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Sensationalism

Mind 75 (297):1-24 (1966)

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  1. Was Feyerabend a Popperian? Methodological issues in the History of the Philosophy of Science.Matteo Collodel - 2016 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 57:27-56.
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  • Four contemporary interpretations of the nature of science.J. O. Wisdom - 1971 - Foundations of Physics 1 (3):269-284.
    Instrumentalism is an approach to science that treats a theory as a tool and only as a tool for computation; it dispenses with the concept of truth.Conventionalism treats a theory as true by convention if it forms a pattern of observations from which correct predictions can be made.Operationalism denies meaning to the concepts of a theory unless they can be defined operationally. It is argued in this paper that truth-value is indispensable to science, because a theory can be rejected only (...)
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  • On the Use of Historical Examples in Agassi's 'Sensationalism'.T. A. Beckman - 1971 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 1 (4):293.
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  • Gibson's theory of perception: A case of hasty epistemologizing?Edward S. Reed & Rebecca K. Jones - 1978 - Philosophy of Science 45 (4):519-530.
    Hintikka has criticized psychologists for "hasty epistemologizing," which he takes to be an unwarranted transfer of ideas from psychology (a discipline dealing with questions of fact) into epistemology (a discipline dealing with questions of method and theory). Hamlyn argues, following Hintikka, that Gibson's theory of perception is an example of such an inappropriate transfer, especially insofar as Hamlyn feels Gibson does not answer several important questions. However, Gibson's theory does answer the relevant questions, albeit in a new and radical way, (...)
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  • Conventionalism and economic theory.Lawrence A. Boland - 1970 - Philosophy of Science 37 (2):239-248.
    Roughly speaking all economists can be divided into two groups--those who agree with Milton Friedman and those who do not. Both groups, however, espouse the view that science is a series of approximations to a demonstrated accord with reality. Methodological controversy in economics is now merely a Conventionalist argument over which comes first--simplicity or generality. Furthermore, this controversy in its current form is not compatible with one important new and up and coming economic (welfare) theory called "the theory of the (...)
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  • Naturalized perception without information.John Dilworth - 2004 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 25 (4):349-368.
    The outlines of a novel, fully naturalistic theory of perception are provided, that can explain perception of an object X by organism Z in terms of reflexive causality. On the reflexive view proposed, organism Z perceives object or property X just in case X causes Z to acquire causal dispositions reflexively directed back upon X itself. This broadly functionalist theory is potentially capable of explaining both perceptual representation and perceptual content in purely causal terms, making no use of informational concepts. (...)
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  • Tristram Shandy, Pierre Menard, and all that. [REVIEW]Joseph Agassi - 1971 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 14:152.
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  • (3 other versions)Agassi’s “Sensationalism” and Popper on the Empirical Basis.Jeremy Shearmur - 2023 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 53 (1):39-48.
    This paper discusses Agassi’s critique of Popper’s theory of the “empirical basis”. It argues that Popper’s theory should be interpreted with emphasis on its realism and anti-subjectivism, and as stressing a tentative inter-subjective consensus as to what is observed when tests are made. It agrees with Agassi’s critique of “sensationalism”, disagrees that there are residues of “sensationalism” in Popper’s approach, and argues that Popper’s view should be supplemented by a tentative realist metaphysics.
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  • A Touch of Malice.Joseph Agassi - 2002 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 32 (1):107-119.
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  • (3 other versions)Agassi’s “Sensationalism” and Popper on the Empirical Basis.Jeremy Shearmur - 2023 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 53 (1):39-48.
    This paper discusses Agassi’s critique of Popper’s theory of the “empirical basis”. It argues that Popper’s theory should be interpreted with emphasis on its realism and anti-subjectivism, and as stressing a tentative inter-subjective consensus as to what is observed when tests are made. It agrees with Agassi’s critique of “sensationalism”, disagrees that there are residues of “sensationalism” in Popper’s approach, and argues that Popper’s view should be supplemented by a tentative realist metaphysics.
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  • (1 other version)Rationalität und Erkenntnisfortschritt.Bernd Giesen & Michael Schmid - 1974 - Zeitschrift Für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 5 (2):256-284.
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  • Science without reduction.Helmut F. Spinner - 1973 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 16 (1-4):16 – 94.
    The aim of this essay is a criticism of reductionism ? both in its ?static? interpretation (usually referred to as the layer model or level?picture of science) and in its ?dynamic? interpretation (as a theory of the growth of scientific knowledge), with emphasis on the latter ? from the point of view of Popperian fallibilism and Feyerabendian pluralism, but without being committed to the idiosyncrasies of these standpoints. In both aspects of criticism, the rejection is based on the proposal of (...)
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  • (3 other versions)Agassi’s “Sensationalism” and Popper on the Empirical Basis.Jeremy Shearmur - 2023 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 53 (1):39-48.
    This paper discusses Agassi’s critique of Popper’s theory of the “empirical basis”. It argues that Popper’s theory should be interpreted with emphasis on its realism and anti-subjectivism, and as stressing a tentative inter-subjective consensus as to what is observed when tests are made. It agrees with Agassi’s critique of “sensationalism”, disagrees that there are residues of “sensationalism” in Popper’s approach, and argues that Popper’s view should be supplemented by a tentative realist metaphysics.
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  • (3 other versions)Agassi’s “Sensationalism” and Popper on the Empirical Basis.Jeremy Shearmur - 2023 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 53 (1):39-48.
    This paper discusses Agassi’s critique of Popper’s theory of the “empirical basis”. It argues that Popper’s theory should be interpreted with emphasis on its realism and anti-subjectivism, and as stressing a tentative inter-subjective consensus as to what is observed when tests are made. It agrees with Agassi’s critique of “sensationalism”, disagrees that there are residues of “sensationalism” in Popper’s approach, and argues that Popper’s view should be supplemented by a tentative realist metaphysics.
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  • The Pressure of Light: The Strange Case of the Vacillating 'Crucial Experiment'.John Worrall - 1982 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 13 (2):133.
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  • Science versus the scientific revolution.J. O. Wisdom - 1971 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 1 (1):123-144.
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  • (1 other version)On the Methodology of the Social Sciences: A Review Essay Part I.Toby E. Huff - 1981 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 11 (4):461-475.
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  • Universal, basic and instantial statements in the logic of scientific discovery.S. Godlovitch - 1969 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 20 (4):355-356.
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  • (1 other version)Rationalität und erkenntnisfortschritt.Bernd Giesen & Michael Schmid - 1974 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 5 (2):256-284.
    Die Arbeit kritisiert den Versuch Imre Lakatos, durch eine Erweiterung und Veränderung eines falsifikationistischen methodologischen Programms einen funktionierenden Standard des Ausscheidens objektsprachlicher Theorien zu gewinnen. Dies leistet Lakatos auch nicht durch seine Wendung zur Historiographie, die eine Beurteilung konkurrierender methodologischer Programme ermöglichen soll. Immer bleibt seine Methodologie auf die Möglichkeit des Gehaltsvergleiches angewiesen, die nur in den restringiertesten Fällen vorliegen wird und fällt damit noch hinter die frühen Vorschläge Paul K. Feyerabends zurück. Lakatos kann in keiner Phase seiner methodologischen Entwürfe (...)
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  • Conventionalism, Truth, and CosmologicaI Furniture.J. O. Wisdom - 1975 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 4 (3):441-457.
    The problem to be discussed here concerns ontology so far as it may not be formed by scientific theory. In brief terms, the problem arises in the following way. On the one hand, the world surely consists of whatever is there, irrespective of whether human beings are around or not, and irrespective especially of whether human beings have constructed any scientific theories depicting the nature of the world; on the other hand, scientific theories are subject to the limitation that we (...)
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  • Searching for the holy in the ascent of Imre Lakatos.John Wettersten - 2004 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 34 (1):84-150.
    Bernard Lavor and John Kadvany argue that Lakatos’s Hegelian approach to the philosophy of mathematics and science enabled him to overcome all competing philosophies. His use of the approach Hegel developed in his Phenomenology enabled him to show how mathematics and science develop, how they are open-ended, and that they are not subject to rules, even though their rationality may be understood after the fact. Hegel showed Lakatos how to falsify the past to make progress in the present. A critique (...)
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  • The point of positive evidence—reply to professor Feyerabend.T. W. Settle - 1969 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 20 (4):352-355.
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