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  1. We know what stops you from thinking forever: A metacognitive perspective.Rakefet Ackerman & Kinga Morsanyi - 2023 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 46:e112.
    This commentary addresses omissions in De Neys's model of fast-and-slow thinking from a metacognitive perspective. We review well-established meta-reasoning monitoring (e.g., confidence) and control processes (e.g., rethinking) that explain mental effort regulation. Moreover, we point to individual, developmental, and task design considerations that affect this regulation. These core issues are completely ignored or mentioned in passing in the target article.
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  • Initial judgment of solvability: integrating prior expectations with experience-based heuristic cues.Tirza Lauterman & Rakefet Ackerman - 2024 - Thinking and Reasoning 30 (1):135-168.
    Initial Judgment of Solvability (iJOS) is a metacognitive judgment that reflects solvers’ first impression as to whether a problem is solvable. We hypothesized that iJOS is inferred by combining prior expectations about the entire task with heuristic cues derived from each problem’s elements. In two experiments participants first provided quick iJOSs for all problems, then attempted to solve them. We manipulated expectations by changing the proportion of solvable problems conveyed to participants, 33%, 50%, or 66%, while the true proportion was (...)
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  • Mindset effects on the regulation of thinking time in problem-solving.Rakefet Ackerman & Liat Levontin - 2024 - Thinking and Reasoning 30 (3):479-508.
    Understanding time investment while solving problems is central to metacognitive research. By the Diminishing Criterion Model (DCM), time regulation is guided by two stopping rules: a confidence criterion that drops as time is invested in each problem and the maximum time to be invested. This combination generates curved confidence–time associations. We compared the belief that intelligence is malleable, a growth mindset, to the belief that intelligence is fixed, and to neutral control groups. We hypothesized that a growth mindset leads people (...)
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