I make the case that what gets called epistemic paternalism isn’t correctly labelled as such. This mislabelling is problematic for two reasons. First, paternalism in general faces strong challenges to its permissibility. Second, the scope for action of epistemic paternalism is somewhat narrow given the typical concerns of applied epistemology. Having clarified epistemic paternalism and discussed the above considerations, this paper introduces epistemic benevolence. The case is made that the epistemic benevolence-based approach can avoid some of the strong challenges that (...) epistemic paternalism faces and is often more suitable for the concerns of applied epistemology than a paternalist approach. To make these points, first, I make the case for a particular analysis of the epistemic paternalist act and, second, I explain epistemically benevolent acts as acts motivated by a concern for the epistemic welfare of another agent or agents. Given this characterisation, I argue that epistemic benevolence includes epistemic paternalism but extends beyond epistemic paternalism. I consider an objection to epistemic benevolence, which motivates laissez faire epistemic liberalism, a rival theoretical approach. Outlining this alternative serves to provide a further theoretical option relevant for work in applied epistemology. I offer some considerations as to why epistemic benevolence approach should still be favoured. (shrink)

The internet provides easy access to a wealth of information that can sometimes be false and harmful. This is most apparent on social media platforms. To combat this, platforms have implemented various methods of content moderation to flag or block content that is inaccurate or violates community standards. This approach has limitations – from the epistemic injustices that might occur due to content moderation practices to the concerns about the legitimacy of these for-profit platforms’ epistemic authority. In this paper, I (...) highlight some of the epistemic challenges of online content moderation with a focus on how it harms internet users and moderators. If we are to moderate content effectively and ethically, we must attend to these challenges. Hence, I map out an epistemic compass for online content moderation that looks to attend to these challenges. I argue for a pluralistic model of content moderation that categorises content online and distributes the task of content moderation between human moderators, automated moderators, and community moderators in a way that plays to the strengths of each content moderation model. My compass is beneficial for two reasons: first, it allows room for the internet to realise its potential as a democratising force for knowledge, and second, it helps minimise the epistemic downsides of relying on profit-driven companies as epistemic authorities. (shrink)