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  1. An opportunity cost model of subjective effort and task performance.Robert Kurzban, Angela Duckworth, Joseph Kable & Justus Myers - 2013 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (6):661–79.
    Why does performing certain tasks cause the aversive experience of mental effort and concomitant deterioration in task performance? One explanation posits a physical resource that is depleted over time. We propose an alternative explanation that centers on mental representations of the costs and benefits associated with task performance. Specifically, certain computational mechanisms, especially those associated with executive function, can be deployed for only a limited number of simultaneous tasks at any given moment. Consequently, the deployment of these computational mechanisms carries (...)
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  • Evolving resolve.Walter Veit & David Spurrett - 2021 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 44.
    The broad spectrum revolution brought greater dependence on skill and knowledge, and more demanding, often social, choices. We adopt Sterelny's account of how cooperative foraging paid the costs associated with longer dependency, and transformed the problem of skill learning. Scaffolded learning can facilitate cognitive control including suppression, whereas scaffolded exchange and trade, including inter-temporal exchange, can help develop resolve.
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  • Models of Temporal Discounting 1937–2000: An Interdisciplinary Exchange between Economics and Psychology.Till Grüne-Yanoff - 2015 - Science in Context 28 (4):675-713.
    ArgumentToday's models of temporal discounting are the result of multiple interdisciplinary exchanges between psychology and economics. Although these exchanges did not result in an integrated discipline, they had important effects on all disciplines involved. The paper describes these exchanges from the 1930s onwards, focusing on two episodes in particular: an attempted synthesis by psychiatrist George Ainslie and others in the 1970s; and the attempted application of this new discounting model by a generation of economists and psychologists in the 1980s, which (...)
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  • Intertemporal Bargaining in Habit.George Ainslie - 2016 - Neuroethics 10 (1):143-153.
    Lewis ascribes the stubborn persistence of addictions to habit, itself a normal process that does not imply lack of responsiveness to motivation. However, he suggests that more dynamic processes may be involved, for instance that “our recurrently focused brains inevitably self-organize.” Given hyperbolic delay discounting, a reward-seeking internal marketplace model describes two processes, also normal in themselves, that may give rise to the “deep attachment” to addictive activities that he describes: People learn to interpret current choices as test cases for (...)
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  • Reply to commentaries to willpower with and without effort.George Ainslie - 2021 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 44:e57.
    Twenty-six commentators from several disciplines have written on the assumption that choice is determined by comparative valuation in a common denominator of reward, the “competitive marketplace.” There was no apparent disagreement that prospective rewards are discounted hyperbolically, although some found that the resulting predictions could come just as well from other models, including the interpretation of delay as risk and analysis in terms of hot versus cold valuation systems. Several novel ideas emerged.
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  • Monotonous tasks require self-control because they interfere with endogenous reward.George Ainslie - 2013 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (6):679-680.
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  • Endogenous reward is a bridge between social/cognitive and behavioral models of choice.George Ainslie - 2025 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 48.
    Endogenous reward (intrinsic reward at will) is a fiat currency that is occasioned by steps toward any goals which are challenging and/or uncommon enough to prevent its debasement by inflation. A “theory of mental computational processes” should propose what properties let goals grow from appetites for endogenous rewards. Endogenous reward may be the universal selective factor in all modifiable mental processes.
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  • Framing is a motivated process.George Ainslie - 2022 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 45:e221.
    Frames group choices into categories, thus modifying the incentives for them. This effect makes framing itself a motivated choice rather than a neutral cognition. In particular, framing an inferior choice with a high short-term payoff as part of a broad category of choices recruits incentive to reject it; but this must be motivated by its being a test case.
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  • Selfish goals must compete for the common currency of reward.George Ainslie - 2014 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 37 (2):135-136.
    Selfish Goal Theory is compatible with a behaviorally based theory that recognizes mental processes as behaviors. Both envision choices as made by the competition of purposive processes, which are autonomous in that they are not coordinated by an agentic “self.” However, the survival of mental processes – termed “goals” or “interests,” respectively – depends on a well-documented active mechanism: reward.
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  • Response to the critiques (and encouragements) on our critique of motivation constructs.Kou Murayama & Hayley Jach - 2025 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 48:e50.
    The target article argued that motivation constructs are treated as black boxes and called for work that specifies the mental computational processes underlying motivated behavior. In response to critical commentaries, we clarify our philosophical standpoint, elaborate on the meaning of mental computational processes and why past work was not sufficient, and discuss the opportunities to expand the scope of the framework.
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