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Mind 83 (331):406-416 (1974)

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(1 other version)Creative product and creative process in science and art.Larry Briskman - 1980 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 23 (1):83 – 106.details The main aim of this essay is to propose and develop a product?oriented, non?psychologistic, approach to scientific and artistic creativity. I first argue that the central problem is that of answering the question: how is creativity possible? Traditional approaches to this question tend to locate creativity primarily in some special psychological processes or traits, or in some special creative act. Some general arguments against such an approach are developed, and it is suggested that creativity ought primarily to be located in (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 12 citations
How Do We Learn from Argument?: Toward an Account of the Logic of Problems.Terry M. Goode & John R. Wettersten - 1982 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 12 (4):673-689.details From the pre-Socratics to the present, one primary aim of philosophy has been to learn from arguments. Philosophers have debated whether we could indeed do this, but they have by and large agreed on how we would use arguments if learning from argument was at all possible. They have agreed that we could learn from arguments either by starting with true premises and validly deducing further statements which must also be true and therefore constitute new knowledge, or that we could (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 2 citations
Rationality in inquiry : on the revisability of cognitive standards.Jonas Nilsson - 2000 - Umeå Studies in Philosophy 1:154.details The topic of this study is to what extent standards of rational inquiry can be rationally criticized and revised. It is argued that it is rational to treat all such standards as open to criticism and revision. Arguments to the effect that we are fallible with regard to all standards of rational inquiry are presented. Standards cannot be ultimately justified and with certainty established either as adequate or as inescapable presuppositions. Apel's attempt to give ultimate justifications of certain moral and (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 4 citations
A Bootstrap Theory of Rationality.Jonas Nilsson - 2005 - Theoria 71 (2):182-199.details In this paper a bootstrap theory of rationality is presented. Such a theory is an attempt to explain how standards of rational inquiry may be rationally revised — without assuming that there are any basic and fixed standards for evaluating such revisions. The general bootstrap idea is briefly presented in the first sections. The main part of the paper consists of a discussion of what normative requirements a bootstrap theory should contain, and a number of requirements on rational revisions are (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 2 citations

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