystopian, cyberpunk, science fiction novel He, She and It weaves (...) a complex tale around the debate over the status of its central character Yod, a cyborg created in a lab but humanized through the efforts of two women, Malkah Shipman and her granddaughter Shira Shipman. Is Yod a person, despite having been engineered in a lab for a specific purpose? Piercy’s tale both challenges and ultimately supports a naturalist view of persons while simultaneously forewarning us of possible new styles of persons to come. (shrink)

Introduction Reza Davari Ardakni, the Iranian contemporary philosopher, distinguishes development from Western modernity; in that it considers modernity as natural and organic changes that Europe has gone through, but sees development as a planned design for implementing modernity in other countries. As a result, the closedness of development concerns only the developing countries, not Western modern ones. Davari emphasizes that the Western modernity has a universality that pertains to a unique reason and a unified world. The only way of thinking (...) in this world is a philosophical thought based on human self-centered reason, and given the pervasiveness of Western civilization. Therefore, Davari does not consider Westernization as mere imitation of Western customs and methods, but rather as a way of existence in the world. Westernization is a subjective view of the world and beings. Westernization is not optional, enabling non-Western people to avoid it. According to the Westernization scenario, the world today is entirely Westernized, and Davari considers Westernization as the inevitable fate of the people of this era, seeing two alternatives for them, both of which ultimately lead to the same destination, which is to embrace development; either they seize the power of science and technology and join the process of global modernization and participate in it, or they become subdued by this process and accept it without participation. Davari regards the first type of Westernization as active and the second type as passive. Problematique Therefore, underdevelopment is not a concept of the ancient world, nor even of a world between the ancient and the modern, or on the threshold of modernization. Underdevelopment is a condition of suspension and timelessness and being exposed to modernization. To escape the paradox of underdevelopment, which is the inevitable historical fate of non-modernized societies, Davari sees no way out other than embracing development. In other words, Westernized societies, which have become confused due to modernization, have no escape route other than turning to development. Therefore, some critics of Davari accuse the theory of Westernization of being a theoretical rupture. M. T. Tabatabaei, by rejecting the theoretical rupture in the theory of Westernization, believes that in the argument of Davari, we are only faced with a shift from a philosophical to an intellectual level. Tabatabaei, by avoiding providing a philosophical response to the critics of the theoretical rupture, believes that the introduction of active Westernization and collaboration in science and technology as a solution to escape from underdevelopment conditions, is only a shift from a philosophical level to an intellectual level and does not involve a rupture. Therefore, it seems that the philosophical issue of how or the possibility of escaping from underdevelopment conditions is still an open non answered problem. In this study, seeking a philosophical answer to this problem, an attempt has been made to summarize Davari's definitions of development, underdevelopment, participation in the world of science, and the role of humanities and social sciences in development, using his writings and speeches. It is proposed that a way to escape from the clesedness of development based on Davari's views, is to make use of analytical method with emphasizing on concepts and theories of the philosophy and metaphysics of science. Argument According to Davari, the social and human sciences that are responsible for development planning in underdeveloped societies must consider the characteristics of underdevelopment in order to facilitate the transition to more favorable conditions. Davari identifies the following conditions for successful development: 1) replacing tradition with science as the organizing and coordinating principle in society, 2) recognizing the universality of philosophy and science of the Western modernity and the impossibility of blindly imitation and adopting it, 3) inevitability of actively engaging and interacting with development, 4) recognizing the internal dynamics of scientific progress and avoiding authoritarian control, and 5) promoting free participation in the scientific paradigms. Therefore, Davari suggests the following steps towards development: 1) recognizing and understanding the problems of society and the local ecosystem, 2) understanding the philosophical and cultural foundations of Western civilization, 3) understanding the historical context and paradigms of science, 4) understanding the philosophical and metaphysical foundations of science, 5) recognizing the intellectual and philosophical capacities of our own community, and 6) reflecting our own philosophical and metaphysical assumptions in the scientific world in a way that is compatible with scientific methods. Given the motivations for change in science at both the global and national levels, including the emergence of heterodox or indigenous sciences, and the inevitable nature of development, Davari points to the possibility of a path between absolute rejecting or accepting the mainstream social and human sciences. However, this path is challenging and contingent upon the aforementioned conditions and steps of transition. Conclusion It is necessary to seek this path within the realm of the philosophy and metaphysics of science, particularly in the origins and foundations of the social and human sciences. Research in the metaphysics and philosophy of the social sciences provides the opportunity for active scientific engagement in the scientific paradigms and a reconsideration of the foundations of science, allowing for different philosophical foundations while are compatible with scientific methods. Successfully finding a path between absolute rejecting or accepting the existing social sciences will lead to an internal transformation within the field of science and, in fact, will advance the boundaries of knowledge. Therefore, it is possible, while adhering to the conditions of transition and actively participating in the world of science and technology, and accepting the unity of modernity and avoiding selectivity and imitation, to search for a way to overcome the closedness of development through a reconsideration of the philosophical and metaphysical foundations of science, while recognizing our own intellectual heritage and critically assessing Western science and technology. (shrink)

This paper surveys some recent work on realization in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of science.

The study aims to identify the efficiency of the university education performance from the perspective of postgraduate and undergraduate students in international and Palestinian universities. The analytical descriptive approach was used for this purpose and the questionnaire was used as a main tool for data collection. The study community consists of: post graduate students, (23850) graduate students and (146355) undergraduate students. The sample of the study was 378 graduate students and 383 undergraduate students. The random stratified sample was used. The (...) Statistical Package of Social Sciences (SPSS) was also used for data analysis. The study reached a number of results, the most important of which are: The level of efficiency of educational performance in Palestinian and international universities from the point of view of postgraduate and undergraduate students was high. And that there are significant differences between the average views of the sample of the study on the efficiency of educational performance in Palestinian and international universities attributed to the University and to the benefit of international universities. The study concluded many recommendations, the most important of which is the necessity of continuing to develop e-learning strategies that affect the efficiency of educational performance and research commensurate with the university's position in the local and international community, which puts it on the best classification between local and international universities through e-learning. (shrink)

Trope theory is a leading metaphysical theory in analytic ontology. One of its classic statements is found in the work of Donald C. Williams who argued that tropes qua abstract particulars are the very alphabet of being. The concept of an abstract particular has been repeatedly attacked in the literature. Opponents and proponents of trope theory alike have levelled their criticisms at the abstractness of tropes and the associated act of abstraction. In this paper I defend the concept of a (...) trope qua abstract particular by rejecting arguments that purport to show that tropes should not be understood as abstract and by arguing that the abstractness of tropes plays an indispensable role in one of our more promising trope-theoretic analyses of universals and of concrete objects. (shrink)