In the history of ethics, it remains remains unclear how Christians of the Middle Ages came to see God-given virtues as dispositions (habitus) created in the human soul. Patristic works could surely support other conceptions of the virtues given by grace. For example, one might argue that all such virtues are forms of charity, so that they must be affections of the soul, or that they consist in what the soul does, not anything the soul has. Scholars usually assume that (...) the explanation lies in the impact of Aristotle's philosophy on medieval theology. This essay argues that the dispositional account of God-given virtues was already entrenched by the end of the twelfth century and probably owes more to the influence of Augustine's treatise On the Good of Marriage. (shrink)

The medieval Church's concern with moral reform contributed to the emergence of a genre of literature in the thirteenth century dedicated to the vices and virtues. Inspired by monastic and scholastic traditions, treatises such as Laurent d'Orléans's Somme le roi encouraged the avoidance of sin and provided the faithful with a moral taxonomy that ultimately ensured their access to heaven. Marguerite Porete's Mirror of Simple Souls and Meister Eckhart's Discourses of Instruction challenge this virtue-centered approach to salvation. Relying on their (...) shared claim that the fall of the just man is in fact a virtue, this essay argues that their moral theology is grounded not on the a posteriori act of penance needed for salvation, but on the a priori consent of the will. This alternative view of moral life finds support in previous strands of the Christian tradition, and in particular in Peter Abelard's theory of intentionalism. (shrink)

The central question raised in the present article concerns the ontological nature of the intentional act, previous to the proper moral action, in Aristotle’s and Abelard’s thinking. More precisely, we examine two subjects indirectly interconnected. First, we treat the secular problem of the exact nature of will (boulêsis) in Aristotle, which certainly refers to a rational act (logikos), the source of which is, however, the appetite (orexis). The second point is related to the notion of consent (consensus) in Abelard, which (...) also raises the question of its voluntary or rational ontological character. Both topics are connected in so far as the Abelardian consent is similar to the Aristotelian idea of choice (proairesis), and particularly to that of the Stoic assent (sunkatathesis), and not, as some commentators believe, to the Augustinian notion of will as a free and spontaneous act. This identification of the Abelardian consent with the Augustine’s will comes from a confusion, which is more terminological and perspectival than interpretative. (shrink)