Metacognition is the capacity to evaluate the success of one's own cognitive processes in various domains; for example, memory and perception. It remains controversial whether metacognition relies on a domain-general resource that is applied to different tasks or if self-evaluative processes are domain specific. Here, we investigated this issue directly by examining the neural substrates engaged when metacognitive judgments were made by human participants of both sexes during perceptual and memory tasks matched for stimulus and performance characteristics. By comparing patterns (...) of fMRI activity while subjects evaluated their performance, we revealed both domain-specific and domain-general metacognitive representations. Multivoxel activity patterns in anterior prefrontal cortex predicted levels of confidence in a domain-specific fashion, whereas domain-general signals predicting confidence and accuracy were found in a widespread network in the frontal and posterior midline. The demonstration of domain-specific metacognitive representations suggests the presence of a content-rich mechanism available to introspection and cognitive control. (shrink)

The DRM paradigm produces robust false memories of non-presented critical words. After studying a thematic word list participants falsely remember the critical item “sleep.” We report two false memory experiments. Study One introduces a novel use of the lexical decision task to prime critical words. Participants see two letter-strings and make timed responses indicating whether they are both words. The word pairs Night-Bed and Dream-Thweeb both prime “sleep” but only one pair contains two words. Our primary purpose is to introduce (...) this new methodology via two pilot experiments. The results, considered preliminary, are promising as they indicate that participants were as likely to recognize critical words and presented words just as when studying thematic lists. Study Two actually employs the standard DRM lists so that semantic priming is in play there as well. The second study, however, uses functional near-infrared spectroscopy to measure activity in the prefrontal cortex during a DRM task which includes a deception phase where participants intentionally lie about critical lures. False and true memories occurred at high levels and activated many of the same brain regions but, compared to true memories, cortical activity was higher for false memories and lies. Accuracy findings are accompanied by confidence and reaction time results. Both investigations suggest that it is difficult to distinguish accurate from inaccurate memories. We explain results in terms of activation-monitoring theory and Fuzzy Trace Theory. We provide real world implications and suggest extending the present research to varying age groups and special populations. A nagging question has not been satisfactorily answered: Could neural pathways exist that signal the presence of false memories and lies? Answering this question will require imaging experiments that focus on regions of distinction such as the anterior prefrontal cortex. (shrink)

In prior research, signal detection theory has been widely utilized to assess metacognitive ability. However, the SDT metacognitive model requires the use of a two-alternative forced-choice task, while confidence must also be measured discretely. In our model, participants’ cognitive ability and their confidence in the cognitive task were used to estimate their metacognitive abilities. Therefore, in this study, a metacognitive model that can be applied to various cognitive tasks was developed. This model implements the item response theory and Q-learning models (...) to estimate cognitive ability; participants’ metacognitive ability is defined as the discrepancy between their confidence in their cognitive ability and their actual cognitive ability. The entire procedure was divided into two experiments. In experiment 1, two different cognitive tasks were used to estimate metacognitive ability and to examine overall discriminative and convergent validity. Notably, the parameters representing metacognitive ability did not correlate with cognitive ability but were positively correlated between the two tasks. In experiment 2, we performed a similar analysis using a different task to test the replicability of experiment 1. The results for experiment 2 were replicated for discriminative and convergent validity, albeit with weak results. Our metacognitive model exhibited high interpretability and versatility. (shrink)