Some philosophers of science suggest that philosophical assumptions must influence historical scholarship, because history (like science) has no neutral data and because the treatment of any particular historical episode is going to be influenced to some degree by one's prior philosophical conceptions of what is important in science. However, if the history of science must be laden with philosophical assumptions, then how can the history of science be evidence for the philosophy of science? Would not an inductivist history of science (...) confirm an inductivist philosophy of science and a conventionalist history of science confirm a conventionalist philosophy of science? I attempt to resolve this problem; essentially, I deny the claim that the history of science must be influenced by one's conception of what is important in science — one's general philosophy of science. To accomplish the task I look at a specific historical episode, together with its history, and draw some metamethodological conclusions from it. The specific historical episode I examine is Descartes' critique of Galileo's scientific methodology. (shrink)

Popper's theory of demarcation has set the standard of falsifiability for all sciences. But not all falsifiable theories are part of science and some tests of scientific theories are better than others. Popper's theory has led to the banning of metaphysical and/or philosophical anthropological theories from science. But Joseph Agassi has supplemented Popper's theory to explain how such theories are useful as research programs within science. This theory can also be used to explain how interesting tests may be found. Theories (...) of rationality may be used to illustrate this point by showing how they fail or succeed in producing interesting and testable hypotheses in the social sciences. (shrink)

The present paper is an attempt to explore the impact of Karl Popper's ideas on the views of a number of intellectual groups in post-revolutionary Iran. Throughout the text, we have tried to make use of original sources and our own personal experiences. The upshot of the arguments of the paper is that the Viennese philosopher has made a long-lasting impression on the intellectual scene of present-day Iran in that even those socio-political groups which are not in favour of his (...) ideas, especially his model of critical rationalism, have felt the urgent need to make themselves familiar with them. Moreover, many of Popper's ideas have directly or indirectly influenced the thinking of the decision-makers in Iran since 1978. (shrink)

At the beginning of the eighties of the last century, the issue of “patronage” began to arouse scholarly interest and gained importance. Galileo became a test case: his importance, and the importance of patronage – and that of the Medici in particular – go beyond the historical junction of the scientific revolution and have corollaries in the more general attitude to science and knowledge. This case furnished a new line of research for the historical sociology of science. As far as (...) Galileo is concerned, my claim is that the new trend belongs to post-modern historiography, rather than to post-Renaissance Medici patronage. (shrink)

History of science is, we are told, an important subject for study. Its rise in recent years to become a ‘stand alone’ discipline has been mirrored by an expansion of popular history of science texts available in bookstores. Given this, it is perhaps surprising that little attention has been given to how history of science is written. This article attempts to do that through constructing a typology of histories of science based upon a consideration of audiences who read these texts (...) and writers who construct them. It identifies four ideal types of history of science which describe the opposite poles of two continua running from exoteric to esoteric. The article also examines the content of a sample of history of science texts and finds that often these texts, whether esoteric or exoteric, provide only a chronology of events (often incredibly detailed), avoiding discussion or even mention of wider social, economic and political contexts. Such histories serve to reinforce a ‘standard’ account of science as ‘separate’ from the rest of society, an account that is at odds with almost all contemporary sociology of science and science and technology studies. This prompts the question: why should I read histories of science? (shrink)

The topic of history-of-science explanation is first briefly introduced as a generally important one for the light it may shed on action theory, on the logic of discovery, and on philosophy''s relations with historiography of science, intellectual history, and the sociology of knowledge. Then some problems and some conclusions are formulated by reference to some recent relevant literature: a critical analysis of Laudan''s views on the role of normative evaluations in rational explanations occasions the result that one must make aconceptual (...) distinction between evaluations and explanations of belief, and that there are at leastthree subclasses of the latter, rational, critical, and theoretical; I then discuss the problem of whether explanations of discoveries are self-evidencing and predictive by focusing on views of Hempel and Nickles, and I attempt a formalization of some aspects of the problem. Finally, a more systematic and concrete analysis is undertaken by using as an example the explanation of Galileo''s rejection of space-proportionality, and it is argued that the historical explanation of scientific beliefs is a type of logical analysis. (shrink)

The characteristics of inductivist historiography of science, as practised by earlier scientist/historians, and Whig historiography, as practised by earlier political historians, are described, according to the accounts of Agassi and Butterfield. It is suggested that the writings of Geikie on the history of geology allow us to characterize him as a Whig/inductivist historian of science who formulated anachronistic judgements. It is further suggested that his writings have had a considerable long-term effect on interpretations of the history of geology. The character (...) of Geikie's historiography is related to his social, political and religious views, his historicism, and his romantic enthusiasm for Nature. His methodological pronouncements are examined: he believed that the present is the key to the past, and also that the past is the key to the present. He was an empiricist and inductivist. These epistemological and methodological views impinged on his historiography of science. If one attempts to criticize Geikie's historiography, though one may try to judge his work according to the norms of his own day and age, historical anachronism cannot be avoided entirely and one may oneself be charged with acting ‘Whiggishly’. Historians of science, in the process of professionalization, have accepted the historiographical norms of general historians , but in so doing have inherited a problem that arises whenever they contemplate earlier historical writings. It is suggested that there may be more room for Whiggish historiography of science than is presently deemed acceptable. Alternatively, one may wish to draw a careful distinction between science and its meta-discipline, the historiography of science. Whig historiography conflates the two, and the work of Geikie provides a good illustration of this. (shrink)

1. Lies, Error and Confusion 2. Lies 3. The Demarcation of Science: Historical 4. The Demarcation of Science: Recent 5. Observed Regularities and Laws of Nature.