While the richness of Heideggerian philosophy is attractive as a healthcare research framework, its density means authors rarely utilise its fullest possibilities as an hermeneutic analytic structure. This article aims to clarify Heideggerian hermeneutic analysis by taking one discrete element of Heideggerian philosophy (Being-towards-death), and using it’s clearly defined structure to conduct a meta-synthesis of Heideggerian phenomenological studies on the experience of living with a potentially life-limiting illness. The findings richly illustrate Heidegger’s philosophy that there is either an inauthentic positioning (...) towards death, or an authentic positioning towards death with a proposition that (1) death is certain; (2) death is indefinite; (3) death is non-relational; and (4) death is not-to-be-outstripped. None of the 29 included studies on the experience of a confrontation with death fully utilised this framework, despite claiming a grounding in Heideggerian thought. This demonstrates the value in modelling how Heideggerian existential structures can be used proactively as analytical ‘hooks’ for data in research claiming a basis in this philosophy and/or method. By modelling the potential application of an important Heideggerian philosophical construct to published qualitative data, this meta-synthesis has revealed new domains and more nuanced understandings of the temporal structure of Being-towards-death. Such an approach helps to more fully unveil the existential concerns of people at the core of interpretative phenomenological enquiry and may provide a blueprint to map either primary or synthesised data to other key ontological existentials. (shrink)

The aim of this study was interpret the existential construct of family caring following Acute Coronary Syndrome. Family support is known to have a positive impact on recovery and adjustment after cardiac events. Few studies provide philosophically-based, interpretative explorations of carer experience following a spouse’s ischaemic event. As carer experiences, behaviours and meaning-making may impact on the quality of the support they provide to patients, further understanding could improve both patient outcomes and family experience. Fourteen spouses of people experiencing Acute (...) Coronary Syndrome in Sydney, Australia were engaged in a single, semi-structured interview. Interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed verbatim. Data were analysed using hermeneutic interpretation within a Heideggerian phenomenological framework. Acute Coronary Syndrome disrupts lived temporality, and the projected potential for carers’ being-alongside. Carers experienced an existential uncertainty that arose from difficulty in diagnosis, and situated fear as an attuned, being-towards-death. They constructed protective strategies to insulate their partner and themselves from further stress and risk, however, unclear boundaries for protection heightened carer anxiety. The existential structure of care included one of two possible Heideggerian modes: leaping-in care was a dominating mode that required a high level of carer vigilance; leaping-ahead care was a metaphorical walking alongside, as carers gave back control, freeing opportunities for the person to ‘own’ care. Supporting carers through the intensive phase of leaping-in care, and equipping them for informed leaping-ahead care should be a focus in both the acute and post-discharge care phases. (shrink)

Michel Houellebecq to pisarz francuski, autor sześciu powieści, a także poeta, reżyser oraz muzyk. Jego literaturę najczęściej traktuje się jako bezkompromisową krytykę współczesnego społeczeństwa, zwłaszcza takich zjawisk, jak konsumpcjonizm czy seksualizacja kultury. W niniejszym artykule zamierzam wykazać, że powieści Houellebecqa współdzielą myśl, która jest charakterystyczna dla filozofii egzystencjalnej. Opierając się nie tylko na epice, ale również na poezji, esejach i wywiadach Houellebecqa, staram się dowieść, że rozważany przezeń problem — tzw. problem egzystencji — dotyczy relacji między subiektywną jednostką a obiektywną, (...) rozumianą w kategoriach naukowych rzeczywistością, bohaterowie jego powieści natomiast to przedstawiciele możliwych odpowiedzi na pojawiające się tu napięcie. Jeżeli uznać, że ów problem stanowi kluczową cechę egzystencjalizmu, a — jak staram się wykazać — tak właśnie jest, to zasadne staje się nazwanie Houellebecqa prawdopodobnie ostatnim wpływowym przedstawicielem tego nurtu. (shrink)

Während Nietzsche in der Debatte um Anerkennung bisher vorwiegend in Bezug zur Verkennungslinie interpretiert wird, geht es in dem Beitrag dagegen um die Abgrenzung Nietzsches zu dieser vorwiegend französisch geprägten Verkennungslinie. Dies soll an der sozialen Praktik der Scham als distinktes Beispiel für eine konkrete Situation von Anerkennungsbeziehungen im Lebenszusammenhang gezeigt werden. Für die Verkennungslinie wird exemplarisch Jean Paul-Sartres Verständnis von Scham aus Das Sein und das Nichts als Anerkennungsbeziehung herangezogen. Dazu kontrastierend soll auf Nietzsches Beschreibung des „Scham-Ersparens“ als konkrete (...) Form von Anerkennungsverhältnissen eingegangen werden. Hierbei geht es Nietzsche um eine grundsätzliche Fragilität, durch die das Anerkennungsgeschehen stets in eine Form von Verletzung und Verkennung umzuschlagen droht. Dabei soll gezeigt werden, dass Nietzsche nicht Sartres Weg einschlägt, in dem der Andere sein Gegenüber immer schon durch seinen Blick verdinglicht und dadurch die Freiheit des Anderen verunmöglicht. Wie schwierig die Umsetzung im konkreten Fall bei Nietzsche auch sein mag, so gesteht Nietzsche ihr dennoch grundlegend eine gelingende Möglichkeit im ‚Scham-Ersparen’ zu, oder anders gewendet: Es geht Nietzsche um ein Anerkennen im Angesicht der wechselseitigen Verletzlichkeit. (shrink)

This essay explores the unique temporal experience in anxiety. Drawing on first-person accounts as well as examples from literature, I attempt to show how anxiety not only disrupts our physiological and cognitive timing but also disturbs the embodied rhythms of everyday social life. The primary goal, however, is to articulate the extent to which human existence itself is a temporally structured event and to identity the ways that anxiety disrupts this structure. Using Martin Heidegger’s account of human existence as a (...) point of departure, I show how the mood of anxiety has the power to alter our self-interpretations by closing down or constricting our experience of the future. I argue that a constricted future impedes our ability ‘to be’ because it closes off the range of projective meanings that we would ordinarily draw on to create or fashion our identities. (shrink)

This essay explores the unique temporal experience in anxiety. Drawing on first-person accounts as well as examples from literature, I attempt to show how anxiety not only disrupts our physiological and cognitive timing but also disturbs the embodied rhythms of everyday social life. The primary goal, however, is to articulate the extent to which human existence itself is a temporally structured event and to identity the ways that anxiety disrupts this structure. Using Martin Heidegger’s account of human existence as a (...) point of departure, I show how the mood of anxiety has the power to alter our self-interpretations by closing down or constricting our experience of the future. I argue that a constricted future impedes our ability ‘to be’ because it closes off the range of projective meanings that we would ordinarily draw on to create or fashion our identities. (shrink)