In this article I argue for rule-based, non-monotonic theories of common law judicial reasoning and improve upon one such theory offered by Horty and Bench-Capon. The improvements reveal some of the interconnections between formal theories of judicial reasoning and traditional issues within jurisprudence regarding the notions of the ratio decidendi and obiter dicta. Though I do not purport to resolve the long-standing jurisprudential issues here, it is beneficial for theorists both of legal philosophy and formalizing legal reasoning to see where (...) the two projects interact. (shrink)

En el presente artículo se analizan cinco modos de entender el ideal de completitud de los sistemas jurídicos, teniendo como punto de referencia las ideas de Carlos Alchourrón. En este trabajo se propone distinguir los criterios de identificación de los textos jurídicamente relevantes; los métodos o reglas que permiten pasar de un contenido C a un contenido C1, y los criterios de validez o pertenencia de normas al sistema. En la concepción predominante entre los teóricos del derecho, las reglas lógicas (...) sirven para justificar el paso de un contenido a otro, sin embargo, no se admiten como criterios de pertenencia de normas al sistema jurídico. Esto significa que el derecho no es concebido como un sistema deductivo y que un ideal de completitud absoluta es lógicamente posible. En el trabajo se llega a la conclusión de que hay sólo dos formas no banales de entender el ideal de completitud absoluta de los sistemas jurídicos. O bien, en un espíritu formalista, mediante la introducción de reglas residuales de clausura o bien, en un espíritu moralista, aceptando que la moral crítica funcione como criterio de pertenencia al derecho. This paper analyses five different ways of understanding completeness as an ideal of legal systems. In doing so it essentially relies on the thesis discussed by Carlos Alchourrón regarding this subject. The paper stresses the need to distinguish the criteria for the identification of the legally relevant texts, the methods or rules that justify the passage from a content C to another content C1 and, the criteria for the identification of valid norms belonging to the system. According to the dominant conception in legal theory, the rules of logic justify the passage from a content to another; such rules, however, are not accepted as membership criteria. This means that the notion of system that legal theorists use to organize the law is not the notion of a deductive system. In this conception the ideal of absolute completeness is a logically possible ideal. The conclusion reached in the article is that there are only two ways of understanding the ideal of "plenitude" or absolute completeness of a legal system: in a formalist view, through the introduction of residual rules of closure, or, in a moralistic view, by accepting critical morality as a criterium for legal validity. (shrink)

The phenomenon of defeasibility has long been a central theme in legal literature. This essay aims to shed new light on that phenomenon by clarifying some fundamental conceptual issues. First, the most widespread definition of legal defeasibility is examined and criticized. The essay shows that such a definition is poorly constructed, inaccurate and generates many problems. Indeed, the definition hides the close relationship between legal defeasibility and legal interpretation. Second, this essay argues that no new definition is needed. I will (...) show that from an interpretative standpoint, there is nothing special about legal defeasibility. Contrary to what some authors maintain, no unique or privileged source of legal defeasibility exists, nor are there privileged arguments to justify it. Specifically, legal defeasibility refers to interpretative outcomes deriving from interpretative arguments that, on the one hand, are very different from one another, and, on the other, are often employed to justify different interpretative outcomes. In the legal field, the problems related to defeasibility have little in common with the problems that this label covers in other areas—such as logic or epistemology—and they are nothing but the well-known problems related to legal interpretation. In conclusion, this paper argues that as far as legal argumentation is concerned, the notion of legal defeasibility lacks explanatory power, and it should be abandoned. (shrink)