Bioethics has been subject to considerable social criticism in recent years. One criticism that has caused particular discomfort in the bioethics community is that bioethicists, because of the way their work is funded, are involved in profound conflicts of interest that undermine their title to be considered independent moral commentators on developments in biomedicine and biotechnology. This criticism draws its force from the assumption that bioethics is, or ought to be, a type of normative social criticism. Versions of this criticism (...) come from both the political left and right. For instance, such criticisms include allegations that bioethics is inherently socially conservative, that it is inherently “pro-technology”, that it lays spurious claims to moral and social authority and expertise, that its focus on autonomy links it to neoliberal theories of choice, and that it is an ideological mystification of real social relationships and political power. This commentary paper analyses the problem of bioethical conflict of interest, and argues that the types of conflict of interest facing bioethics are inherent to the role of “public intellectual” that bioethicists generally wish to assume. The paper defends this conception of the role of the bioethicist, arguing that bioethicists should be interested and openly so. (shrink)

In “A Conceptual Model for the Translation of Bioethics Research and Scholarship,” Debra Mathews et al. aim to “begin an important discussion” about how to measure success in bioethics, and in doing so they set out a typology of bioethics research and scholarship with the arguably correct assumption that we cannot evaluate success in bioethics without first understanding what its goals are. I think the authors are correct in their claim that, in the current academic climate, having work in bioethics (...) deemed a success is likely to hinge, in some way, on its being translated into practice and having impact. I want, however, to add a critical voice in the form of three considerations that I feel ought to be attended to before the work progresses further, the first being that the typology Mathews et al. propose is highly problematic. Although there is a burgeoning literature on “empirical bioethics” methodologies that blend empirical and conceptual work, the typology appears to ignore this. (shrink)