Drawing on the SAGE minutes and other documents, I consider the wider lessons for norms of scientific advising that can be learned from the UK’s initial response to coronavirus in the period January-March 2020, when an initial strategy that planned to avoid total suppression of transmission was abruptly replaced by an aggressive suppression strategy. I introduce a distinction between “normatively light advice”, in which no specific policy option is recommended, and “normatively heavy advice” that does make an explicit recommendation. I (...) argue that, although scientific advisers should avoid normatively heavy advice in normal times in order to facilitate democratic accountability, this norm can be permissibly overridden in situations of grave emergency. SAGE’s major mistake in early 2020 was not that of endorsing a particular strategy, nor that of being insufficiently precautionary, but that of relying too heavily on a specific set of “reasonable worst-case” planning assumptions. I formulate some proposals that assign a more circumscribed role to “worst-case” thinking in emergency planning. In an epilogue, I consider what the implications of my proposals would have been for the UK’s response to the “second wave” of late 2020. (shrink)

The vegan project is defined as the project that strives for radical legal reform to pass laws that would reserve the consumption of animal products to a very narrow range of situations, resulting in vegan diets being the default diets for the majority of human beings. Two objections that have been raised against such a project are described. The first is that such a project would jeopardise the nutritional adequacy of human diets. The second is that it would alienate human (...) beings from nature. It is argued that neither undermines the vegan project. (shrink)

When faced with an urgent and credible threat of grave harm, we should take proportionate precautions. But what is it for a precaution to be “proportionate”? I construct a pragmatic analysis of consisting of four tests—permissibility-in-principle, adequacy, reasonable necessity and consistency—that could realistically be applied by a citizens’ assembly meeting online or in person. I apply these tests retrospectively to two examples from the COVID-19 pandemic—border closures and school closures—arguing that my account captures the key questions on which it is (...) both feasible and important to integrate expert input with democratic input. I then consider how we might try to manage the risk of future pandemics in a proportionate way. (shrink)