There are a bewildering variety of claims connecting Darwin to nineteenth-century philosophy of science—including to Herschel, Whewell, Lyell, German Romanticism, Comte, and others. I argue here that Herschel’s influence on Darwin is undeniable. The form of this influence, however, is often misunderstood. Darwin was not merely taking the concept of “analogy” from Herschel, nor was he combining such an analogy with a consilience as argued for by Whewell. On the contrary, Darwin’s Origin is written in precisely the manner that one (...) would expect were Darwin attempting to model his work on the precepts found in Herschel’s Preliminary Discourse on Natural Science. While Hodge has worked out a careful interpretation of both Darwin and Herschel, drawing similar conclusions, his interpretation misreads Herschel’s use of the vera causa principle and the verification of hypotheses. The new reading that I present here resolves this trouble, combining Hodge’s careful treatment of the structure of the Origin with a more cautious understanding of Herschel’s philosophy of science. This interpretation lets us understand why Darwin laid out the Origin in the way that he did and also why Herschel so strongly disagreed, including in Herschel’s heretofore unanalyzed marginalia in his copy of Darwin’s book. (shrink)

This paper has two objectives, neither previously attempted in the published literature—first, to outline J. M. Keynes's theory of knowledge in some detail, and, secondly, to justify the contention that his epistemology is a variety of rationalism, and not, as many have asserted, a form of empiricism. Keynes's attitude to empirical data is also analysed as well as his views on prediction and theory choice. 1This paper is partly based on ideas initially advanced in O'Donnell [1982], a revised and expanded (...) version of which is to be published as O'Donnell [1989]. I should like to thank an anonymous referee for helpful comment, and King's College, Cambridge for permission to quote from the Keynes Papers. (shrink)

[full article, abstract in English; only abstract in Lithuanian] In Normativity of Scientific Laws explicit and implicit normativities were discerned and it was shown, following Joseph Rouse, that scientific laws implicitly harbour what Alchourrón and Bulygin imply to be the core of normativity. Here I develop this claim by discerning six aspects of implicit normativity in scientific laws: general and special conceptual normativity, concerning analytical thinking and special scientific terminologies; theoretical and material epistemic normativity, concerning mathematical and experimental accountability of (...) the world; narrow and broad practical normativity, concerning technologies in both narrower and broader senses. (shrink)

Joseph Agassi is an Israeli scholar born in Jerusalem on May 7, 1927. He has many books and articles published contributing to the fields of logic, scientific method, foundations of sciences, epistemology and, most importantly for this Journal, in the historiography of science. He studied with Karl Popper, who was definitely his biggest influence. He taught around the world in different universities. He currently lives in Herzliya, Israel. For his important contribution to the historiography of science, we chose to open (...) the first issue of this journal with this interview recognizing his importance for the field, as well as paying our homage to him. (shrink)

This paper explores the link between the case for indeterminism in an epistemological fashion and methodological individualism in the thought of two defenders of both stances: Karl Popper and Friedrich Hayek. The relation between these issues has not received much attention before and even less so with regard to these two thinkers. First, Popper’s defence of indeterminism from an epistemic viewpoint and Hayek’s views about the indeterminism of action are studied. Second, their positions about methodological individualism are considered. Finally, several (...) comparative questions are aired. (shrink)

Night: The presence of the absence, the dissolution of the person in the night, the horror of being, the reality of the unreal, it takes us more to the absence of God than to God, to the absence of every entity. Dawn: Not being conscious of the existence of that unchangeable supposed centre of the person within time does not mean that we cannot be able to explain the not static changeable and relational personal identity in other ways. Day: It (...) is me who flows, but I am not in the flow like a support from where life flows, I am flowing in my own reality. This is not similar to an egology, it does not mean that everything exists and is loved to me, but it does mean that everything is seen and loved for me. (shrink)

Jorge Luis Borges is working for decades now on the execution of the nightmare. Perhaps his most celebrated instance is "Tlon, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius ". It would take much work to sift the fabricated references in Borges' works from the ones deliberately misread from the over-emphasis on an author's casual remark, etc.