I examine the relation between logic and nature in terms of ‘reflection’, the word that Hegel uses at the end of theEncyclopaedia Logicto describe the self-sundering or externalization of the idea into nature. Although nominally the term ‘reflection’ seems to denote a uniquely mental process and is often used so by Hegel in his early critique ofReflexionsphilosophie, in his later writings it also has an irreducibly ontological significance. Hegel describes logic's opening-out to nature as a movement of ‘reflection’ [Widerschein] and (...) he follows Kant in describing the shift from the finite to the infinite in the relation between nature and thought as one of reflective judgement. Although Hegel generally considers reflection to be uniquely concerned with finite cognition and the constitution of finite things, I argue that in his embrace of reflective judgement he sees a key role for reflection in the relation of logic, nature and spirit. (shrink)