As the public profile of bioethics rises, and as litigation about issues ranging from assisted reproduction to gene therapy multiplies, the presence of bioethics experts in a litigation context has become more common. Dozens of appellate opinions refer to bioethics testimony in the lower courts. Today's technical advisory services for attorneys advertise bioethics experts along with experts in scientific fields. A single bioethicist has served as an expert in more than fifty cases. In all likelihood, opportunities for bioethicists to fill (...) the role of testifying expert will grow as medicine and biotechnology become more complex. Bioethics experts have also been involved in several other kinds of litigation-related activities, including investigation, consultation with attorneys, preparing reports that express expert opinions, and explaining and defending these opinions by deposition.Despite the growth of these activities by bioethicists, they have never been free of controversy, have recently been received with little enthusiasm by the judiciary, and could become highly problematic in the future. (shrink)

Professor Imwinkelried is surely right: the propriety of bioethicists serving as expert witnesses in litigation is problematic, and, I would add, it should remain problematic. Such testimony most certainly does not belong everywhere it will be offered by lawyers and litigants in an effort to advance their interests. Yet in contrast to some commentators, Imwinkelried and I both see a place for bioethicists serving as expert witnesses, although we differ significantly on how to understand and justify this place. In any (...) event, serious questions regarding the proper place for expert bioethicist testimony in the courtroom do exist, not only for law but also bioethics as well.The threshold question regarding the prospect of bioethicists serving as expert witnesses would seemingly have to be: “could a bioethicist qualify as an expert witness under the controlling rules of evidence?” Imwinkelried, however, does not perceive any need to even entertain this question as he claims that “technical evidentiary standards are inapplicable when information is presented to a judge to permit the judge to perform… a legislative or law-making function.”. (shrink)

Professor Imwinkelried is surely right: the propriety of bioethicists serving as expert witnesses in litigation is problematic, and, I would add, it should remain problematic. Such testimony most certainly does not belong everywhere it will be offered by lawyers and litigants in an effort to advance their interests. Yet in contrast to some commentators, Imwinkelried and I both see a place for bioethicists serving as expert witnesses, although we differ significantly on how to understand and justify this place. In any (...) event, serious questions regarding the proper place for expert bioethicist testimony in the courtroom do exist, not only for law but also bioethics as well.The threshold question regarding the prospect of bioethicists serving as expert witnesses would seemingly have to be: “could a bioethicist qualify as an expert witness under the controlling rules of evidence?” Imwinkelried, however, does not perceive any need to even entertain this question as he claims that “technical evidentiary standards are inapplicable when information is presented to a judge to permit the judge to perform… a legislative or law-making function.”. (shrink)

The term, “bioethics” was coined in 1970 by American cancerologist V. R. Potter. In the few decades since, the field of bioethics has emerged as an important discipline. The field has attained a remarkable degree of public recognition in a relatively short period of time. The “right to die” cases such as In re Quinlan placed bioethical issues on the front pages. Although the discipline is of recent vintage, the past quarter century has witnessed a flurry of scholarly activity, creating (...) a substantial body of bioethical literature. Moreover, the bioethics movement has manifested itself in institutional expressions. Universities and medical schools have added courses in bioethics to their curricula. In 1974, federal legislation and regulations mandated that federal grantees conducting human subjects research establish institutional review boards to safeguard subjects’ welfare, and even absent a legislative mandate numerous hospitals created ethics committees. Centers and institutes, devoted exclusively to the study of bioethical issues, have been founded. (shrink)

The term, “bioethics” was coined in 1970 by American cancerologist V. R. Potter. In the few decades since, the field of bioethics has emerged as an important discipline. The field has attained a remarkable degree of public recognition in a relatively short period of time. The “right to die” cases such as In re Quinlan placed bioethical issues on the front pages. Although the discipline is of recent vintage, the past quarter century has witnessed a flurry of scholarly activity, creating (...) a substantial body of bioethical literature. Moreover, the bioethics movement has manifested itself in institutional expressions. Universities and medical schools have added courses in bioethics to their curricula. In 1974, federal legislation and regulations mandated that federal grantees conducting human subjects research establish institutional review boards to safeguard subjects’ welfare, and even absent a legislative mandate numerous hospitals created ethics committees. Centers and institutes, devoted exclusively to the study of bioethical issues, have been founded. (shrink)

The nature, possibility, and implications of ethics expertise in general and of bioethics expertise in particular has been the focus of extensive debate for over thirty years. What is ethics expertise and what does it enable experts to do? Knowing what ethics expertise is can help answer another important question: What, if anything, makes a claim of expertise legitimate? In other words, how does someone earn the appellation “ethics expert?” There remains deep disagreement on whether ethics expertise is possible, and (...) if so, what constitutes such expertise and what it entails and legitimates. Discussion of bioethics expertise has become particularly important given the growing presence of bioethicists in the clinical setting as well as efforts to professionalize bioethics through codes of ethics and certification efforts. Unlike in the law or in engineering, where there may be a body of knowledge that professional organizations or others have articulated as important for education and training of experts, ethics expertise admits of no such body of knowledge or required experience. Nor is there an entity seen as having the authority to articulate the necessary scope of knowledge. Questions about whether there is such a body of knowledge for particular areas within bioethics have emerged and played a central role in professionalization efforts in recent years, especially in the area of clinical ethics. (shrink)

Philosophers have harbored doubts about the possibility of moral expertise since Plato. I argue that irrespective of whether moral experts exist, identifying who those experts are is insurmountable because of the credentials problem: Moral experts have no need to seek out others’ moral expertise, but moral non-experts lack sufficient knowledge to determine whether the advice provided by a putative moral expert in response to complex moral situations is correct and hence whether an individual is a bone fide expert. Traditional accounts (...) of moral expertise require that moral experts give reliably correct moral advice supported by adequate justification, an account which, I argue, is too lean in allowing for the possibility of a moral expert who is motivationally indifferent to her own moral judgments and advice. Yet even if the proposition that a moral expert is an individual who provides reliably correct moral advice supported by adequate justification and is necessarily motivated by that advice exhausts the necessary and sufficient conditions for moral expertise, this proposition cannot function as an applicable criterion for non-experts to use in appraising would-be experts’ claims to expertise. The credentials problem thus remains unanswered. (shrink)

This paper explores the concept of moral expertise in the contemporary philosophical debate, with a focus on three accounts discussed across moral epistemology, bioethics, and virtue ethics: an epistemic authority account, a skilled agent account, and a hybrid model sharing key features of the two. It is argued that there are no convincing reasons to defend a monistic approach that reduces moral expertise to only one of these models. A pluralist view is outlined in the attempt to reorient the discussion (...) about moral expertise. (shrink)

This paper offers an exposition of what the question of method in ethics consultation involves under two conditions: when ethics consultation is regarded as a practice and when the question of method is treated systematically. It discusses the concept of the practice and the importance of rules in constituting the actions, cognition, and perceptions of practitioners. The main body of the paper focuses on three elements of the question of method: canon, discipline, and history, which are treated heuristically to outline (...) what the question of method in ethics consultation fully involves. (shrink)

According to G. E. Moore, moral expertise requires abilities of several kinds: the ability to factor judgments of right and wrong into (a) judgments of good and bad and (b) judgments of cause and effect, (2) the ability to use intuition to make the requisite judgments of good and bad, and (3) the ability to use empirical investigation to make the requisite judgments of cause and effect. Moore’s conception of moral expertise is thus extremely demanding, but he supplements it with (...) some very simple practical guidance. (shrink)