Revitalized interest in "the virtues" has affected the study of Buddhism in recent years, and in this regard we may benefit by focusing on the Zen Master Dōgen (1200-1253). Seeking to describe Dōgen's moral virtues, we might begin by a study of his primer, the "Shōbōgenzō" Zuimonki; a particularly efficacious template for this project would appear to be one provided by Edmund L. Pincoffs in his book "Quandaries and Virtues: Against Reductivism in Ethics". This "modus operandi" reveals Dōgen's exhortation of (...) a broad array of mandatory and nonmandatory virtues, partially depend- ing on whether or not the intended recipient is a layperson or one leading the religious life. If valid, this description may benefit Dōgen Studies as well as contribute to, and encourage, other "Western" efforts to articulate Buddhist ethics. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Many Buddhist teachers in North America teach forgiveness: an attitude of non-anger not conditional on wrongdoers repairing their wrongs. Classical Buddhist texts and premodern Buddhist cultures also taught forgiveness: the act of reconciling after wrongdoers repaired wrongs. This article describes traditional Buddhist forgiveness processes, analyses how new processes to forgive arose in North America, and outlines the current state of Buddhist forgiveness teachings there. It shows that the predominant way North American Buddhists now teach forgiveness is new. It developed (...) in the 1970–1990 period and incorporates non-Buddhist discourses. In addition to clarifying what forgiveness has long been in Buddhism and how, in North America, changes to that occurred, the article notes the frequent absence, among academic scholars and Buddhists alike, of awareness concerning (a) the replacement of longstanding Buddhist teachings on forgiveness by new teachings; (b) the predominantly non-Buddhist sources of the new teachings; and (c) the impact on victims, wrongdoers, relationships, and communities of the new teachings. The article contributes to scholarship on Buddhist ethics, forgiveness in Buddhism, and the development and hybridisation of Buddhism in North America. (shrink)

What have modern Buddhist ethicists to say about abortion and is there anything to be learned from it? A number of writers have suggested that Buddhism (particularly Japanese Buddhism) does indeed have something important to offer here: a response to the dilemma of abortion that is a 'middle way' between the pro-choice and pro-life extremes that have polarised the western debate. I discuss what this suggestion might amount to and present a defence of its plausibility.

Abstract Everyday inanimate things such as stones, teapots and bicycles are not objects to which moral agents could have direct duties; they do not have moral status. It is usually assumed that there is therefore no reason to think that a morally good person would, on account of her goodness, be disposed to treat them well for their own sakes. I challenge this assumption. I begin by showing that to act for the sake of an entity need not be to (...) suppose that it has moral status, but simply to regard it as an end in itself. Having done this, I argue that it is not, as is conventionally assumed, implausible to suppose that to be morally good is to be disposed to treat at least some inanimate things gently, and to do so, moreover, for the sake of those things, rather than for some other reason. (shrink)