Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Avoiding Moral Commitment.Miles Tucker - forthcoming - Journal of the American Philosophical Association.
    I argue that relaxed moral realists are not ontologically committed to moral properties. Regardless of whether we tie ontological commitment to quantification, entailment, or truthmaking, if moral properties are not explanatory (as relaxed realists claim), then moral truths do not require moral properties. This permits a nominalist form of relaxed realism that is both simpler and more ecumenical than extant formulations. The possibility of such a position places pressure on the ontology of competing views—and helps focus attention on the critical (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The New Moral Argument for God Fares No Better.Evan Jack, Mustafa Khuramy & Erik Schulz - 2024 - Res Philosophica 101 (4):705-714.
    Recently, Andrew Ter Ern Loke has provided a new deductive formulation of the Moral Argument for the existence of God, which states that if one believes in moral realism (the metaethical view that there are objective moral truths), then they should also believe in theism. We demonstrate how his New Moral Argument does not guarantee the conclusion that objective moral truths are metaphysically grounded in a divine personal entity. Next, we reconstruct the argument in a way that is logically exhaustive. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Relaxed realism and normative belief: A functionalist account.Paiman Karimi - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
    I offer an account of normative belief designed specifically for relaxed realists. This proposal not only gives relaxed realists an explicitly robust account of normative belief but also distinguishes their theory from related theories, notably quasi-realist ones. In doing so, it addresses a dilemma raised in the literature against relaxed realist theories.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark