The juxtaposition encompassed in the phrase "feminist epistemology" strikes some feminist theorists and mainstream epistemologists as incongruous. To others, the phrase signals the view that epistemology and the philosophy of science are not what some of their practitioners and advocates have wanted or claimed them to be-but also are not "dead," as some of their critics proclaim. This essay explores the grounds for and implications of each view and recommends the second.

This essay focuses on the extent to which the methods of analytic philosophy can be useful to feminist philosophers. I pose nine general questions feminist philosophers might ask to determine the suitability of a philosophical method. Examples include: Do its typical ways of formulating problems or issues encourage the inclusion of a wide variety of women's points of view? Are its central concepts gender-biased, not merely in their origin, but in very deep, continuing ways? Does it facilitate uncovering roles that (...) gender, politics, power, and social context play in philosophy as well as in other facets of life? (shrink)

Experimental psychology has much to offer the current debate about memories of childhood abuse. However, laboratory scientists, with their enormous cognitive authority to define reality for the rest of the population, must be especially conservative when arguing that laboratory results on memory generalize to contested memories of abuse. Researchers must make an effort to untangle the appropriate from inappropriate application of research results to this debate. A crucial untangling strategy for future research on general phenomena involves taking care to pose (...) questions separately. When the research is disseminated, its relevance and its limitations must be carefully communicated. Finally, scientists must attend to their power to define reality for others. (shrink)